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LEADERSHIP WORKBOOK

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BOOK ONE

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Engineer Officer Basic Course
Fort Belvoir, Virginia

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COMMAND DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF COMBINED ARMS
UNITED STATES ARMY ENGINEER SCHOOL
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060-5341

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THIS STUDENT WORKBOOK SUPERSEDES
ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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ADVANCE SHEET #1

AirLand Battle Leadership

I. SCOPE: Explain in clear unmistakable terms the Army's expectations of its officers and the standards for and responsibilities of a leader in the profession of arms.

II. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

TASK: Explain the Army's expectations and standards for its officers (FM 100-1, FM 22-100).

CONDITION: In a Classroom with a guest speaker and advance reading assignment.

STANDARD: Students will discuss and explain their roles as officers from the Army's standpoint.

III. Enabling Learning Objectives:

TASK : Emphasize the uniqueness of the profession of arms and the seriousness of the commissioning oath with the obligation it entails.

CONDITION: In a Classroom with a guest speaker.

STANDARD: Students will discuss and explain the meaning of their oath and the obligations they have to it.

TASK: Define leadership.

CONDITION: In a Classroom with a guest speaker.

STANDARD: Definition must include values, ethics, and standards; and how they relate to leadership.

TASK: Discuss a personal philosophy of leadership.

CONDITION: In a classroom environment a senior army officer discusses his philosphy of leadership.

STANDARD: The student will gain some of the guest speakers insight into leadership and the Army.

TASK: Define a leader in terms of the Be, Know, Do concept, and how that doctrine concept of leadership links with AirLand battle doctrine.

CONDITION: Classroom and advance reading assignment.

STANDARD: The student must describe a leader utilizing the Be, Know, Do concept, and obtain an understanding of the leadership AirLand battle doctrine linkage.

TASK: Provide a historical perspective of the profession of arms.

CONDITION: In a classroom with a guest speaker.

STANDARD: The student must make a comparison of leadership styles based on the comments of the guest speaker.

TASK: Introduce the officer to the leadership block of instruction.

CONDITION: Classroom.

STANDARD: The students will understand the major objectives for the remainder of the leadership instruction.

IV. INSTRUCTIONS:

1. READ: Chapter 4, FM 100-1, The Army.

2. Scan: Chapter 2, FM 22-100, Military Leadership.

2. BRING TO CLASS:

   a. FM 100-1, The Army.

   b. FM 22-100, Military Leadership

   c. Leadership Workbook.

3. OPTIONAL READINGS:

   a. "Hallmark of a Profession," Student Handout 1, enclosed.

   b. Chapter 1, DA Pam 600-2, The Armed Forces Officer.

   c. CPT Waskow Case Study, Student Handout 3.

STUDENT HANDOUT 1

HALLMARKS OF A PROFESSION

By JOHN MARSTON

There are more professions today than ever before--and more on the way! Just as brand names have become necessary to distinguish merchandise in an affluent economy, so descriptive labels for complex, largely intangible human services are also necessary. We are constantly obliged to trust people to perform for us services which we cannot truly evaluate.

Writing in the PUBLIC RELATIONS JOURNAL in 1958, Charles P. Rockwood, public relations director of The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, noted that historic professions included law, medicine, clergy, teaching, and military leadership. To these, in recent times, Mr. Rockwood noted, have been added accounting,architecture, and engineering.

Ten years later the list is even longer as new developments in science, in communications, in political organization, and in social organization cause the roll of specialists who claim professionalism to grow.

What is a profession? Is a profession only a specialty or do other elements justify the honor and rewards which frequently accompany professionalism? A list of characteristics to distinguish professions from merely skilled occupations must include at least most of the following:

1. A defined area of competence. A "professor" is one who professes to know much about a specific subject and is not a jack-of-all-trades. The doctor does not claim to be a legal expert nor a certified public accountant to be an architect any more than any other layman would.

In time, as various new areas of competence arise, they too assume the characteristics of professionals. In a new field, such as public relations, clearly drawing the lines is sometimes a problem. Incompetence in a profession is a species of fraud upon those who pay for professional services and has been so regarded by the courts.

2. An organized body of knowledge of some consequence. A profession renders an intangible service which is distinguished by the knowledge required to perform it and the zeal of its practitioners in behalf of their clients. A lawyer, for example, knows the laws and is active in his client's behalf; a general is knowledgeable in the nature of warfare and gives his best efforts to his country. If an organized body of knowledge is so trivial that an amateur can master it in six weeks of home study, the occupation can scarcely call itself a profession.

A body of knowledge resides primarily in a literature of principles and cases, a formal educational process through which those who know

more assist those who know less, and often a period of apprenticeship such as that in medicine, law or teaching.

3. Self-consciousness. Professional practitioners have a common bond leading to professional organizations with strong local units and an active life of their own. Professionals realize who they are.

4. Competence of entrants. Such measurement is accomplished in a profession by accepting evidence of educational achievement, by voluntary certification based upon examination or by regulation and licensing based upon examinations and experience, backed by the laws of the state. Those who are not competent should be discouraged or prevented from entering or continuing in the field.

5. Continuing education. Practitioners exchange information and update their knowledge through journals and meetings. Sharing information is a characteristic of professions; hidden methods and trade secrets are considered unprofessional. In order to continue to be competent, the professional must continue to grow. His own accumulation of experience and formal study assist in his growth.

6. Support of research. Interest in expanding knowledge in the field is also characteristic of professions. As knowledge in the field increases, so does the competence of individual practitioners.

7. Aid in the education of competent replacements. A profession shows its interest in the public welfare and also serves the interest of practitioners by aiding the education of aspirants and by preventing the entry of untrained people who would bring discredit upon the whole profession and injure all of its members.

8. Independence. A professional person's assets are in his head rather than in his tools or in his being a part of some larger chain-of-command organization. The doctor is sought for what he knows about curing disease, the lawyer for his knowledge of laws, and the teacher for his skill in showing others how to learn. Professionals often work for a salary in a hospital, corporation or school--but if the circumstances are favorable, a professional can also practice independently of any supporting organization.

A professional as a staff member does not blindly take or give orders. His decisions are based on knowledge and solicitude for his client's or employer's success. He should not temper his professional opinions to suit his client's desires or demands, nor allow his independence or judgment to be swayed (or to seem to be swayed) by conflicting interests.

Why is a skilled occupation such as plumbing or plastering not considered a profession? Does a plumber not have self-consciousness (especially as expressed in a union), a defined area of competence, a body of knowledge, and apprentice program and self-employment? Is not his work essential to the public welfare? The answer is, of course, "yes" but the difference seems to be that the plumber performs primarily

a physical task, the results of which are subject to judgment by intelligent laymen. The complete professional largely performs intangible mental tasks which are beyond easy evaluation by laymen.

Professions, of course, often contain elements of skill (a surgeon, for example), but professions also involve a greater degree of decision-making on how a skill should be used. The professionalism of the physician lies not only in the skill of his fingers, but also in the ability of his mind to diagnose and prescribe the best courses of action. His ability in diagnosis and prescription are not easily judged by the layman, who cannot be equally informed.

If the plumber, for example, plans large, complicated water and sewerage systems, his work becomes that of an engineer and he enters the ranks of professionalism. The boundary between skill and professionalism is not entirely rigid and, as technical progress increases the ranks of professions or quasi-professions, it will become a more complicated question. The difference seems to lie in (1) the extent of knowledge required and (2) the intangibility of the service which makes judgment by laymen difficult or impossible. The inability of laymen to judge the performance of a professional creates the need for professional ethics.

PUBLIC OBLIGATIONS

At the very minimum, the practice of a profession must not be harmful to the public welfare and, indeed, it should serve a public need. The public, for example, requires justice for protection and peace, so lawyers are needed to help a court dispense justice. The public needs health, which leads to practice of medicine. The need for housing results in architects; the need for airplanes or highways in engineers; and the need for knowledge in teachers.

Social surroundings are necessary to bring forth professionals to fill these needs. Without a lawful society there is no value in the ability of a lawyer as an advocate. Without freedom of communications there is no need for the public relations man or journalist or advertising man. Whatever diminishes the law diminishes the lawyer and elevates the gunman; whatever restricts freedom of communication diminishes the value of the public relations practitioner or journalist or advertising man.

In its own interests, and those of society, a profession must see that the public knows the purposes that it serves and the qualifications of its practitioners. To accept badges such as M.D., CPA, A.J.A., or Ph.D. as valid currency, the public must first know what they mean.

In turn, the public has a right to expect professionals to give public service beyond that of other people. A lawyer is obligated to aid the law and a journalist to promote free and honest communication. Professional men must give their time and energy beyond immediate personal gain; they cannot quit work when the whistle blows, free of all cares. Professionalism demands duties in connection with the profession as well as the common obligations of citizenship.

ETHICAL CODE

A man who sells material things can be judged by the volume or quality of the objects he produces, but a professional man who supplies intangible services is not so easily evaluated. "Caveat emptor" cannot apply. His own ethical standards and those of his group must be relied upon to protect his clients and the public. The freedom of clients to choose professional advisers, and of professional men to accept or reject clients, established a special relationship between them.

"A code of professional ethics is a voluntary assumption of self-discipline above and beyond the requirements of the law," according to Ethical Standards of the Accounting Profession, written in 1966 by John L. Carey and William O. Daugherty. "A code is intended to be enforceable . . . at a higher level than the law . . . at a lower level than the ideal . . . a practical working tool . . . The public expects three things from anyone who holds himself out as a qualified member of a recognized profession--competence, responsibility and a desire to serve the public . . ."

1. Obligation to clients. A professional man is obliged to work loyally for the best interests of his client and not to serve competing interests secretly or to accept recompense from hidden sources (such as subcontractors or suppliers), in effect serving two masters. He is obligated to put forth his best effort on behalf of his client regardless of the size of his fee.

A professional cannot curry favor by being a yes man and still be true to his professional knowledge or to his client. As a staff advisor, a professional man is expected to give his best advice although he does not have the power of ultimate decision. A professional wholly employed by an organization, such as a corporation attorney or a company doctor, is sometimes required to handle all cases given to him as a part of his employment or to resign his post. If a legal case, for example,is false or harmful to the public welfare, a lawyer's alternatives are to discourage his employer from his course or to resign, admittedly a hard choice.

It is not professional for a doctor to receive renumeration from patients for the sale of surgical instruments or medicines which he himself prescribes, or for an engineer to have a financial interest in a subcontractor or produce which he recommends.

Free communication between professional men and their clients is necessary for competent professional advice and should not be disclosed to others without the client's consent. The law recognizes this confidential relationship between a lawyer and his client, and a court cannot force the lawyer to disclose what his client has said. The priest is likewise protected by law, but the physician not so much and the journalist hardly at all. In any case it is the duty of the professional man to be discreet at all times--not to gossip about his client's affairs or to betray his client by disclosing private knowledge.

A special problem, similar to that of other fully hired professionals, arises in the instance of the teacher. To whom does the teacher's loyalty belong? To the client (student) or to the employer (state)? Carl F Taeusch, writing in 1926, said: "If teaching is a profession then the pupil is the client and professionalism requires that treatment of the client be for his own best interests."* But the client in this case is a minor, so who is to judge his "best interest"? The student? His parents? The teacher? Or a school board?

In any event, a professional is expected to be "solicitous" for his client, anxious or concerned about his welfare beyond the limits of his contract and attempting to help him in every possible way.

2. Obligation to others in the profession. Professions are judged as individuals, but their individual fortunes rise and fall with the reputation of the group of which they are members. Each, therefore, has a personal responsibility to the group.

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* Professional and Business Ethics, Carl F. Taeusch, State University of IOWA, 1926.

Obligations to other professionals include not stealing their clients by derogatory statements or undue cost-cutting, not making exaggerated claims, often not advertising at all in the formal sense, and, usually, avoidance of fee structures contingent upon promised results. A professional is expected to do his best regardless of the outcome and to be so rewarded.

A professional should encourage public support of professionals in areas where it is important, as, for instance, the selection of qualified engineers for highway posts, doctors for health commissioners, or lawyers for judges.

PROFESSIONAL CODES

Setting fees involves both professional and client relationships and occupies a large part of many professional codes.

A professional man's fee should take into consideration the cost of his education and his lower earnings getting started in the field.

Professional people should be paid for simply being available if needed, such as a small town doctor who might not find 100 per cent of his time occupied. In some cases--lawyers or public relations men, for example--being available is formalized by a fixed retainer fee.

A professional man often imparts knowledge to his clients so they will be able to continue the service on their own. He thus may have "first-time only" clients and is justified in charging a fee for giving his knowledge away--permanently, as it were.

Finally, professional men usually engage in self-policing through their professional associations. If they do not discourage or bar incompetent, lazy, or fraudulent members, public confidence will fall, all will be injured, and public laws will probably take a hand if the public injury is sufficiently severe.

3. Obligation to society. Professionals should not operate in a way that harms the society which provides the social structure making their activity possible. A lawyer, for instance, should not take a case which he believes has no merit and which is mainly intended to harass or injure the opposing party or to work oppression or wrong. In fact, his obligation is to urge conciliation and bring about peace to lessen the burden of disputation upon society. A lawyer is an officer of the court and the court, acting for society, can exclude him from practice.

Corrupting the channels of public communication is condemned in the code of the Public Relations Society of America in the same way that corrupting a judge or a juror or witness would be condemned in a lawyer.

Disguising sources of information to the public is also forbidden. "A member shall not make use of any organization purporting to serve some announced cause but actually serving an undisclosed special or private interest of a member or his client or his employer," says the PRSA Code.

Many professions are "suicidal" in that their goals, if achieved, would mean the end of the occupations of their members. Dentists, for example, would not be needed if all patients had perfect, enduring teeth; without crimes or disputes there would be little work for lawyers; excellent public health would lessen the need for doctors. Yet good dentists continue to promote better dental health, lawyers fight crime and doctors urge sanitation. In fact, as improvements are made new needs come to light, so the efforts of professionals for the improvement of society is usually rewarded by more work rather than less.

LICENSING

Directly or indirectly, professionals are licensed by society to practice for its benefit as well as their own and that of their clients. If professional activity becomes harmful to society, professionals may be replaced or prevented from practice.

Society, however, demands that professionals do more than serve their clients loyally and cooperate with their brothers-in-arms. Modern society expects a professional to avoid practices which injure the public welfare and, even more, to make a positive contribution to the common good--and society must constantly be shown that this is being done.

STUDENT HANDOUT 2

SUMMARY SHEET

OUTLINE OF "HALLMARKS OF A PROFESSION"

CHARACTERISTICS OF A PROFESSION:

1. A defined area of competence.
2. An organized body of knowledge of some consequence.
3. Self-consciousness.
4. Competence of entrants.
5. Continuing education.
6. Support of research.
7. Aid in the education of competent replacements.
8. Independence.
9. General considerations:
   a. A professional does not blindly take or give orders.
   b. A professional's decisions are based on knowledge.
   c. The complete professional largely performs intangible mental tasks which are beyond easy evaluation by laymen.
   d. Professions often contain a skill but professions also involve a greater degree of decision making on how a skill is used.

PUBLIC OBLIGATIONS:

1. The practice of a profession must not be harmful to the public welfare and indeed, it should serve a public need.

2. In its own interests and those of society, a profession must see that the public knows the purposes that it serves and the qualifications of its practitioners.

3. The public has a right to expect professionals to give public service beyond that of other people.

4. Professionals must give their time and energy beyond immediate personal gain; they cannot quit work when the whistle blows, free of all cares.

HANDOUT 1-2 Summary Sheet

ETHICAL CODE:

1. A professional's own ethical standards and those of his group must be relied upon to protect his clients and the public.

2. A professional's code is a voluntary assumption of self-discipline above and beyond the requirements of the law.

3. A code is intended to be enforceable . . . at a higher level than the law . . . at a lower level than the ideal.

4. The public expects three things from anyone who holds himself out as a qualified member of a recognized profession--competence, responsibility, and a desire to serve the public.

5. A professional cannot curry favor by being a "yes" man and still be true to his professional knowledge or to his client.

6. A professional's individual fortune rises and falls with the reputation of the group of which he is a member. Each, therefore, has a personal responsibility to the group.

7. Professionals usually engage in self-policing through their professional associations. If they do not discourage or bar incompetent, lazy, or fraudulent members, public confidence will fall, all will be injured, and public laws will probably take a hand if the public injury is sufficiently severe.

8. Society, however, demands that professionals do more then serve their clients loyally and cooperate with their brothers-in-arms. Modern society expects a professional to avoid practices which injure the public welfare and, even more, to make a positive contribution to the common good--and society must constantly be shown that this is being done.

STUDENT HANDOUT 3
CPT Waskow
CASE STUDY

Captain Waskow was a company commander in the Thirty-sixth Division. He had led his company since long before it left the States. He was very young, only in his middle twenties, but he carried in him a sincerity and a gentleness that made people want to be guided by him.

"After my father, he came next," a sergeant told me.

"He always looked after us," a soldier said. "He'd go to bat for us every time."

"I've never knowed him to do anyting unfair," another said.

I was at the foot of the mule trail the night they brought Captain Waskow down. The moon was nearly full, and you could see far up the trail, and even partway across the valley below.

Dead men had been coming down the mountain all evening, lashed onto the backs of mules. They came lying belly-down across the wooden pack-saddles, their heads hanging down on one side, their stiffened legs sticking out awkwardly form the other, bobbing up and down as the mules walked.

The Italian mule skinners were afraid to walk beside dead men, so Americans had to lead the mules down that night. Even the Americans were reluctant to unlash and lift off the bodies when they got to the bottom, so an officer had to do it himself and ask others to help.

I don't know who that first one was. You feel small in the presence of dead men, and you don't ask silly questions.

They slid him down from the mule, and stood him on his feet for a moment. In the half-light he might have been merely a sick man standing there leaning on the others. Then they laid him on the ground in the shadow of the low stone wall beside the road. We left him there beside the road, that first one, and we all went back into the cowshed and sat on water cans or lay on the straw, waiting for the next batch of mules.

Somebody said the dead soldier had been dead for four days, and then nobody said anything more about it. We talked soldier talk for an hour or more; the dead man lay all alone, outside in the shadow of the wall.

Then a soldier came into the cowshed and said there were some more bodies outside. We went out into the road. Four mules stood there in the moonlight, in the road where the trail came down off the mountain. The soldiers who led them stood there waiting.

"This one is Captain Waskow," one of them said quietly.

Two men unlashed his body from the mule and lifted it off and laid it in the shadow beside the stone wall. Other men took the other bodies off. Finally, there were five lying end to end in a long row. You don't cover up dead men in the combat zones. They just lie there in the shadows until somebody comes after them.

The unburdened mules moved off to their olive grove. The men in the road seemed reluctant to leave. They stood around, and gradually I could sense them moving, one by one, close to Captain Waskow's body. Not so much to look, I think, as to say something in finality to him, and to themselves. I stood close by and I could hear.

One soldier came and looked down, and he said out loud, "God damn it!"

That's all he said, and then he walked away.

Another one came, and he said, "God damn it to hell anyway!" He looked down for a few last moments and then turned and left.

Another man came. I think he was an officer. It was hard to tell officers from men in the dim light, for everybody was bearded and grimy. The man looked down into the dead captain's face and then spoke directly to him, as through he were alive, "I'm sorry, old man."

Then a soldier came and stood beside the officer and bent over, and he too spoke to his dead captain, not in a whisper but awfully tenderly, and he said, "I sure am sorry, sir."

Then the first man squatted down, and he reached down and took the captain's hand, and he sat there for a full five minutes holding the dead hand in his own and looking intently into the dead face. And he never uttered a sound all the time he sat there.

Finally he put the hand down. He reached over and gently straightened the points of the captain's shirt collar, and then he sort of rearranged the tattered edges of the uniform around the wound, and then he got up and walked away down the road in the moonlight, all alone.

The rest of us went back into the cowshed, leaving the five dead men lying in a line, end to end, in the shadow of the low stone wall. We lay down on the straw in the cowshed, and pretty soon we were all asleep.

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Brave Men, by Ernie Pyle, 1944

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ADVANCE SHEET #2

Group Dynamics

I. SCOPE: Recognize the basic dynamics of small group interaction.

II. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

TASK: Identify and demonstrate a working knowledge of basic group dynamics.

CONDITION: A classroom, information provided by an instructor, and student participation.

STANDARD: Student will:
a. define what a group is.
b. discuss content and process as two basic levels of group interaction

III. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

TASK: Define and discuss what a group is.

CONDITION: A classroom, information provided by an instructor, and student information.

STANDARD: Students will participate in a small group exercise to define what a group is.

TASK: Identify and discuss two basic levels of group interaction.

CONDITION: A classroom, information provided by an instructor, and student discussion.

STANDARD: Students will discuss content and process as two basic levels of group interaction.

TASK : Recognize the basic dynamics of small group interaction.

CONDITION: Classroom, student/instructor interaction.

STANDARD: The students will form and participate in small groups.

IV. INSTRUCTIONS:

1. READ:

a. Handout 1, "Characteristics of a Fully-developed and Mature Group," enclosed.
b. Handout 2, "Group Roles," enclosed.

2. BRING TO CLASS:

   a. Leadership Workbook.

   b. FM 22-100, Military Leadership.

3. OPTIONAL READING: Student Handout 3, "Group Nature".

STUDENT HANDOUT 1

GROUP DYNAMICS

CHARACTERISTICS OF A FULLY DEVELOPED AND MATURE GROUP

1. A mature group has a clear understanding of its purposes or goals.

2. A mature group is able to look ahead and plan ahead.

3. A mature group is able to initiate and carry on effective, logical problem solving.

4. A mature group has achieved an appropriate balance between established ways of working together and readiness to change its procedural patterns.

5. A mature group provides for the diffusion and sharing of leadership responsibilities.

6. A mature group has a high degree of cohesiveness or solidarity, but not to the point of exclusiveness or to the point of stifling individuality.

7. A mature group makes intelligent use of the differing abilities of its members.

8. A mature group provides an atmosphere of psychological freedom for the expression of all feelings and points of view.

9. A mature group is not over-dominated by its leader or by any of its members.

10. A mature group has achieved a healthy balance between cooperation and competitive behavior on the part of its members.

11. A mature group strikes an appropriate balance between emotionality and rationality.

12. A mature group can readily change and adapt itself to the needs of differing situations.

13. A mature group recognizes the value and the limitations of democratic procedures.

14. A mature group has achieved a high degree of effective intercommunication among its members.*

*Source unknown

STUDENT HANDOUT 2

GROUP DYNAMICS

GROUP ROLES

1. Initiator- Proposing tasks, goals, or actions; defining the problem or suggesting a procedure.

2. Information Giver- Offering facts; giving expression of feelings; giving an opinion.

3. Information Seeker- Asking for opinions, facts, feelings, or clarification.

4. Coordinator/Summarizer- Pulling together related ideas; restating suggestions; offering a decision or conclusion for group consideration.

5. Reality Tester- Making a critical analysis of an idea; testing an idea against some data; trying to see if the idea will work.

6. Harmonizer- Attempting to reconcile disagreements; reducing tension; getting people to explore differences.

7. Gate Keeper- Helping others to participate; keeping communications open; facilitating the participation of others.

8. Consensus Tester- Asking if a group is nearing a decision; sending up a trial balloon to test a possible conclusion.

9. Encourager- Being friendly, warm and responsive to others and indicating interest in their contribution.

10. Compromiser- When his/her own idea or status is involved in a conflict offering a compromise which yields status; modifying in the interest in their contribution.

11. Aggressor - Deflating other's status; attacking the group or its values; joking in a "barbed" way.

12. Blocker- Disagreeing and opposing beyond reason; resisting stubbornly the group's wishes for personally oriented reasons.

13. Dominator- Asserting authority or superiority to manipulate the group or certain members; interrupting contributions of others; controlling.

14. Withdrawer/Disrupter- Making a display of nonlistening disinterested behavior; abandoning the group while remaining physically present; seeking recognition in ways not relevant to the group task.

15. Self-Interester- Using the group as a vehicle for special interest or purpose; cloaking one's personal biases in a stereotype which fits his/her individual needs.*

*Group Development Through Participation Training by John McKinley, Paulist Press, New York; 1978.

STUDENT HANDOUT 3

Group Nature

In the same way that knowledge of individual nature becomes the key to building strength within the group, an understanding of crowd nature is essential to the conservation of the unique powers within the individual, particularly under conditions of extreme pressure.

Whereas the central object of barracks discipline is to raise a safeguard against any military body reverting to crowd form under trial by fire, history shows that paralysis both of leadership and of the ranks, obliviousness to orders, forgetfulness of means of communication, disintegration, and even panic are the not uncommon reactions of military forces when first entering into battle.

Furthermore, when afield and under the stress of war, if aware that their effort and sacrifice is little valued and even derided by major elements on the home front, they can become unruly and nigh mutinous. This is not because Americans are hypersensitive: military bodies, the world over, react in much the same way to the indifference, hostility and turbulence within the society. From Bunker Hill and Brandywine, down to the withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter and the closeout of force in South Vietnam, the American record shows that our troops are susceptible to these ill effects. Therefore our peacetime training needs to be reappraised with a critical eye to the main issue.

Any of these unsteady reactions can be minimized, if not prevented, by training that anticipates the inevitable disorders of campaigning--including those of a material sort as well as the disorders of the mind--and acclimates men to the realities of the field in war. All may be averted or minimized if leadership is braced to the shock and prepared to exercise strong control. Indeed, it is a truth worthy of the closest regard that the greater number of the disarrangements that take place during combat are due to leadership feeling a tightening of the throat and a sticking of the palate and failing to do what the intellect says should be done.

To take any action, when even to think of action is itself difficult, is the essential step toward recovery and the surmounting of all difficulty. It is not because of a babel of mixed voices and commands that military bodies not infrequently relapse into helplessness and stagnation in the face of the enemy. From that cause there may occur occasional minor dislocation. Their damaging consequence is trivial compared to the failures that come of leadership, at varying levels, not acting promptly to exercise authority when nothing else can resolve the situation. Among the commonest of experiences in war is to witness troops doing nothing, or worse, doing the wrong thing, without

circumstance, any man who has the nerve and presence to step forward and give them an intelligent order in a manner indicating that he expects to be obeyed, will be accepted as a leader and will be given their support.

For this reason, under the conditions of modern battle, the coherence of any military body comes not only of men being articulate all down the line but of building up the dynamic power in each individual. It is a thoroughly sound exercise in any unit to give every man a chance to take charge and give orders in drill or other limited exercises, once he has learned what the orders mean. By the same token, it is good practice for the junior leader to displace a private in a training exercise and become commanded for a time, to sharpen his own perspective.

Progress comes of making the most of our strengths rather than looking for ways to repair weaknesses. This is true in things both large and small. The platoon leader who permits himself to be bedeviled by the man who won't or can't keep step cannot do justice to the ambitions of the 10 strongest men beneath him, upon whom the life of the formation would depend, come an emergency. To nourish and encourage the top, rather than to concentrate effort and exhaust nerves in trying to correct the few least likely prospects, is the healthy way of growth within military organization.

Not all men are fitted by nature for the precisions of life in a barracks. They may accept its discipline while not being able to adjust to its rhythm. The normal temptation to despair of them needs to be resisted if only for the reason that experience has proved they sometimes make the best men in combat. There are many types that fit into this category--the foreigner but recently arrived in America, the miner who has spent most of his years underground, the boy from the sticks who has known only the plough and furrow, the woodsman, the reservation Indian, and the individuals of all races who have had hard taskmasters or other misfortune in their civilian sphere, and expect to be hurt again. It is not unusual for this kind of material to show badly in training because of an ingrained fear of other men. At the same time, they can face mortal danger. To harass the man who is trying but can't quite do it therefore cuts doubly against the strength of organization. It may ruin the man; it may also give his comrades the feeling that he isn't getting a fair break.

The military crowd requires, above all, maturity of judgment in its leaders. It cannot be patronized safely. Nor can it be treated in the classroom manner as if wisdom were being dispensed to schoolboys. When it has been remiss, it expects to catch unshirted hell for its failngs, and though it may smart under a just bawling out, it will feel let down if the commander quibbles. But any officer puts himself on a skid and impairs the strength of his unit if he takes to task all hands because of the willful failings of a few. Strength comes to men when they feel that they are grown up and as a body are in control and under control, since it amounts to the same thing; it is only when men unite toward a common purpose that control becomes possible. In this respect, the servant is in fact the master of the situation, fully realizes it, and is not unprepared to accept proportionate responsibility.

It is a sign of a good level of discipline in a command when orders are given and faithfully carried out. But it is a sign of a vastly superior condition when the people are prepared to demand those orders they know the situation requires, if the unit is to be helped. No competent subordinate sits around waiting for someone else to give impulse to movement if his senses tell him that things are going wrong. He either suggests a course of action to his superior, or asks authority to execute it on his own, or in the more desperate circumstances of the battlefield he gives orders on his own initiative. To counsel any lesser theory of individual responsibility than this would leave every chain of command at the complete mercy of its weakest link, and throughout the general establishment would be denied the inspiration that comes of the upward thrust of energy and ideas.

This latter characteristic in the people composing any organization is the final statement of moral responsibility for success. Within military forces, an element of command is owned by every man who is doing his duty with intelligence and imagination. That puts him on the side of the angels, and the pressure he exerts is felt not only by his subordinates but by those topside who are doing less. Many a lazy skipper has snapped out of it and at last begun to level with his organization because he felt the hot breath of a few earnest subordinates on his neck. Many a battle unit has held to ground it had been ready to forsake because of the example of an aid man who stayed at his work and refused to forsake the wounded. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was thinking of these things when he said during World War II: "There is among the mass of individuals who carry rifles in war a great amount of ingenuity and efficiency. If men can talk naturally to their officers, the product of their resourcefulness becomes available to all." But the art of open communication requires both receiving and sending, and the besetting problem is to get officers to talk naturally to men.

In the seventeenth century Marshal Maurice de Saxe rediscovered cadenced marching which, along with the hard-surfaced roads of France, had remained buried since the time of the Romans. He reinstituted precision marching and drill within military bodies, and by that action changed European armies from straggling mobs into disciplined troops. The effects of that reform have been felt right down to the present. Baron von Steuben, the great reorganizer of the forces in George Washington's Army, simply built upon the principles de Saxe had set forth one century earlier. These two great architects of military organization founded their separate systems upon one controlling idea--that if men can be trained to think about moving together they can then be led to move toward thinking together. De Saxe wanted keen men, not automatons; in that, he was singular among the captains of his day. He started the numbering of regiments so that they would have a continuing history and thereby benefit from esprit de corps. He was the first to see the great importance of battle colors and to standardize their use. Of his own military opinions he wrote: "Experts should not be offended by the assurance with which I deliver my opinions. They should correct them; that is the fruit I expect from my work."

Now to take a look at von Steuben. He was the the drillmaster of the American Revolution, but he was also its greatest student of the human mind and heart. He wrote the drill regulations of the Army and, as he wrote, committed them to memory. Of his labors he said: "I dictated my dispositions in the night; in the day I had them performed." But he learned the nature of the human material for which he believed these exercises were suited by visiting the huts of the half-clad soldiers of Valley Forge, personally inspecting their neglected weapons and hearing from their own lips of their sufferings. His main technique in installing his system was to depend upon the appeal of a powerful example; to remove all doubt of exactly what was wanted, he formed a model company and drilled it himself. He was a natural man; troops warmed to him because of an unabashed use of broken English and his violently explosive use, under stress, of "gottam!" which was his only quasi-English oath. In countenance he was strikingly like General George S. Patton and there were other points of resemblance. A private soldier at Valley Forge was impressed with "the trappings of his pistols, the enormous holsters of his pistols, his large size, his strikingly martial aspects." But while he liked to dine with great men at his table, he chose to complete his list with officers of inferior rank. Once at Valley Forge he permitted his aides to give a dinner for junior officers on condition that none should be admitted that had on a whole pair of breeches. This making the most of adversity. While wearing two stars and serving as Inspector General of the Army, he would still devote his whole day to drilling a squad of 10 to 12 men to get his system going. To a former Prussian associate he wrote this to Americans: "You say to your soldier, Do this!' and they doeth it; but I am obliged to say, This is the reason that you ought to do that' and then he does it."

This was the key to the phenomenal success of his system.

Within six weeks after he began work at Valley Forge, the Continental Army was on a new footing of self-confidence. His personal diligence in inquiring into the conduct of all officers toward their men, and his zeal in checking the accoutrement and carriage of every soldier established within the Army its first standard of inspection. Officers began to divide their scant rations with their men so that they would perform better. But though he drilled the men of Valley Forge in marching and maneuver, Steuben paid no attention to the manual of arms; he let that wait until after he had gone into battle with these forces. He explained why: "Every colonel had introduced a system of his own and those who had taken the greatest pains were naturally the most attached to their work. Had I destroyed their productions, they would have detested me. I therefore preferred to pay no special attention to this subject until I had won their confidence." To take hold at the essential point and postpone action on the relatively unimportant, to respect pride and natural dignity in others, and, finally to demonstrate that there is a better way to win loyalty and to use loyalty as the portal to more constructive collective enterprise-all of these morals shine in this one object lesson. The most revealing light upon the character of Steuben is shed by the episode in which he had one Lieutenant Gibbons arrested for an offense, which he later learned another person had committed. He then went before the regiment. It was

raining hard, but he bared his head and asked Gibbons to come forward. "Sir," he said, "the fault which was committed might, in the presence of an enemy, have been fatal. Your Colonel tells me you are blameless. I ask your pardon. Return to your command."

Mistakes will occur. Tempers will go off half-cocked even among men of good disposition. Action will be taken on impulse rather than full information, despite every warning about its danger. But no officer doing serious injustice to a subordinate can afford to make less amends than Steuben did, if he wants to retain respect. Admiral Halsey wrote about how he had once relieved one of his captains in battle, found months later that he had misjudged him, and then tried by every means within his power to make redress.

The main connecting link between the perfecting of group action in training and the end product of unity and economy of operations in battle has never been succinctly expressed even by such masters as de Saxe and von Steuben, though they felt it by profound instinct. The time-honored explanation is that when men accustom themselves to obeying orders, the time ultimately arrives when they will obey by habit, and that the habit will carry over into any set of circumstances requiring response to orders. This has the quality of relative truth; it is true so far as it goes, but it undersells the major values.

The heterogeneous crowd is swayed by the voice of instinct. Properly trained, any military unit, being a homogeneous body, should be swayed by the voice of training. Out of uniformity of environment comes uniformity of character and spirit. From moving and acting together men grow to depend upon and to support each other, and to subordinate their individuals wills to the will of the leader. And if that were all that training profited them, they would rarely win a battle or a skirmish under modern conditions!

Reprinted from Chapter 10, DA Pam 600-2 The Armed Forces Officer.

COMMAND DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF COMBINED ARMS
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ADVANCE SHEET #3

The Leader as a Teacher

I. SCOPE: Know the roles and importance of the leader as a teacher.

II. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

TASK: Demonstrate an understanding of the leader's role as teacher.

CONDITIONS: Classroom, advance sheet, and reading notes.

STANDARDS: The student will:

a. Explain the leader's teaching roles and responsibilities.

b. Define role modeling.

c. Discuss the relationship between teaching and role modeling.

d. Discuss teaching as a continuous activity.

e. Discuss the importance of positive and negative reinforcement teaching subordinates.

III. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

TASK : Recognize competent teaching behavior.

CONDITIONS:

a. Given a vignette, case study, or film showing leaders interacting with subordinates and soldiers.

b. Given a list of leader behaviors which describe a competent teacher.

STANDARD: The student will recognize the following leader-teacher competencies and their supporting behaviors.

a. Demonstrates concern for efficiency and effectiveness.

b. Advises and Counsels

c. Demonstrates training skills.

d. Manages and controls.

e. Demonstrates a skillful use of influence.

TASK : Explain the similarities and relationships between teaching and counseling.

CONDITIONS: Classroom and reading notes.

STANDARDS: The student will:

a. Discuss teaching as a continuous activity to improve soldier and unit performance.

b. Discuss the need for planning, feedback, and reinforcement in both counseling and teaching.

IV. INSTRUCTIONS:

1. READ:

a. Student Handout 1, "The Leader Teacher," (page 3-4).

b. Student Handout 2, "Sergeant Wiley Fox," (page 3-7).

2. BRING TO CLASS:

a. Leadership Workbook.

b. FM 22-100, Military Leadership.

3. OPTIONAL READING:

a. "How to Develop Soldiers," Student Handout 3, enclosed.

b. "Peer Instruction," Student Handout 4, enclosed.

STUDENT HANDOUT 1

THE LEADER-TEACHER

1. READING ASSIGNMENT.

a. Introduction. At a recent conference of leadership experts, former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mayer, said that Army leaders must be taught how to function as leader-teachers rather than as leader-mangers. "Their primary role must be that of a leader-teacher rather than a leader manager." The Chief of Staff clearly indicated that the primary responsibility of a leader, regardless of his or her rank or position, is to be a teacher to those under and around him or her. This is perhaps another way of saying that the leader is a servant to those whom he serves, a servant in a sense that he fulfills their needs and seeks their welfare, their advancement and their professional, mental and ethical development. A paramount need of both the unit and those who make up the unit is a depth of leadership so that the unit can function when the leader is not there or becomes a casualty. This depth comes only from teaching and developing one's subordinates. The article "Peer Instruction" at the end of this section recounts the necessity for leaders at all levels to train and teach other leaders. This lesson will discuss the leader's role as a teacher.

b. The Leader as a Teacher.

(1) Because you are a leader, your subordinates will be looking at you and observing your actions and behavior. People believe - they believe what you do, not what you say. While they may hear the words you will say, they will be carefully measuring your actions against these words to see if they match--to see if your words and actions are consistent. People learn behavior and values through their eyes. You will teach your subordinates your values and standards through your daily actions. You will demonstrate your assumptions about them and yourself and your commitment to them and the unit to which you are assigned. They will see your standards for their behavior and your expectations for their behavior. In short, they are looking at the way you conduct yourself in your leader role so they may know how to act and pattern their behavior. As a leader you are a role model and a teacher, and the proverb, "Your actions speak louder than words", is absolutely true. Remember we judge ourselves by our intentions, we judge others by their behavior. What applies to us will apply to our soldiers.

(2) One of the purposes of this lesson is to make you acutely aware of your responsibilities as a teacher both in terms of teaching through example as a role model and by atucally instructing your subordinates in a way that imparts the standards, attitudes, values, skills and knowledge which improve their professional competence and the unit's effectiveness. As leader given the responsibility for a group of soldiers, you are responsible for the developement of their professional knowledge, their career development and their tactical and technical skills.

Their welfare and advancement depend on this development. The unit also depends on this development to provide the depth of leadership, competency, cohesion and trust that are essential to survive in battle. Leading, teaching and training go hand in hand. Soldiers who know they have or are being trained and developed by their leaders also know their leaders care for them. But, subordinate training cannot be done in a haphazard manner. It must be planned, conscientiously pursued and be continuously reinforced and practiced by leader-teachers. Being a teacher must become part of your nature. There are a set of indentifiable behaviors which identify the competent teacher. These are identified in the leader-teacher lesson.

(3) There is another aspect of teaching which relates to the character of the American soldier and must be understood by every leader. General Fredrick von Stuben, the Army's first drill instructor and Inspector General, made the following observations about the American soldier in 1776. He said, "When I tell a Prussian soldier to do something, he does it because I tell him. However, with American soldiers, I must first tell them why they should do it, and then they will do it." The American soldier wants to know why. This characteristic springs from the Judeo-Christian concept of the uniqueness and sacredness of the individual and the American idea of individual rights. This is based on a value that says, "I am unique and worthwhile, I am deserving of respect and consideration and, therefore, my actions should lead to some worthwhile goal." If we place ourselves in that same position, we can see that's not a bad idea at all. So part of your responsibilities as teachers is not only to instruct what to do but why we do it. Telling why we do things is important. Understanding "why" builds trust and confidence so that when the time comes to give orders quickly and there is not time to explain why, our soldiers will have the confidence in us as leaders to know that what we're saying is important and there is a reason for it. This complements the time we spend teaching how to do things. Teaching "how to" builds the soldier's confidence in himself while developing a team; telling "why" builds the soldier's confidence in you the leader. Together they build trust, respect, cohesion and loyalty.

2. SUMMARY.

a. As a leader you are a teacher.

b. You have a responsibility to teach your subordinates through role-modeling and a conscious teaching, coaching or counseling process. The objective of his teaching is to develop competent leaders capable of accomplishing missions when you are not there.

c. Teaching is a continuous process.

d. On the spot corrections are a form of teaching.

e. There are specific observable behaviors which facilitate teaching, coaching and counseling. They must be known and displayed.

STUDENT HANDOUT 2

Sergeant Wiley Fox

Wiley Fox was hardly the Hollywood ideal of a lean, mean Army sergeant. He was of medium build, bespectacled with gray, receding hair and an ample, but not corpulent, girth that provided living testament to the rich food and European beer he loved so well. On leave in his small southern hometown he would have easily passed for a middle aged shopkeeper. Dressed in his black suit, white shirt, and tie he looked like a parish pastor. Puttering in his yard wearing bermuda shorts and a sport shirt transformed him into a recently retired courthouse clerk whose only passion was photographing roses. In Army fatigues he looked a bit like the good soldier Schweik who would have marched more smartly if the quartermaster had only issued him boots a size larger. In his dress uniform he appeared every inch the mild mannered General Omar Bradley who looked after his men with fatherly concern. His unassuming manners probably contributed to his effectiveness in his career specialty of military intelligence, for few would imagine that such an innocuous fellow could pose much of a threat until it was too late.

Yet Wiley Fox was a warrior, who was prepared to be absolutely ruthless in carrying out the professional duties that he described simply enough--killing people. He had been severely wounded in Vietnam, but immediately returned to the war zone upon his recovery. He exulted in war not because of the killing and carnage, but for the intellectual and emotional thrill of pitting himself against an equally cunning adversary. Listening to his war stories was like listening to the tales of a big game hunter, even down to the one that got away...

He also loved the Army and his country with a passionate, old fashioned patriotism that sounded strange amid the cynicism of his contemporaries. He became unabashedly misty-eyed when he talked of flag and country, and the sincerity and rhetorical style of his speech transformed the trite, jingoistic cliches of politicians into profound, inspirational truths. He transferred into the unit from Korea where he had suffered a series of mild heart attacks, but his determination to "go down fighting" was such that he managed to re-enlist for another six years without having a medical examination...

When he came into the unit he worked as the company operations sergeant, but quickly grew bored with the paperwork. He desperately wanted to have a platoon of his own, but none was available. After considerable conniving, wheeling, and begging he convinced the company commander and first sergeant to give him recent transfers and cast-offs from the existing platoon. He was ecstatic at the prospects, but confided:

"All they would give me is 34 men. That's not many, but it's a start. If I only had 60 men I could set this battalion on its ass."

Casual inspection revealed that the platoon looked no different than countless others. The uniforms ranged from neat to disheveled, and hair cuts from evenly trimmed to ragged. The physical appearance of the bay

was undistinguished in muted institutional greens and grays with a tile floor that was usually scuffed. The men spent their days as most others in the unit doing chores in the motor pool, cutting grass, shoveling snow, going to the field for training, and occasionally getting a job for which they had been trained.

Yet, to the observer familiar with other barracks, there were striking differences. The bay was partitioned off in cubicles by wall lockers like other bays, but here each area housed four to six men instead of the usual two or three. Bunk beds were the rule, and there seemed to be more wall lockers than residents. A quarter of the bay was a lounged area with a carpet, easy chairs, and a few magazines. The barracks oderly had a desk immediately inside the door, and Sergent Fox kept his desk near the lounge area rather than in the platoon sergeant´s office.

Wiley Fox orchestrated all of the platoon movements from his desk in the bay. He was always soft spoken with his mild southern drawl, and referred to the men by their first names or their last prefaced by "mister." The observer notes:

Sergeant Fox greeted each man as he made his way through the bay on his morning tour. "Morning Robert, how are you today? Have a good leave?...Barry, got some work for you today; hurry up with your breakfast...Kenny, you had an appointment with the JAG; was that today or tomorrow?...Mister Dexter, top o the morning; you were late coming off leave, but don´t worry about it; I covered for you...William, did you call your folks?..."

From his desk he only needed to mutter to himself, "Now where is so and so," and one of the men would go scurrying off to summon the man requested. It was not that he could not assume "command presence," but that he usually chose not to. The observer notes:

> At the end of the picnic only half a dozen or so men remained to kill the keg. Sergean Fox suggested they police up the area, and I reached under the table to retrieve a cigarette package. Fox snapped out in a tone that permitted little argument, "Captain, leave the paper where it lies." "Sergeant Fox, how do you know I wasn´t responsible for putting it there?" "Leave it lie! In my Army, officers don´t pull police call."

In addition to his gentle speech, he had the habit of touching men when he addressed them individually such that their attention was riveted on him as he spoke. The observer notes:

One man requested that he be allowed to go get snow tires for his car. Sergeant Fox granted the request, but grasped the soldier gently on his upper arm and counselled, "Now, what ever you do, drive carefully. In this snow drive very slowly, and if some fool follows you too closely, just pull of the road and let him by. You read me? OK, son, see you when you get back."

Later in the morning a similar touch accompanies a routine inquiry:

As we approached the truck a black private was brushing snow from the hood. Sergeant Fox laid his hand on the private's arm and asked, "You get it started alright? Good, I'm counting on you to have it ready to go at any time. How are your ears? Don't let them get too cold; if they get too cold you be sure and go inside." Listening to the sergeant I got the impression this was the most important man with the most important job in the entire battalion, and judging from the private's expression as he listened, he had the same impression.

Like his gentle speech, his gentle touch could be modified to suit the occasion. The observer notes:

Sergeant Fox talked about handling each man as an individual. "Now you take Noble, he must have had a rough time growing up, and I'll bet his father beat him plenty. You can't talk to him like the other men; you first have to get his attention and make him afraid." "How do you make him afraid?" "I slammed him up against the wall and tapped him in the stomach a few times; that's all it took; now he listens when I talk to him."

Given the nucleus of an in-group, the structure grew by continual infusions of distinctive activities. There was always something going on in the platoon ranging from sitting in the lounge being quizzed for the promotion board, to planning a fifty-mile hike to recon the river, to building wash stands and showers for the next field exercise, to showing up the other platoons by shoveling all the walks before the others were up and dressed. The objectives of these activities were to fill time, allow each individual to contribute his skills, and most important, to provide a means for the men to know each other. The observer notes:

Sergeant Fox talked about keeping up morale during inclement weather. "You gotta do something with them or they start bickering and squabbling amongst each other. When we were on that temporary duty assignment it rained one afternoon, and they immediately commenced to grumbling. I loaded them on the truck and drove to the local historical society museum. You should have heard them moaning on the way, "This won't be any fun. Who wants to go to a boring old museum." When they came out they were singing a different tune, "Gosh, I didn't know this area went back to the revolution. Did you see that old cannon? Yeah, and can you imagine farming with them wooden tools?" They grumbled, but they talked about the museum all through supper that night."

The out-groups were usually the other platoons in the company, and could be defined as an amorphous, sinister "they." An armed robbery in a neighboring company provided such an occasion. As Sergeant Fox told the story:

"That desk at the door is for the barracks orderly and a CQ in the evening. It's extra duty, but the men don't object. After the robbery I told them that nothing like that would ever happen in our platoon. If

anyone comes in here with a gun, someone just distract him while others get behind him, jump him, and stomp him into the ground." He then added with a chuckle, "I think the round the clock barracks guard was their idea."

The platoon was also remarkable for the absence of the usual grumbling about having no real mission. For Sergeant Fox, the mission was "whatever the company commander orders us to do," and he had the ability to endow the most mundane tasks with the drama of combat...

If the task at hand could not be accomplished with a combat motif, other strategies were employed. Fox continues:

"Whenever possible, I always say, have some fun. When I was operations sergeant I got a piddling two man detail to pick up some trash in a long ravine. Well, I went to the stable and got a horse so one man could ride and carry the sacks while the other filled them. "I had men volunteering for that detail." "How about mowing grass?" "Grass details are the most fun of all. I organized drag races with the riding mowers. Even persuaded the MPs to ticket a man for going three miles an hour in a two mile zone. Company commander then called him out in front of the formation, read the citation, and told him not to get caught next time. Everybody laughed, and the man felt right good for being recognized as a fast worker."

In another sense, however, Wiley Fox defined his mission more broadly and more aggressively than simply waiting for an order from the commander:

"Most of these younger sergeants have spent their careers in Vietnam or in getting ready to go to the war zone. They don't realize that in garrison there really isn't very much for a soldier to do. Garrison is mostly just sitting around maintaining equipment that is seldom used. The most important job of a platoon segeant is to aggressively seek out work for his men. If I can find ony two hours of work a week that is in line with a man's interests, I have a better soldier. You always have to study the individual, and then play to his strong side. I remember one unit in Germany I had a man who was interested in photography. They were planning a new darkroom at the hobby shop, so I got him a job every afternoon designing and installing the darkroom. Another man was mechanically inclined, so we would scour the city on garbage hauling days for discarded bicycles. He fixed them up and we would lend them to anybody in the unit who wanted to borrow them. We got so many that we damned nearby had a platoon on bicycles. Then there was the Puerto Rican who didn't speak English very well. I didn't know what to do with him; all he ever showed much interest in was music. Then I hit on the idea of training him to modify American electrical appliances to work on the European circuits and vice-versa. It wasn't long until he was one of the happiest people in the unit. The Army doesn't like to admit it, but most of our "work" can be done in three or four hours a day."

Wiley Fox approved of drinking, but strongly disapproved of drug use. Every two weeks or so the sergeants in the platoon chipped in to buy a keg of beer that usually lasted two days before it was gone. He would buy anyone a case of beer on anything reasoning, "The important

thing is that the men talk to each other. Makes no difference who buys the beer; just so we have a reason to get together." When asked how many of his men used drugs, he answered quickly, "none." He believed he had eradicated drug use by the conventional means:

"First I got some films from the education center; you know, showing what happend to people on drugs. Then I took all five of them to the emergency room in a city hospital, and we watched the addicts come in all drugged up with scars running all over their arms. I also arranged for a marijuana sniffing dog to come through the barracks, and I let everyone know that I won't tolerate that stuff in my platoon. I tell them, "Go ahead and use whatever you want, but I'm going to catch you; it's only a matter of time, and when I do, you'll know you've been had. They quit using quite directly, and I haven't had any problem with drugs in the platoon at all."

A more likely explanation for his success is that he supplanted the role of drugs in the barracks with his own strategies for bringing men together, giving them things to talk about and issues on which to align themselves. In addition, his relationship with each man in the platoon was so personalized, and so intense that to be caught in disapproved behaviors would have betrayed a trust that each man was committed to maintaining. The personal concern began at the first meeting, with Sergeant Fox interviewing the new man about his hometown, family, friends, interests, girlfriends, and talents. The observer notes:

I asked him why he collected so much personal information. "I need it to be effective. Take Richards over there; he comes from a large family, his father ran off, and he has to send most of his pay home. Now when something goes wrong with the family, he'll go AWOL if he has to help them out. He likes mechanics, so I got him a part-time job at a filling station; he sends his pay home, but makes enough at the station to get along here in the barracks. Donohue just broke up with his girl-- happens every two weeks--so he'll probably need a little extra time off this weekend. Keefer lives in California; he need a little help getting a military hop if he is to get home."

Each introductory interview was followed up with a letter to the man's family expressing the sergeant's delight in having their son in his platoon, advising them to be sure to contact the Red Cross if their boy was needed at home in an emergency, and requesting that they write or call him with any questions or concerns. Furthermore, although the company policy forbade accepting collect calls, Wiley Fox left standing order that all such calls from members of his platoon were to be transferred to his home phone and that he would accept the charges...

Not only did the men have his phone number, but they were also encouraged to visit him and his wife at their apartment for fresh baked apple pie, milk, and cookies. Thus, Wiley Fox was never off duty. Whether it was through telephone calls from the barracks orderly or through visits of the men to his home, he was always apprised of what was happening in the platoon, and was likely to appear on the bay at any time. He was in constant motion picking up rumors, praising the men, counselling, joking and planning out loud the activities for tomorrow.

Wiley Fox did not last very long as a platoon sergeant, about six months at most. The unit was in the field for the annual graded exercise. He had prepped his men for weeks on ambush tactics, security precautions, and the grading procedures, yet he felt the unit was not really ready...

The first day of the exercise dawned clear, but with light snow. Sergeant Fox had worked all night preparing the men for loading the equipment. In the field, the snow melted and turned the area into sticky mud. By ten in the morning the tents were in place, the foxholes dug, and Wiley Fox had completed his first tour of the area. He stopped at a jeep to talk with one of the squad leaders, complained that he feared his angina "hisses" were acting up again, and slumped to the ground. The squad leader knelt in the mud, and slipped the nitro table under Fox's tongue as he had been instructed. The field ambulance would not start. Slowly the nitro took effect, and Wiley Fox was helped to a jeep for the ride to the hospital.

When he returned to duty, his request to return to the platoon was denied, and he went back to a desk job in the intelligence office. The platoon quickly reverted to the typical patterns of behavior described for other units. Wiley Fox could not comprehend why his platoon fell apart:

"It's not supposed to work that way. In the Army no man is indispensable. I set it up; I showed them how to work it; but when I left they forgot everything. Why? It's supposed to just keep going with new men and different faces. The parts are interchangeable in the Army, yet the platoon fell apart when I left. Why? No single individuals can be that important. Why, Doc, why?"

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STUDENT HANDOUT 3

How to Develop Soldiers

LEADERSHIP ARITHMETIC

What wins on the battlefield is skill, will, and teamwork. Another way of saying this is that how well a UNIT does depends upon a basic "formula" of leadership arithmetic. This first formula says:

> The sum of the performance of the individual soldiers x the ability of the soldier to work together as a team x the ability of the leadership to get all those teams to work together as a unit = THE PERFORMANCE OF A UNIT.

This formula shows clearly that the fundamental building block of unit performance is the performance of the individual soldier. And just as there is another for INDIVIDUAL performance. The second formula says:

> The soldier's skill in performing tasks critical to success on the battlefield x his will to learn and put that skill to work = THE PERFORMANCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER.

SKILL AND WILL

In developing soldiers, the leadership of the unit must build skill and will. Either one without the other is admirable, but by itself, it won't win. The marksmanship skills of an expert rifleman are officially recognized as "outstanding." The rifleman is rewarded with a special medal. Years ago, he got extra pay. But all that skill is precisely worthless if in battle he is not willing to take the risk, stick his head up, and kill somebody. And all that skill is also worthless if as he takes aim his weapon won't fire because he has not been willing to keep it maintained and ready, especially on those cold, rainy, muddy winter nights when his fingers were numb and blue.

So on the other hand, will without skill is also worthless. If our rifleman has little skill as a marksman but is willing to assault the enemy, swinging his weapon like a club, that's very heroic. But if the enemy meets all this fine will with one well-aimed shot, our man loses. High levels of will can often compensate for lower levels of skill, and vice versa. However, soldiers who are best prepared to fight have high levels of both.

It should be obvious to you now that skill and will are linked together. Each affects the other. When we first discussed the prime standard for your leadership, we said that, on the battlefield, the prime standard centers around the confidence of the soldier. And the soldier's confidence is, very simply, based on a combination of his skill and his will. Therefore, if the leadership of the unit is to meet the prime standard of leadership, then it must build both.

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STUDENT HANDOUT

PEER INSTRUCTION

One dark, rainy and muddy evening during the Battle of the Bulge, in the St. Vith area, a tank battalion commander requested that I visit his unit and welcome 175 replacements that he had just received. They were assembled in the blackout when I arrived.

After a few words of welcome, I asked one of them when he had left Fort Knox. His reply was, "We have never been to Fort Knox" I asked another how he learned to be a tanker. He said, "We have never seen a tank." I asked where they had received their basic training. They said, "Camp Croft," which I recognized as being an Infantry Replacement Training Center.

I pointed out that they would be in battle at daylight the next morning with a tough enemy, as loaders, gunners, and perhaps drivers, and they had better listen closely to the tank commander and other members of the tank crew because the next morning we played for keeps. They ere motivated to learn. The tanks fought well the next day and those exinfantrymen played their part in the tank teams satisfactorily or better.

This simple story, which was more or less repeated many times in our Army in World War II and later, and will undoubtedly be repeated again in case of war, should cause our peacetime trainers to think of the problems of rapid mobilization and the prompt replacement of casualties on the battlefield.

We have, for years, recognized "on-the-job" training as being a big part in preparing officers and men to become competent members of Army combat, combat support and combat service support "teams." This process is usually essential even when replacements arrive with their basic training completed. Peer Instruction is a more rapid process usually.

After 11 months of battle in World War II, as Division Commander, I directed a study of our officer casualties and how they were replaced and trained during our combat period. I found that we had replaced our combat company commanders about once a month and our combat platoon leaders more often. We did not make a survey of the turnover of the squad leaders or tank commanders, but these were also very often required.

Where did these leaders come from? They were moved up from below. Some moved up more than once during the war. They had not been to an NCO Academy or to an Officer's Basic or Advanced Course. They had not had specialist courses in their MOS's. But they learned fast and maintained the momentum and excellence of their units and the division. Their motivation was no problem and their associates felt a very personal interest in qualifying them for their new positions. This is what I refer to as Peer Instruction.

Lieutenant Colonel Creighton Abrams, a recent Chief of Staff, was one of many tank battalion commanders. He filled vacancies in his tank platoon leaders many times in 11 months of battle. Whenever he could find time in the evening, he assembled his platoon leaders for what he called their "Basic Course," which he taught himself.

I am sure it followed no formal curriculum and the course varied from week to week, but he produced outstanding leaders for his tank platoons from the NCO's he brought up from the ranks.

The transition from our peacetime educational system for personnel (officer and enlisted) will be very drastic once we commit our troops to combat. Our officers must be oriented to expect this and how to handle the problems effectively and promptly. Peer Instruction is a big part of the solution.

The effectiveness of this training depends greatly upon the ability and dedication of the noncommissioned officers and junior officers.

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ADVANCE SHEET #4

Leadership Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority

I. SCOPE: Be familiar with the leader's roles duties, and responsibilities.

II. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE;

TASK Define and discuss the duties, responsibilities and authority of officers, NCOs, and the relationship between the two.

CONDITIONS: Classroom instruction discussion and advance readings.

STANDARD: Task will be accomplished in accordance with doctrine in FM 22-100, FM 22-600-20 and AR 600-20.

III. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES;

TASK : Define and discuss the 3 types of duties.

CONDITIONS: Classroom instruction, discussion, and advance readings.

STANDARD: The lieutenant will define and explain specified, directed, and implied duties as covered in this class.

TASK: Define and discuss the concept and basis of authority.

CONDITIONS: Classroom instruction, discussion, and advance reading.

STANDARD: The lieutenant will define and discuss command authority and general military authority in accordance with FM 22-600-20.

TASK : Define the function of the chain of command and the NCO support channel.

CONDITIONS: Classroom instruction, discussion, and advance readings.

STANDARD: The lieutenant will accomplish this task in accordance with FM 22-600-20.

TASK: Define and discuss the division of functional duties of offices and NCOs.

CONDITIONS: Classroom instruction, discussion, and advance readings.

STANDARD: The lieutenant will accomplish the task in accordance with FM 22-600-20.

TASK : Discuss establishment of effective relationships with subordinates, warrant officers, senior officers, and peers.

CONDITIONS: Classroom instruction, discussion, and advance readings.

STANDARD: Discussion will focus on why these relationships are necessary to become an effective leader as well as how to establish those relationships.

IV. INSTRUCTIONS:

1. READ:

   a. FM 22-100, Military Leadership, pp 238-241.

   b. FM 22-100, Military Leadership, Apeendix E, pp 299-300

2. SCAN:

   FM 22-600-20, The Army NCO Guide.

3. BRING TO CLASS:

   FM 22-100, Military Leadership.

   FM 22-600-20, The Army NCO Guide Leadership Workbook.

4. OPTIONAL READING: Student Handout 2, "Commanders Must Earn Loyalty

STUDENT HANDOUT 1
IN CLASS EXERCISE
OBC - DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITY

SECTION I

Duties fall into three categories: specified, directed, and implied. Specified duties are those duties which are clearly outlined in DA publications such as FMs, TMs, and ARs. Directed duties are usually unique to an organization and are found in the unit SOPs or commander's directives. Implied duties are duties that the conscientious individual usually performs voluntarily to ensure the smooth, efficient functioning of his unit. Usually, as leaders climb in rank, their specified duties will absorb less of their time and more of their duties become directed and implied.

Authority necessary to accomplish a duty comes with the assigned duty, whether the duty is directed, specified, or implied. Sufficient authority to accomplish that duty is automatically delegated. When a platoon leader receives instructions that his platoon's weapons will be cleaned immediately he has the automatic and necessary authority. to hold the platoon past normal duty hours in order to accomplish the mission that his orders/instructions specify. Remember that there exists two categories of authority: command and general military authority. Command authority is the organizational right to carry out your unit's mission. You are exercising command authority over your subordinates by virtue of your position in the unit. On the other hand, general military authority charges each leaders, by virtue of his rank, to enforce all regulations at all times, regardless of duty assignment. It is fully incumbent upon all soldiers to correct violations of regulation, and in some circumstances, you may have to correct a superior.

Keep in mind that all military members have individual responsibility for their conduct, such as personal appearance and maintenance of their private business and family affairs. The individual is charged with accountability in these areas both as a soldier and as a member of society. Command responsibility, on the other hand, is the collective responsibility for unit achievement of set standards for maintenance,discipline, training performance, and other military goals. While subordinates are answerable to the commander as to how the unit progresses toward these goals, commanders are fully responsible for the achievement of the goals in the eyes of their commander. There are certain factors, such as degree of control, which impact on command responsibility. Bear in mind that when leaders issue orders, it is incumbent upon leaders to provide the resources necessary to perform the task. it is useless to have a soldier clean a rifle without providing all necessary cleaning equipment

Leaders at all levels must strive to develop teamwork while applying the doctrine of authority, responsibility, and duty when assigning tasks. Leaders can establish teams and properly assign tasks by using the concepts discussed in this class and reading assignment. The following procedure is to assist you in doing this:

1. Ensure you understand your mission.

2. Analyze the situation to determine the implied missions, goals, and objectives.

3. Determine tasks required to do the mission.

4. Determine your team assets.

5. Establish team organization and determine which tasks fall to officers or NCOs.

6. Assign tasks accordingly.

7. Work with your NCOs to ensure all tasks are accomplished and done right.

Study and use the following doctrinal principles; correctly applied a clear division of labor will be achieved:

1. The officer commands, plans, establishes policy, and manages the Army.

The NCO conducts the daily business of the Army within established policy.

2. The officer focuses on collective training which leads to mission accomplishment.

The NCO focuses on individual training which leads to mission capability.

3. The officer is primarliy involved in units and unit operations.

The NCO places his major focus on individual soldiers and team leading.

4. The officer concentrates on unit effectiveness and unit readiness.

The NCO concentrates on each subordinates NCO and soldier, including personal equipment, is individually ready and functioning as as effective team member.

5. The officer pays particular attention to the standards, care, and professionalism of officers.

The NCO focuses on the standards, care, and professionalism of NCOs and enlisted personnel.

There is only one chain of command in the Army. Through the chain of command, instructions and order relating to the performance of the unit mission are issued and policies for conducting business are conveyed down to the unit. The chain is paralleled and reinformed by the NCO support channel. The chain of command allows for one person to be in charge of giving directions.

Learning, practicing, and applying this doctrine within your unit using the methodology taught and practiced will result in improved organizational effectiveness, a goal which all officers and NCOs must strive to reach together. If Army leaders understand the duties, responsibilities, and authority of officers and NCOs, and know and apply the principles of task assignment, the effectiveness of the Army will improve.

SECTION II

Given a mission to plan, coordinate, and run an M-16 qualification range, take 5 to 8 minutes working in discussion groups to identify the following:

Specified Duties

Directed Duties

Implied Duties

SECTION III

There is only one chain of command in the Army. Through the chain of command, instructions and orders relating to the performance of the unit mission are issued and policies for conducting business are conveyed down to the unit. The chain is paralleled and reinforced by the NCO Support Channel. Although we will be discussing only the Chain of Command and NCO Support Channel, we must keep in mind that most units also have staff and technical channels at battalion level and above. The chain of command allows for one person to be in charge of giving direction; thus, avoiding confusion and frustration. It extends from the major commander to the squad leader. We must keep two things in mind as we study this chain of command. First, it is a two-way channel for communications, and second, the chain consists of all officers except for the squad leader, section chief, or team leader. This chain can even be extended further down to include the individual soldier, completing the entire communications channel.

Within the chain of command many duties are the same for officers and noncommissioned officers and can be shared. As an example, both individuals accomplish the duty of "taking care of the soldier," but their respective tasks are different. Similarly, a company commander and first sergeant may share a duty because of their related organizational positions. Sharing duties means that both commissioned and noncommissioned officers work toward the same goal, objective, or mission. Tasks, therefore, are things a leader is required to do to perform a duty. Duties can be shared, tasks should not. In establishing general rules for use when determining whether a task should belong to an NCO or officer, it is recognized that the commander sets the overall policies and standards of the unit and is concerned with the entire range of duties of officers, NCOs and other enlisted personnel. The division of these functional duty areas of responsibilities between officers and NCOs, does not imply that they operate in a separate compartmentalized manner. The functional duty areas of responsibility, officer and NCO, are interlocking and interdependent.

Some general rules to apply in dividing functional duties are:

1. The officer commands, establishes policy, plans and programs the work of the Army; the NCO conducts the daily business of the Army within established orders, directives, and policy.

2. The officer concentrates on collective training which will enable the unit to accomplish its mission. The NCO concentrates on individual training which develops the capability to accomplish the mission.

3. The officer is primarily involved with unit operations, training, and related activities. The NCO is primarily involved with training individual soldiers and teams.

4. The officer concentrates on unit effectiveness and unit readiness; the NCO concentrates on each subordinate NCO and soldier and on the small teams of the unit to ensure that each is well-trained, highly motivated, ready, and functioning.

5. The officer pays particular attention to the standards of performance, training, and professional development of officers as well as NCOs; the NCO concentrates on the standards of performance, training, and professional development of NCO's and enlisted personnel.

6. The officer creates conditions--makes the time and other resources available--so the NCO can do his job; the NCO gets the job done.

THERE ARE 2 EXCEPTIONS TO THESE RULES:

1. Squad Leader/Section Leader.

As pointed out previously, these positions are unique in that, under normal circumstances, they are the only NCOs directly in the chain of command. Thus, the squad/section leader has to focus both on proficiency of individual members of the squad/section and also on the squad/section's overall proficiency--individual and collective.

2. Platoon Sergeant.

The platoon sergeant is, in fact, the assistant platoon leader and must be prepared to take command in the absence of the platoon leader. As platoon leader, the platoon sergeant assumes the same responsibilities as the commissioned officer--except those directly related to area of responsibility to prepare for the positions of platoon leader and the officer's commission. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant must recognize the importance of mutually educating each other. This means that the platoon sergeant must move in and out of the platoon leader's to teach and advise the platoon leader. By applying six rules of general areas of responsibility and taking the exceptions into consideration, most tasks and responsibilities can be readily labeled commissioned or noncommissioned office business. Conscientious application of these six rules is an important step in formulating the thought process necessary to correctly assign tasks and responsibilities.

STUDENT HANDOUT

Commanders Must Earn Loyalty

A tourist turned off the hard-surfaced highway into the Tennessee mountains, onto a winding, single-lane dirt road. Then he saw a log cabin off the road and noticed the front door had two holes at the bottom, each large enough to permit the passage of a cat.

This intrigued the tourist, so he approached on foot toward the ancient, overalled and bearded figure in a rocking chair on the front porch. "My friend," the tourist said, "you have two cat-sized holes in the bottom of your front door. Why is one not enough?

The old mountaineer parted his tobacco-stained whiskers, squirted a jet of tobacco juice over the porch railing that landed near the tourist's feet, and replied "Waal, I got two cats. And when I say 'Scat' I mean 'Scat'?"

The old fellow had instilled discipline in his cats but how much loyalty had he inspired?

This raises the question faced by commanders at all levels in military service: both discipline and loyalty are required in a good outfit, so how can their sometimes conflicting requirements be reconciled?

The best case study known to me of this classic problem centers around a change in command of the famous 1st Infantry Division during World War II. This occurred after the Sicily campaign, when Maj. Gen. Terry Allen was replaced. These comments in A Soldier's Story by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley are pertinent:

> Under Allen the 1st Division had become increasingly temperamental, disdainful of both regulations and senior commands. It thought itself exempt from the needs for discipline by virtue of its months on the line. . . Allen had become too much of an individualist to subordinate himelf without friction in the group undertakings of war... To save Allen both from himself and from his brilliant record, and to save the division from the results of too much heavy success, I decided to separate them.

His successor was Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, widely known in the Army as a stern disciplinarian. Gen Huebner was keenly aware of the freewheeling attitude in the division, as well as the high loyalty the "Big Red One" felt toward their departing commander, Gen. Allen.

This was a tough situation for a new commander but Gen. Huebner met it squarely. On his second day in command, he ordered a spit-and-polish cleanup, then directed a rigid training program that included close-order drill.

This program outraged the combat veterans. Why Gen. Huebner followed this course on assuming command reveals his ideas about how discipline and loyalty are related. Consider these incidents recounted by Arthur L. Chaitt in the Bridgehead Sentinel (Spring, 1973, Society of the First Division).

He quotes Maj. Gen. Sternberg, years later:

> One memory that stands out in my mind relates to the hard-nosed attitude Huebner exhibited when he took over the division from the fabulous and popular Terry Allen . . . for instance, requiring combat veterans to take basic rifle marksmanship training, practice saluting, close-order drill and the like. And putting the "fear of God" in the chain of command. . . I asked him later how a gentle guy like him could be such a mean bastard. He replied, "Ben, remember when you take over a command, you can start out being an SOB and later become a good guy, but you can never start off being a good guy and later become an SOB."

Another, way of saying, "First things first--and discipline comes first."

Col. C. M. (Pop) Eymer, the Division G4, shared the frustrations of the staff in the initial transition from Gen. Allen to Gen. Huebner. He put it this way:

> Over the next several months while the staff planned for the invasion of France, Gen. Huebner ignored our attitude and patiently imposed his will upon us and eventually won our complete loyalty and affection.
>
> Before leaving Sicily for England I had a talk with him, although I do not recall how the coversation came about. Anyway, I asked why he had not fired all of us because of our attitude toward him when he assumed command. He chuckled with the puckish little squint which was so engaging. "Hell, Pop, I knew you would all come around. I was not about to get rid of the best damn staff in the best damn division in the Army. All I wanted was to earn the same loyalty you gave to Terry Allen."

This is a most perceptive statement on discipline and loyalty. In other words: discipline must be imposed, but loyalty must be earned.

Another point in that simple statement is one I often saw violated. A new commander should not be jealous of the loyalty of his new command toward their previous commander. If he expects instant disloyalty by his new command to his predecessor, on what basis can he hope for their loyalty to him?

How does a commander "earn" loyalty? The first requirement is that he must himself be a competent soldier. But it goes beyond that, for he must be interested in the welfare of those under him, and there are innumerable ways this comes up. Further, how a commander earns this loyalty will vary with situations and individuals. Here are several illustrations mentioned by Arthur L. Chaitt:

- o One night, during the Battle of the Bulge, Gen. Huebner noticed that his G3 was heavily fatigued and badly in need of sleep. So the general quietly posted a guard on the G3's door, with orders that no one but himself could wake him.

- o In the Hurtgen Forest, Col. T. F. Lancer remembers that Gen. Huebner would bring coffee each night to the sentry outside his headquarters.

- o Another revealing sidelight involved Gen. Huebner's orderly, Marvin. Just before the assault landing in Normandy, the "Old Man" received a bottle of Kentucky whiskey, and said, "We won't need it here, but on the far shore." He then put the bottle in his musette bag and handed it to his orderly, saying "Marvin, get this to me on the far shore."

As Brig. Gen. John G. Hill related it, "The first thing Marvin did aboard ship was drop the bag on the steel deck and break the bottle. He then took off to find the general's aide, and this conversation followed."

Marvin: "My God, we broke the general's whiskey!"
Aide: "What do you mean, we broke the general's whiskey?"
Marvin: "What'll we do? We can't tell the general."
Aide: "Yes, we re going to tell him right now."
Gen. Huebner: "Hell, I've no use for such people--transfer him to the 26th Infantry."
Marvin: "No sir, general. You ain't going to fire me."
Gen. Huebner: "Why the hell aren't I going to fire you?
Marvin: "Cause you can't get nobody better!"
Gen. Huebner, after recovering the power of speech: "Well, I guess you're right.

So Marvin stayed on. Things like this get around and say things about a commander his men can learn in no other way. It takes human understanding on both sides to cement loyalty.

Another soldier I served under who demanded uncompromising discipline and inspired intense loyalty was my West Point classmate, Maj. Gen. Joseph P. Cleland. Afer completing jump school he commanded the 504th Airbone Infantry at Fort Bragg, N.C.

As Christmas neared, he issued orders that no married man living at home with his family on or near Fort Bragg would be detailed on guard Christmas Eve or Christmas Day. Then on Christmas Eve he inspected sentries on post.

Later that night the jeep driver returned to his regimental commander's home with a message. "Mrs. Cleland," the driver reported, "the colonel said he will not be home until morning."

Then he continued, "You are not going to believe this. The colonel found a man on post whose family is here at Bragg. So he relieved the sentry, took the soldier's rifle to walk post himself, and had me drive the soldier to his home and family."

The stern discipline and hard training that Gen. Cleland demanded were merged with loyalty for such a commander that discipline alone can never achieve. Added comments are:

o When Regimental Commander Cleland inspected the sentries, he exercised his responsibility to insure discipline by checking compliance with his orders; on finding a failure, he took the most direct action to carry out his own order for that soldier to be home with his family on Christmas Eve; and you can bet those in the chain of command who failed to implement his order smelled gunpowder later.

o By his action Gen. Cleland dramatized two basic principles: obedience to orders is the essence of discipline and loyalty is a two-way street.

o In Walter Reed Hospital, near the end of his life, Lt. Gen. Huebner said, in substance, "People are important, things are not--and nothing is more important than the respect of one man for another."

So now we have this amplified relation: discipline must be imposed, but loyalty must be earned--yet the highest form of discipline exists only when there is mutual loyalty, up and down.

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ADVANCE SHEET #5

Leadership Doctrine

SECTION I

I. SCOPE: Know and express in writing the Army's doctrine on leadership.

II. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

TASK: Describe the Army Leadership concept of Be, Know, Do.

CONDITION: Given a choice of two topic questions.

STANDARD: The student will write an answer to one of the topic questions that complies with the standards of writing contained in Section III of this advance sheet.

III. INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Prepare to write a paper on one of the following two topic questions.

Choice A: The Army's Leadership doctrine is based on the theme BE-KNOW-DO. What does "BE-KNOW-DO" mean, and how will following this doctrine make you a successful officer?

Choice B: What were Joshua Chamberlain's significant BE-KNOW-DO attributes during the fight at the Little Round Top during the Battle of Gettysburg? Describe how these attributes made him a successful officer.

2. READ:

a. Section II, "Some Thoughts on Writing," enclosed.

b. Section III, "Grading Criteria," enclosed.

c. Student Handout 1, "Leadership Doctrine," enclosed.

3. SCAN: FM 22-100, Military Leadership, Chapter 3, pp 55-60.

4. NEEDED FOR THE ESSAY:

   a. Leadership Workbook.

   b. Enough 8 1/2- x 11-inch lined notebook paper to write a double-spaced 300 to 500 word paper. Bring a black pen or pencil.

   c. Dictionary.

5. OPTIONAL READING: Student Handout 2, "What is Army Leadership?" page 5-7.

SECTION II

Some Thoughts on Writing

Other things being equal, a superior rating will usually be given to the officer who has persevered in his studies of the art of self-expression, while his colleague who attaches little importance to what may be achieved through working with the language will be marked for mediocrity.

A moment's reflection will show why this has to be the case and why mastery of the written and spoken word is indispensable to successful officership.

As the British statesman, Disraeli, put it, "Men govern with words." In the Armed Forces command is exercised through what is said that commands attention and understanding and through what is written that directs, explains, interprets, or informs.

Battles are won through the ability of men to express concrete ideas in clear and unmistakable language. All administration is carried forward along the chain of command by the power of men to make their thoughts articulate and available to others.

There is no way under the sun that this basic condition can be altered. Once the point is granted, any officer should be ready to accept its corollary--that superior qualification in the use of the language, both as to the written and the spoken word, is more essential to military leadership than knowledge of the whole technique of weapons handling.

It then becomes strictly a matter of personal decision whether the officer will seek to advance himself along the line of main chance or will take refuge in the excuse offered by the great majority: "I'm just a simple fighting man with no gift for writing."

SECTION III

Grading Criteria

A. General

The writing requirement is the first of two such assignments in the Engineer Officer Basic Course Leadership Curriculum. The writing requirement is intended to make the student think about the Army's Leadership Doctrine and express in writing what "BE-KNOW-DO" means.

The essay will be turned in at a time specified by the platoon leader. As a means for achieving positive input for the students' Academic Efficiency Report (AER), the essay will be graded as superior, satisfactory or unsatisfactory. While no specific number of words is required to achieve a satisfactory or superior rating, the Leadership Branch believes either topic question can be answered in about 400 words, plus or minus 100. To use substantially less words in your answer may cause your understanding of the subject to be questioned.

All students including Allied Officers must complete the writing requirement. The essay itself must be completed without notes or books.

B. Specific

1. Superior (90-100):

The student will receive a superior evaluation when his/her essay reflects an understanding of the theme BE-KNOW-DO of Army leadership doctrine as described in FM 22-100, Military Leadership. Depending on the topic question selected a superior essay will focus on how BE-KNOW-DO applies to the historical case study of Joshua Chamberlain or his/her situation as an Engineer Lieutenant. Necessarily, a superior paper will reflect excellent style and grammar. Specifically, the essay will have an introduction which defines the purpose of the paper and naturally leads the reader to the main body. The main body will be organized so that each paragraph has its own topic sentence and main points are easily identified and are arranged in a logical order. Transition sentences will lead readers smoothly to the next paragraph. The conclusion/summary will be logically drawn from analysis and will be fully supported. The essay must be grammatically correct and must not contain more than one error in spelling or grammar. Each aspect (BE, KNOW, DO) must be clearly described using key words to clarify meaning. In addition, each aspect requires support citing personal or theoretical examples or using Joshua Chamberlain as your example.

2. Satisfactory (70-89):

To achieve a satisfactory evaluation the student must demonstrate an understanding of the theme BE-KNOW-DO as Army leadership doctrine. The essay will be logically organized and will lead to an appropriate conclusion. The difference in a superior and satisfactory evaluation will be, necessarily, in the area of clarity examples and support.

3. Unsatisfactory (< 70):

The student will receive an unsatisfactory evaluation when his/her essay contains one or more of the following deficiencies:

a. The student demonstrates a lack of understanding of the BE-KNOW-DO leadership doctrine theme.

b. The student fails to answer the questions given, i.e., writes on his/her own leadership doctrine, not the Army's.

c. The student's paper is so lacking in neatness, style, grammar, and expression that serious errors in logic are present. Excessive errors in grammar and expression can be sole grounds for an unsatisfactory evaluation.

Students receiving an unsatisfactory evaluation will be counseled individually.

STUDENT HANDOUT 1
Leadership Doctrine

1. INTRODUCTION: This lesson lays the foundation for all subsequent leadership instruction. It provides the concepts and philosophy upon which your leadership skills and competencies will be built. Inherent in this is understanding of what is meant by doctrine. The following discussion will define what is meant by leadership doctrine, its importance and what are the conditions for it to be effective. The reading assignment in FM 22-100, Military Leadership will introduce you to the Army's leadership philosophy, BE-KNOW-DO. It is hoped that FM 22-100 and the principles and philosophy it contains will become a part of your life.

2. LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE:

a. Leadership doctrine is the Army's official philosophy of leadership. This philosophy includes a logically related set of beliefs, values, concepts, principles, methods and programs which can be clearly learned and applied for the purpose of creating cohesive, disciplined units that can win in battle.

b. The Army's leadership doctrine is a philosophy of what a leader must Be, Know, and Do to develop subordinates and develop combat effective units.

c. One of the most important functions served by leadership doctrine is that it gives everyone in the Army a common language of words and concepts so that people can communicate precisely about complex situations. This common language gives people a shared frame of reference to be used as a start point for analyzing and resolving complex leadership situations.

d. In order for leadership doctrine to be effective it must be a living doctrine that is learned, understood and applied by leaders throughout the Army. Therefore, doctrine must be the foundation for all leadership education and training. Training and education must extend the doctrine, bring it to life and ensure that people know how to apply it in reality. Training and education must use the same definitions of words and concepts that are used in the doctrine. Training and education can and should extend the doctrine as new ideas and knowledge becomes available. However, the new knowledge and concepts need to be taught in a manner and in a language that reinforces the doctrine.

e. Models, philosophies or concepts that do not agree with the Army's leadership philosophy (doctrine) can be discussed in seminars or other forums that exchange information because this is the way our doctrine is challenged and gradually changed for the better. We want to develop leaders who think creatively, who question and test the validity of existing doctrine and methods. However, opposing philosophies should not be presented in a way that confuses the officer about what is and is not a part of the Army's leadership doctrine.

STUDENT HANDOUT 2

What is Army Leadership?

LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

In battle, when soldiers die--and in battle, some must--they cannot be managed to their deaths. They must be led there. You manage machines and programs and budgets. You lead men. Managers don't take those battlefield risks. Leaders do. Managers work with things and numbers. Leaders work with people and feelings.

"Command," at any level, will always be a mix of leadership and management, but the proportions will vary. At the GENERALS' level, more management than leadership. At the CAPTAINS' level, far more leadership than mangement. Look next at some of the reasons why Army leadership is different from any kind of civilian leadership.

MILITARY LEADERSHIP IS DIFFERENT

The difference between military leadership and any other kind is because of your soldiers: who they are, where they come from, what they do, and how they live--as soldiers. Our Army is not a "corporation." Preparing for and defending this nation is not an "occupation." And being a soldier is not a "job." Think about the differences:

o YOU DON'T SELECT, AND THEN HIRE, YOUR "EMPLOYEES." Soldiers are assigned to you by grade and MOS. If you don't have enough or the right skills then you do the best you can with what you have. You can't run a want ad in the classified section. If you're short on soldiers, it means that at some time, some place, some colonel or some general or some civilian official in those levels up above you has made a mistake. Just as you do. Somewhere that teamwork among levels broke down.

o THE WORKERS IN YOUR "LABOR" FORCE HAVE SIGNED A CONTRACT. You can't fire them on the spot or lay them off during hard times. And they can't quit, go on strike, carry signs around, or stage a walkout.

o YOU MUST DEAL WITH A HIGHER TURNOVER OF PEOPLE THAN ANY BUSINESS COULD TOLERATE. A civilian leader has some turnover problems, but he also must worry about stagnation in his work force. Your work is about the chaos of soldier turbulence.

o YOUR SOLDIERS ARE MUCH YOUNGER THAN THE MEN IN MOST BUSINESS. Most of your men have never worked before. Many have never been away from home. All of them have to learn and adjust to an entirely new way of life when they join our Army.

o YOU HAVE MORE POWER OVER YOUR MEN THAN ANY CIVILIAN BOSS. Soldiers can be fined or put in jail for doing things that would be ignored on the job in civilian life.

o YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO YOUR SOLDIERS DOESN'T END WHEN SOME WHISTLE BLOWS. You have certain responsibilities for what your soldiers do off duty as well as on duty. No civilian foreman gets telephone calls in the middle of the night when one of his men has been in an accident or a fight or is in jail. Additionally, you have certain responsibilities toward your soldiers' families and where and how they live.

o YOU CONTROL YOUR SOLDIERS' TIME--24 HOURS A DAY WHEN NECESSARY. For soldiers, there are no automatic eight-hour days, forty-hour weeks, and weekends off. When their leaders feel it's necessary, soldiers must work until the mission is accomplished to standards. With no extra pay for overtime.

o YOUR SOLDIERS ARE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT THE RISK OF DEATH ON THE BATTLEFIELD IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION. There is no civilian "job description" for the kind of work done by Stan Goff, or for the conditions under which he did it.

All these differences are important as you try to think about and learn about leadership. It is easy to compare yourself with the civilian foreman or supervisor or middle manager or young executive. In many respects, you two look the same. But leadership lessons and techniques developed in the business world and in the universities, though they are often valuable and instructive, must be given careful thought. Inside our Army, they may not "fit." and that's because of the differences--in you, in your soldiers, and in the tasks, conditions, and standards of Army leadership. There is no business firm or civilian university anywhere that has as its foremost objective the requirement to fight and win the land battle.

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COMMAND DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF COMBINED ARMS
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ADVANCE SHEET #6

Leadership Styles

I. SCOPE: Become familiar with the different leadership styles and those styles which best fit the situation.

II. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

TASK: Apply Army leadership styles to unit situations.

CONDITION: Classroom, Advance Sheet, and reading assignment, and case study or role-playing situation.

STANDARD: The student will:

a. Analyze the situation to determine the essential situational variables.

b. Evaluate which variables are controlling.

c. Recognize the operational environmental forces.

d. Exhibit a leadership style which is appropriate to the situation.

ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

TASK: Recognize the three basic leadership styles.

CONDITION: Classroom, Advance Sheet, reading assignment, and role-playing exercises or case studies.

STANDARD: The student will:

a. Identify the appropriate style in others.

b. Demonstrate the three basic styles.

c. Describe the conditions under which a style is appropriate.

TASK: Analyze the relationships of situation variables.

CONDITION: Given a case study or role-playing exercise.

STANDARD: The student will identify the following situational variables for either an individual or group:

- Knowledge and skill
- Experience
- Task-related information
- Motivation
- Criticality of time
- Power relationships

TASK: Exhibit a leadership style appropriate to a situation.

CONDITION: Given:

a. A role-playing situation and vignette.

b. An analysis of the situation.

c. Evaluation of the environmental forces.

STANDARD: The student will:

a. Match the situational variables with the appropriate style (pick the style that works best considering the situation variables).

b. Develop a plan to reduce or block the negative environmental forces.

c. Describe how the chosen style applies to leadership that directs, implements, and motivates.

IV. INSTRUCTIONS:

1. READ:

FM 22-100, Military Leadership, "Determining Leadership Styles," pages 294-298.

2. BRING TO CLASS:

a. FM 22-100, Military Leadership.

b. Leadership Workbook.

3. OPTIONAL READING: Student Handout 1, "Military Leadership, What is it? Can it be Taught?" by Maxwell Taylor, Gen, USA (Ret)

STUDENT HANDOUT 1

MILITARY LEADERSHIP

What is it? Can it be taught?

Maxwell D. Taylor, General, US Army (Ret)

Upon being ordered to West Point as Superintendent in 1945, I duly reported for instructions to the Army Chief of Staff, Dwight D, Eisenhower. To my surprise he limited his comments to two points, the importance which he attached to the Honor System and his strong feeling that the Academy should include in its curriculum a formal course designed to teach cadets the principles of military leadership. In his view, this had never been adequately undertaken in the past despite the fact that the preparation for military leadership was prime objective of a West Point education.

Armed with this mandate from General Eisenhower, upon taking over my duties I promptly initiated an elementary course in the psychology of leadership as a first step and thereafter watched the development of the course with keen personal interest. As events turned out, it marked for me the beginning of a quest for the ultimate sources of leadership and a satisfactory answer to the questions posed by this article--What is leadership? Can it be taught?

Having agreed to summarize my tentative conclusions on these points, I must begin by stating my understanding of what is meant by military leadership. I take it to mean the gift enjoyed by a limited number of commanders who have been able to derive a maximum measure of military effectiveness from themselves, their associates and all other resources placed at their disposition. If this is indeed leadership, how is it produced? What are the talents and attributes of the men who possess it?

Assisted by historical studies of individual cases and by personal contacts with proven leaders, a student of this subject can assemble a list of attributes apparently shared by many eminent leaders and in due course arrange them according to some system of classification. My own efforts have led to an arrangement in four categories under the headings of professioanl competence, intellectual capacity, strength of character and inspirational qualities.

In the case of the first category it is fairly easy to agree upon the attributes which one ordinarily associates with professional competence. One expects a military leader to demonstrate in his daily performance a through knowledge of his own job and further an ability to train his subordinates in their duties and thereafter to supervise and evaluate their work. His competence may be further confirmed by evidence of good judgment in choosing key assistants in command and staff functions--proof that he knows a good man when he sees one.

Also he may be expected to give importance to maintaining physical fitness. Because of the strenuous demands of military life, a competent officer should regard his career as an arduous endurance race for which he must remain constantly in training. To do so, in early life, he should acquire habits of moderation in eating, drinking, working and playing--activities any one of which if carried to excess may impair his effectiveness as a leader. Napoleon might have won at Waterloo had he been physically fit to ride a horse on the day of the battle. Alexander might have found new worlds to conquer had he been less successful in finding wine and dissolute companionship early in life.

But an ideal leader must have qualities beyond those of a competent professional. If he is to rise above subaltern grades, he must acquire a disciplined and orderly mind--one as accustomed to thinking hard as his body is inured to working hard. His intellectual interests should be as broad as the scope of the national interests for which his profession undertakes to provide security. In 1962, President Kennedy made this point in an address to the West Point graduating class in which he stressed that its members must prepare themselves for dealing with problems outside the military field--diplomatic, political and economic matters to include a knowledge of the foreign policies of other nations. In his view the ideal leader was more than a military specialist--he was a man of wide horizons capable of perceiving the military role in a setting of integrated national power derived from many sources.

If asked to identify certain intellectual gifts particularly appropriate to the tasks of such a leader, I would underscore the importance of clarity and facility in oral and written expression. A career officer is constantly engaged in attending school, teaching school, training men and units, explaining military issues to superiors and setting forth to them the relative merits of alternative decisions and courses of action. In all such tasks he must be able to speak and write lucidly and persuasively, carefully avoiding any professional jargon which may becloud his thoughts and obscure his meaning. (As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of school English teacher, simplifying and purifying the language of important staff papers to make them readily comprehensible to civilian leaders.) While military communicators need not aspire to a high literary quality in their style, they must be clear and concise if they are to avoid misunderstandings which may prove fatal to the outcome of matters of great moment.

Similarly, as a speechmaker, a commander need not rise to Churchillian heights of eloquence, but he must be able to speak easily and effectively to his men, explaining to them the why of their tasks and spurring them to action at critical movements. Napoleon was famous for ability to rouse his men, a skill never better demonstrated than in his proclamation in 1796 to the ragged Army of Italy awaiting to invade Lombardy. Although regarded by some historian as a regretable invitation to plunder the "rich provinces and opulent towns" of the enemy, it gave the French soldiers an elan which carried them to six victories in a fortnight and launched their commander on his career of conquest.

The task of identifying subordinate qualities becomes much greater in the case of our third category which embraces the traits of character encountered in successful leaders. Historically, those traits have generally included virtues such as reliability, courage, dedication to mission, determination, and self-discipline. Napoleon stated it more briefly: "The chief virtues of a soldier are constancy and discipline" but he was thinking of soldiers in the ranks, not those in high command. The latter must above all have the ability to exercise command in such a way as to gain and retain the respect and confidence of their men--not merely by virtue of their professional competence and intellectual gifts but also from evidence of strength of character. Men going into danger want a leader they can count upon, one who though demanding much of them will bring them back alive and victorious. They will readily accept a stern commander if it is apparent that he views his rank as an obligation to them, not as a personal privilege and honor. Once such bonds of mutual respect and confidence unite a leader and his mean, they become a mighty force capable of the deeds of such famous fighting units as Caesar's Tenth Legion, Napoleon's Old Guard and Jackson's Stonewall Brigade.

Such thoughts lead me to a consideration of the final category--the inspirational qualities of a leader who can incite his men to unusual acts of valor. Many of the qualities previously discussed--competence, physical fitness, intellectual power, strength of character--contribute to the image of an inspiring leader but they are not sufficient in themselves. There are many able officers who are competent, intelligent, and reliable, yet remain dull, unimaginative and uninspiring-incapable of stirring a pulse, raising a cheer, or moving a soldier toward the enemy. Something else must be added to produce a "critical mass"-some spark which will release enthusiasm and even fervor in quite ordinary men and thereby obtain from them extraordinary results.

What constitutes the spark? Is it innate as it appears in some cases or may it be acquired by effort on the part of some while remaining unattainable by others? Is it definable or merely perceptible? A distinguished justice of the Supreme Court, the author of a widely discussed opinion on obscenity, was asked by a friend to define it. "I can't define it," he replied, "but I sure know it when I see it." Perhaps this aspect of leadership is of the same order.

Regardless of the elusiveness of the quality, one can readily identify its presence in an officer who has it. In the first place he is likely to give the external impression of a leader--he looks, acts and obviously feels a leader. General Phil Sheridan on his stone horse in Sheridan Circle conveys that impression even today as he seems to bow to admirers aligning the square. General Patton always looked the beau sabreur in his shining boots, pearlhandled revolvers and glittering helmet--trappings worn deliberately to call attention to a leader in the same way and for the same purpose that Henry of Navarre wore his white plume "into the ranks of war" at the battle of Ivry.

A sure indicator of the charisma of a leader is the effect of his presence on his troops. General Lee needed only to ride by a column on Traveler to arouse both the cheers of his men and their concern for his safety. Gros' painting of the young Bonaparte carrying the tricolor across the fireswept bridge at Arcola exemplifies the intrepid leader exposing himself to animate his troops. Wellington, who could hardly be accused of a Bonapartist bias, said that Napoleon's presence on the field was worth 40,000 troops to the French. The Iron Duke, himself a stern, no-nonsense commander who described his recruits from England as "the scum of the earth," succeeded by some mysterious gift in converting this scum into the veterans who manned the squares at Waterloo, turned back the Old Guard and toppled the Emperor. The unique spark which glowed in the personality of such leaders, even if undefinable, was no less real in presence and effect.

Before closing this survey of leadership, we might seek further clues to its nature in the qualities of a few well-known American leaders of World War II. Let us take, for example, the cases of General Marshall, the wartime Army Chief of Staff; General MacArthur, the commander of a theater of operations in the Pacific; General Bradley, an Army Group commander in Europe; and General Patton, our most famous armor commander. I have chosen them because of their acknowledged eminence, their differing levels of responsibility and their surprising contrasts in personality, habits and methods.

As to professional competence, they were all thoroughly equipped for their wartime assignments but as the result of differing circumstances. By virtue of his unusually rapid promotion in and after World War I MacArthur spent little time in the junior grades and had unusual opportunities to prepare for his subsequent wartime role by peacetime service as Army Chief of Staff and later as Field Marshal of the Philippine Army. Whereas he never had to learn the soldier's trade at each level in a laborious ascent to high command, the other three waited long years before reaching general rank, a delay which allowed ample time to ground themselves in the tactics and technique of their arms of the service. Marshall, by his many years between wars spent at Fort Benning, had the added opportunity of becoming acquainted with many of the ablest officers of the infantry, a valuable asset, when, as Chief of Staff, he became responsible for choosing and assigning the senior generals of an expanding Army.

In the intellectual field, MacArthur was always notable for the breadth of his interests and the brilliance with which he gave expression to his thoughts. Marshall was often referred to as a man with "a steel trap mind"--he impressed not by brilliance but by the logic and clarity of his thinking. Bradley had the manner of a schoolmaster-in fact, he had taught school prior to entering West Point and later, as a major, instructed cadets in mathematics at the Academy.

Patton, deliberately I suspect, fostered the impression of a flamboyant, hard--riding cavalryman, the antithesis of a scholar. On the latter point, the West Point faculty, by their low academic rating of Cadet Patton upon graduation, appeared to agree. But, Patton was deeply read in military history and was in fact a profound student of the profession of arms and the art of war. In Africa and Europe, he never missed the opportunity to pause at a nearby battlefield of the past before moving on to do battle on a field which would later bear his name.

The task becomes more difficult when we seek to appraise the character and inspirational power of such men. I would award the palm for strong character to Marshall--he has always typified to me utter integrity and moral fearlessness. After a hard decision, he had a way of folding his arms and saying: "Well, let the chips fall where they may." Bradley stood out by his calm judgment, his quiet, buiness-like manner and his evident concern for his troops. In this course of the battle for the Normandy beachhead, I was amazed to receive the unsolicited help of a combat command of the 2d Armored Division. General Bradley, the Army commander, had noted German tanks moving into my division sector and had hurried armor to reinforce our lightly armed airborne troops.

While Patton was known as a rough-tongued, arbitrary commander quick to wrath, during my service in his Third Army in the Battle of the Bulge, I could never have asked for a more considerate commander. Anything the division needed at Bastogne he provided--if he had it. It is just possible that some of this consideration stemmed from the fact that he never caught me in the division command post during his recurrent visits to the front. His antipathy for commanders who allowed themselves to become tied to their headquarters was well known--and, I might add, well justified.

There is much to learn from both Patton and Bradley if only because of the great dissimilarities in their appearance, personality, and methods of command. When caught in the limelight of world attention, Patton was no shrinking violet--indeed he rarely operated out of range of a friendly photographer. Bradley was modest to a fault and quick to pass the credit to his subordinates.

On the evening of 7 March 1945, Generals Ridgway, Gavin and I were guests at dinner of General Eisenhower at his headquarters near Reims. In the course of the evening, the General was called to the telephone in an adjacent room to receive a message from General Bradley whose advance had been halted by the barrier of the Rhine. Shortly we heard an excited whoop from Ike who rushed back beaming: "What do you know! Brad has just seized an unguarded bridge at Remagen and he's apologizing to me because he says it isn't a very good one!"

A sharper study in contrast was the difference in the way in which Patton and Bradley took leave of their senior commanders on the eve of two important operations, the invasion of Sicily on 10 July 1943, and the Normandy landing, 6 June 1944. I happened to be present at both.

A few days before the opening of the Sicilian campaign, Patton assembled his general officers in Mostaganem, Morocco, for a final discussion of plans. It was an all-day session with Patton taking little part until the very end. Then he took the floor and regaled us with a moving account of the gallant performance of green American troops in the North African operations in the spring. It was clear that he wanted to remind us generals going into our first combat that there was nothing wrong with our troops--and thereby to warn us that if anything went awry it would clearly be the fault of the generals. He closed with a menacing wave of his swagger stick and an ominous farewell: "The meeting's over. On your way and I never want to see you bastards again until you're ashore with your outfits in Sicily."

It was far different at First Army Headquarters in Bristol, England, when General Bradley took leave of his corps and division commanders shortly before D-Day. Bradley personally conducted the meeting and personally cross-examined each senior commander regarding his plans and his readiness for unexpected contingencies. When my turn came, I faced the Army commander, pointer in hand, before a map of my division sector and proceeded to recite my plans, feeling once more a cadet hoping for a passing mark from the instructor.

When the day was over, Brad, like Patton in Africa, felt the need to say something to inspire his commanders as they embarked on the greatest military operation of recorded history. But Brad was no speaker and he sensed it at this critical moment. So he simply folded his hands behind his back, his eyes got a little moist, he gulped and said quietly, "Good luck, men."

Which way was the better, Patton's or Brad's? All I can say is that we did our best for both.

In this discussion, I have been obliged to neglect my old West Point Superintendent, Douglas MacArthur from the morning of 13 June 1922, when he gave me my diploma until in the fall of 1955, when I called on him in New York at the Waldorf Towers to pay him my respects as the new Army Chief of Staff. I rang his doorbell with some trepidation as I suspected that, in his view, I was one of the Marshall-Eisenhower clique which had derogated the importance of the Pacific theater where he had fought and won the war. But when the door opened, there was MacArthur in person, arms outstretched to give me a warm embrace and hearty welcome--"Max, it's good to see you again!" Whereupon the new Chief of Staff became another fascinated victim of the famous MacArthur charm which few escaped--with the possible exception of President Truman.

After this rambling effort to explain and illustrate what seems to be the nature of successful military leadership, I am still left with a question to be answered. Can leadership in the sense used here be taught or is it a talent which eludes the methods of the schoolmaster and the scholar? In large measure, I would rally to the view which General Sherman expressed on this subject: "I have read of men born as generals peculiarly endowed by nature but have never seen one." As he had obviously known able generals on both sides of the Civil War, one must conclude that he believed that they had learned or had somehow acquired their gifts through means other than heredity.

Among our four categories of leader attributes, there is little doubt that professional competence and a trained intellect can be developed by standard educational methods. Professional competence has long been the primary objective of the military school system maintained by the Armed Forces, the overall success of which has never been challenged. A sound mind in a sound body has been an accepted goal of the educative process since antiquity. Hence, there seems no reasons to doubt that the leadership qualities of our first two categories are susceptible to being taught and learned.

The possibility of teaching character is somewhat more doubtful. However, religious teachers, prophets and sages of all times have undertaken to teach moral principles by precept, example, parable and fable. Parents have used the rod to reinforce precept in enforcing on their children a decent respect for the behavioral code of contemporary society. The fact that, by such means, many men have acquired habits of virtuous conduct which they have pursued over much of their lives at least in many cases provides ample ground to believe that the attributes with high moral character can be successfully taught or learned.

I must admit, however, that the acquisition of inspirational qualities through teaching techniques is far more uncertain. To some extent, such attributes can probably be acquired through studies of historical and contemporary examples but unfortunately there is no corpus of literature or base of scientific data available to help the researcher in this relatively unexplored field. Students of war and of the military profession have conducted few if any thoughtful investigations seeking to identify the sources of the inspirational qualities of certain leaders. It may be argued that the aspiring young leader may obtain academic instruction in certain arts and techniques which appear related to this quality--such subjects as public speaking, debating and histronics, the latter suggested by the dramatic skills demonstrated by a Patton or a MacArthur. Also studies in sociology and mass psychology may provide clues to the means available to a leader to influence the reactions of his followers.

But such approaches though useful are insufficient to plumb this secret of leader magnetism. In the end, the greatest promise for the researcher of this black art and an opportunity to observe their styles, methods and tricks of the trade. He might even explore the ground for President Lincoln's feeling that the quality of General Grant's whiskey had something to do with his quality as a general. All leads must be pursued tenaciously if we are ever to reach a solution to this fascinating riddle--what makes the inspiring leader?

NOTE: General Taylor delivered the substance of these remarks from outline notes at an elective seminar on Leadership for the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in the spring of 1977.

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ADVANCE SHEET #7

National, Personal, and Ideal Army Values

SECTION I

I. SCOPE: Know and express, in writing, the similarities and conflicts between national values, personal values, and ideal Army values.

II. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

TASK: The student will demonstrate, in writing, an improved understanding of personal values and the values of subordinates, peers, and senior officers.

CONDITION: Given a choice of two topic questions, outside classroom reading, and 40 minutes of actual in class writing time.

STANDARD: The student will write an answer to one of two topic questions that complies with the standards contained in Section II of this advance sheet.

III. INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Come to class prepared to write a paper on one of the following two topic questions:

Choice A: Schofield's Definition of Discipline espouses a type of leadership consistent with national values and ideal Army values. Cite and explain what national and ideal Army values are contained in Schofield's definition and compare or contrast them with your own personal values.

Choice B: In the "Asleep in the Truck" case study, what are LT Clark's demonstrated personal values as indicated by his dressing down of PV2 Woods? Explain how they coincide with or conflict with national and ideal Army values.

2. READ:

a. Section II, Grading Criteria, enclosed.

b. Student Handout 1, "Values," enclosed.

c. Student Handout 2, "Schofield's Definition of Discipline," enclosed.

d. Student Handout 3, "Asleep in the Truck," enclosed.

3. SCAN: Chapter 4, Professional Beliefs, Values and Ethics, FM 22-100, Military Leadership, pp 73-91.

4. BRING TO CLASS:

   a. Leadership Workbook.

   b. Enough 8 1/2- x 11-inch lined paper to write a 300 to 500 word double-spaced essay.

   c. A black pen or pencil.

5. OPTIONAL READING:

   a. Student Handout 4, "Duty-Honor-Country," page 7-13.

   b. Student Handout 5, "Philosophy of the Army Officers Corps" enclosed.

SECTION II

Grading Criteria

A. General

The 40 minute in class writing requirement is the second of two such assignments in the Engineer Officer Basic Course Leadership Curriculum. The classroom writing requirement is intended to make the student think about differences and similarities between national, ideal Army, and personal values. This class will be progressive and continuous from the student's previous instruction at the MQS I level.

The essay will be turned in at the end of class. As a means for achieving positive input for the students' Academic Efficiency Report (AER), the essay will be evaluated as superior, satisfactory or unsatisfactory. While no specific number of words is required to achieve a satisfactory rating the Leadership Branch believes either topic question can be answered in about 400 words, plus or minus 100. To use substantially less words in your answer may cause your understanding of the subject to be questioned.

All students including Allied Officers must complete the writing requirement. During the class writing assignment the two topic questions will be put on a sheet to be handed out by the instructor. The essay itself must be completed without notes or books, i.e., clear desks.

B. Specific

1. Superior:

The student will receive a superior evaluation when his/her essay reflects an understanding of the relationship between national, ideal Army, and personal values. Depending on the topic question selected, a superior essay will answer the question given and discuss what national, ideal Army, and personal values are demonstrated. The student may be asked to cite his/her own personal values as in Choice A and contrast them with national and ideal Army values. Necessarily, a superior paper will reflect excellent style and grammar. Specifically, the essay will have an introduction which defines the purpose of the paper and naturally leads the reader to the main body. The main body will be organized so that each paragraph has its own topic sentence and main points are easily identified and are arranged in a logical order. Transition sentences will lead readers smoothly to the next paragraph. The conclusion/summary will be logically drawn from analyses and will be fully supported. The essay must be grammatically correct and must not contain more than one error in spelling or grammar.

2. Satisfactory:

To achieve a satisfactory evaluation the student must demonstrate an understanding of the interrelationship between national values, ideal Army values and personal values. The essay will be logically organized and will lead to an appropriate conclusion. The difference in a superior and satisfactory evaluation will be, necessarily, in the area of style and expression.

3. Unsatisfactory:

The student will receive an unsatisfactory evaluation when his/her essay contains one or more of the following deficiencies:

a. The student demonstrates a lack of understanding of values and/or the relationship between national, ideal Army, and personal values.

b. The student fails to answer the questions given.

c. The student's paper is so lacking in neatness, style, grammar, and expression that serious errors in logic are present. Excessive errors in grammar and expression can be sole grounds for a unsatisfactory evaluation. A paper judged not long enough to answer the topic question will receive an unsatisfactory evaluation.

Students receiving an unsatisfactory evaluation will be counseled individually.

STUDENT HANDOUT 1

VALUES

A. Values- basic fundamental concepts held by individuals which provide the standards for governing behavior.

B. Ideal Army Values

1. Any listing of ideal Army values can stagger the imagination. They include courage, candor, honesty, commitment, loyalty, competence, respect for others, and fairness. The list goes on and on. In his speech to the Military Academy's Corps of Cadets, Douglas MacArthur listed "Duty, honor, and country" as the three ideal Army values the officer corps must live up to. That speech is enclosed as optional reading in Student Handout 4. The ideal Army values in this discussion are used not because they are considered to be the only ones but because they express important ideas that the professional can demonstrate. When an officer practices these values, he is building a case for himself as a person of integrity. It must be stressed that these values are ideals which all military professionals strive to achieve. We realize that people are human and will make mistakes that can be costly to themselves, to others, and to the profession. While one slip in behavior does not necessarily destroy a leader's integrity, it can damage his credibility. This credibility can be rebuilt only over a period of time. We must remember, however, that the more responsibility we have, the more damage we can do with one error.

2. Honesty. This is a universal value that has particular significance for military professional. The officer's word is his bond. Dishonesty is disfunctional to the military profession and can cost the lives of others.

3. Loyalty. Unit cohesiveness, which is fundamental to an effective fighting unit, is based on loyalty. Loyalty is a two-way street. As professional officers you will be in a position to give loyalty to your superiors and subordinates and to receive loyalty from them. Trust and confidence between soldiers and in units is firmly integrated with loyalty.

4. Competence. Competence is not a value that may be of critical importance in some civilian occupations, but in the military it is of ultimate importance. The engineer lieutenant who is not tactically competent, for example can cause the unnecessary death of their own fellow soldiers or innocent noncombatants.

5. Selfless Service. This value is considered to be the most important of the ethical values of the military professional (Chapter 4, FM 100-1). Subordination of self-interest to the larger group is absolutely essential to military service. It is an important part of the Constitution. Our society is based on the active subordination of self-interest for the common good. In the Oath of Commission, we are voluntarily entering a profession in which we place obligation to the service ahead of obligation to our own needs. The military only operates as a group; individuals must therefore be prepared to consider group needs as very important.

6. Respect for Others. This value is closely tied to the basic national value of human dignity/human worth that we will discuss in another lesson. Its particular importance for the military is in balancing the depersonalizing forces of the technological/bureaucratic system. While most of us subscribe to the value of demonstrating respect for others (at least we want it for ourselves), we must be aware that bureaucratic systems are amoral; that is, there is no inherent moral perspective in them. It is only in practicing the ethical values which we espouse, expressing them in our daily life, that this human dimension is added.

7. Fairness. Fundamental of American life is the concept of justice. As lofty as it sounds justice has application in the simplest events in the military because it is interpreted as fairness. The 1SG's duty roster is not popular, but as long as it is properly executed its fairness will not be called into question and soldiers will respect it as the fairest means of accomplishing an objective. Soldiers expect their leaders to be fair. Failure to meet this expectation can be the leader's quickest downfall.

8. Honesty, loyalty, competence, selfless service, respect for others, and fairness are concepts generally esteemed in our society and, as we have seen, important to the military profession. We have not produced an exhaustive list, but we have identified some core values for the military officer. The leader who fails to respect others will find it difficult to win their respect. If a leader is not honest and fair in dealing with others, his military effectiveness (and personal prestige) will suffer. The incompetent officer can be the cause of waste, injury or needless death. The professional must temper his natural concern for personal success and well-being with a sense of loyalty to others and unselfish commitment to the needs of the service and the welfare of the nation. The philosophy of the Army Officer Corps, Student Handout 5, is the Army's effort to link ideal Army values with officer management.

C. Personal Values:

1. Ideal Army values have been discussed in the reading already. How do these values fit with your own personal values? Further, how are your personal values tied to the values important to our nation? These are issues that we will consider in this lesson.

Vital to our heritage as Americans is the notion of moral pluralism. This means that we come from many different ethical backgrounds. Archie Bunker has expressed well the way in which a narrow viewpoint can separate us as human beings. As we begin to discuss a matter of importance to each of us--our own personal values--we would do well to heed the lesson that Archie teaches us. There are different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds represented in this class. It is in the spirit of the American Way of Life that each student's position be respected. For example, some of us might feel strongly that our religious beliefs are a most important part of our lives as military professionals; for others, this might not be an important issue at all. Discussing these personal values, which may include religious beliefs, involves revealing a very intimate part of ourselves to others. This calls for us to respect these views and not to belittle others for holding them.

2. Several things might happen to a value when an individual becomes a member of the military profession.

* A personal value might be enhanced and become more important. For example, dishonesty between individuals in civilian life may dissolve a relationship or cost a number of lives in the worst case. In the military, simple lies can cost a great loss in resources and lives.

* A value which may not be critically important in much of civilian life can become extremely important to the military (for example; competence).

* A value can be redefined or circumscribed by new and specific rules when entering a profession. For example, it is not acceptable to kill as a citizen except under extreme circumstances. In the military, we are trained to kill but in accordance with prescribed rules.

3. Integrity is the capstone of personal values.

a. Integrity might be defined as:

The unit of moral belief and moral action.

The unity of moral belief and moral action involves strict adherence to a code of values. If this is true, an officer of integrity must understand his values, adopt the values of his profession, and take responsibility for his actions--in other words, be sure that they are consistent with this collected body of professional values.

b. Integrity is expected of the officer by his peers, subordinates, superiors, and most importantly by the American people. It is the basis for the affirmation of the special trust and confidence placed in us as officers. Integrity also forms the capstone for the values which are important to military life.

4. Personal values often coincide with ideal Army values. In other cases, however, there can be conflict. The personal value of "free time" may conflict with the ideal Army value of selfless service. The young military officer must think about similarities and differences between his/her personal values and ideal Army values. What is their impact on the student's ability to be a professional military officer?

D. Basic National Values:

1. Basic to the values of the military are the values upon which our nation is founded. These are found in the Constitution, Bill of Rights, and Declaration of Independence. Everything that we do as soldiers, as well as the Army values we hold, ought to be consistent with these national values. Chapter 1 of FM 100-1 refers to the Constitutional basis of the Army. It is clear that there is a legal reason for the Army's existence written into the Constitution itself, as it "provides" for the common defense" of our nation. Beyond this, however, there are certain moral principles written into the founding documents that provide for a stable and just community in which we all can live.

2. Individual and Community: A Balance.

a. We hear much about the rights of the individual. These are indeed precious. The Bill of Rights, made of amendments to the Constitution, clearly establishes the desire of the American people to guard the status of the individual in our society. It was self-evident to the signers of the Declaration of Independence that "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" are "inalienable" rights; they are undeniable to the individual. On the other hand, the statement, "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union..." assumes that we are individuals and that we also constitute a community of people living together as a nation. We have a responsibility to the group. In real sense, we are asked voluntarily to give up some personal interests for the good of the community. In a very real way, the whole becomes more than the sum of its parts.

b. In a practical way, this is an attempt to create a community with the most possible personal freedom. At the same time, there is the realization that there must be some way to keep your freedom from interfering with mine. This calls for something outside of each of us to be the reference point when community and personal interests conflict. That something is the principle of justice or fairness.

c. The tension between individual and community is increased in the military. Respect for the individual is upheld in terms of due process and consideration of the welfare of the troops, etc.; but the unique mission of the military calls for a more stringent adherence to group needs. Cohesion is a word used to highlight the importance of teamwork and togetherness in accomplishment of the mission "to support and defend the Constitution." In combat, the leader may be told by his superior that a tactical position must be held. The leader organizes his subordinates in the best possible way to hold the position. Unless there is a clearly immoral or illegal objective in the order, there is no room to question. Obedience is paramount. Such obedience requires teamwork and places group welfare above personal goals. It is this type of discipline that can mean the difference between winning and losing the battle, which of course impacts on the larger activity--the war.

d. Specific individual values. Although it is frequently necessary and appropriate that group values be given primary consideration, as a leader, you must be sensitive to the individuals in your charge. The fact that the profession asks the soldier to commit himself to a life of discipline necessary for the military creates a moral obligation on the part of the leader to keep the welfare of the individual soldier high on his list of priorities. This situation is reflected in several important constitutional values. They are: human worth and dignity, individual freedom, and equality.

- o Human worth and dignity
  - People are more important than systems.
  - People need, however, to recognize the importance of the system. Personal needs often must be subordinate to Army needs.
  - The concepts of human worth and dignity apply not only to Americans, but extend to the victims of war and even to the enemy.
  - Every person, both friend and foe, must be respected as a human being.
- o Individual freedom.
  - Liberty is one of the "inalienable" rights in the Declaration of Independence. The "blessing of liberty" is secured in the Constitution.
  - Personal freedom must always consider other persons. I cannot do what I please if it violates the rights of another individual.

- In a special sense, some personal freedom must be voluntarily given up if we are to have an effective Army that is to protect the system that established the freedom in the first place.

o Equality.

- Different training, maturity, responsibility, and experience place people at different places in the military hierarchy. This, however, does not contradict their fundamental equality as individual persons.

- Equality is institutionally recognized in the equal opportunity program.

E. Summary and Conclusion:

In the reading ideal Army values, personal values, personal values and basic national values have been discussed. These values are all interrelated. All of these values may come into play as you reason about the moral/ethical problems which you face in your assignments. As a professional, you take on many new responsibilities. Among these are the responsibilities to develop your understanding of the values of your profession and the ability to make mature judgements based on these values.

STUDENT HANDOUT 2

SCHOFIELD'S DEFINITION OF DISCIPLINE

The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and to give commands in such a manner and such a tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but and intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his subordinates, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.

Major General John M. Schofield, in an address to the Corps of Cadets, West Point, NY, August 11, 1879.

Asleep in the Truck

CASE STUDY

Lieutenant Clark has been having a difficult time with PV2 Woods, a member of his platoon. Private Woods is a surly young soldier who has frequently been in trouble since coming to the unit. He has one Article 15 for being in a barracks fight and another for being disrespectful to an NCO. He displays obvious contempt for officers generally and for LT Clark in particular, though he generally manages to do this without breaking regulations.

On a tour through the motor pool, the lieutenant discovers Private Woods sleeping in the back of a 5-ton dump truck. He shouts at an enlisted man to awaken him, then chews him out in a loud voice in the presence of other personnel in the motor pool. The officer tells Woods that he is a disgrace to himself and to his uniform. He makes disparaging comments about the man's lack of integrity and implies that he must not have been brought up well. Now that he has him where he wants him, the lieutenant shouts, he is going to see that Woods gets what he really deserves!

STUDENT HANDOUT 4

DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY

[Address at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, on the presentation of the Thayer Award by the Association of Graduates to General MacArthur, May 12, 1962. Annually, the Association of Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy presents the Thayer Award, its highest honor, to a distinguished U.S. citizen whose service in the national interest exemplifies the motto of the Academy: Duty, honor, country. In May, 1962, General MacArthur was named the recipient of the Thayer Award. During a day full of nostalgia, he was honored at a cadet parade on the Plain he so often mentioned. After a luncheon in the cadet dining hall, the Thayer Award was presented to General MacArthur before a large audience, including the entire Corps of Cadets. He then began to speak to the future officers on the meaning of the Academy's code: Duty, honor, country. This speech was delivered extemporaneously and, as far as can be determined by the editor, had not been written out by General MacArthur prior to its delivery at West Point. The speech--one of America's truly great pieces of oratory--summarized the General's philosophy of life and the guidelines he believed to be the heritage of the American soldier.]

No human being could fail to be deeply moved by such a tribute as this. Coming from a profession I have served so long and a people I have loved so well, it fills me with an emotion I cannot express. But this award is not intended primarily to honor a personality, but to symbolize a great moral code--a code of conduct and chivalry of those who guard this beloved land of culture and ancient descent. For all hours and for all time, it is an expression of the ethics of the American soldier. That I should be integrated in this way with so noble an ideal arouses a sense of pride, and yet of humility, which will be with me always.

Duty-Honor-Country. Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be. They are your rallying points to build courage when courage seems to fail, to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faitH, to create hope when hope becomes forlorn.

Unhappily, I possess neither that eloquence of diction, that poetry of imagination, nor that brilliance of metaphor to tell you all that they mean.

The unbelievers will say they are but words, but a slogan, but a flamboyant phrase. Every pedant, every demagogue, every cynic, every hypocrite, every troublemaker, and, I am sorry to say, some others of an entirely different character, will try to downgrade them even to the extent of mockery and ridicule.

But these are some of the things they do. They build your basic character. They mold you for your future roles as the custodians of the nation's defense. They make you strong enough to know when you are weak, and brave enough to face yourself when you are afraid.

They teach you to be proud and unbending in honest failure, but humble and gentle in success; not to substitute words for actions, not to seek the path of comfort, but to face the stress and spur of difficulty and challenge; to learn to stand up in the storm, but to have compassion on those who fall; to master yourself before you seek to master others; to have a heart that is clearn, a goal that is high; to learn to laugh, yet never forget how to weep; to reach into the future, yet never neglect the past; to be serious, yet never to take yourself too seriously; to be modest so that you will remember the simplicity of true greatness, the open mind of true wisdom, the meekness of true strength.

They give you a temperate will, a quality of the imagination, a vigor of the emotions, a freshness of the deep springs of life, a temperamental predominance of corage over timidity, of an appetite for adventure over love of ease.

They create in your heart the sense of wonder, the unfailing hope of what next, and the joy and inspiration of life. They teach you in this way to be an officer and a gentleman.

And what sort of soldiers are those you are to lead? Are they reliable? Are they brave? Are they capable of victory?

Their story is known to all of you. It is the story of the American man-at-arms. My estimate of him was formed on the battlefield many, many years ago, and has never changed. I regarded him then, as I regard him now, as one of the world's noblest figures; not only as one of the finest military characters, but also as one of the most stainless.

His name and fame are the birthright of every American citizen. In his youth and strength, his love and loyalty, he gave all that mortality can give. He needs no eulogy from me or fro any other man. He has written his own history and written it d on his enemy's breast.

But when I think of his patience in adversity, of his courage under fire, and of his modesty in victory, I am filled with and emotion of admiration I cannot put into words. He belongs to history as furnishing one of the greatest examples of successful patriotism. He belongs to posterity as the instructor of future generations in the principles of liberty and freedom. He belongs to the present, to us, by his virtues and by his achievements.

In twenty campaigns, on a hundred battlefields, around a thousand campfires, I have witnessed that enduring fortitude, that patriotic self-abnegation, and that invincible determination which have carved his statue in the hearts of his people.

From one end of the world to the other, he has drained deep the chalice of courage. As I listened to those songs (of the Cadet Glee Club), in memory's eye I coulse see those staggering columns of the First World War, bending under soggy packs on many a weary march, from dripping dusk to drizzling dawn, slogging ankle-deep through the mire of shell-pocked roads; to form grimly for the attack, blue-lipped, covered with sludge and mud, chilled by the wind and rain, driving home to their objective, and, for many, to the judgment seat of God.

I do not know the dignity of their birth, but I do know the glory of their death. They died, unquestioning, uncomplaining, with faith in their hearts, and on their lips the hope that we would go on to victory.

Always for them: Duty-Honor-Country. Always their blood, and sweat, and tears, as we sought the way and the light and the truth. And 20 years after, on the other side of the globe, again the filth of murky foxholes, the stench of ghostly trenches, the slime of dripping dugouts, those boiling suns of relentless heat, those torrential rains of devastating storms, the loneliness and utter desolation of jungle trails, the bitterness of long separation from those they loved and cherished, the deadly pestilence of tropical disease, the horror of stricken areas of war.

Their resolute and determined defense, their swift and sure attack, their indomitable purpose, their complete and decisive victory--always victory, always through the bloody haze of their last reverberating shot, the vision of gaunt, ghastly men, reverently following your passwords of "Duty-Honor Country."

The code which those words perpetuate embraces the highest moral law and will stand the test of any ethics or philosophies ever promulgated for the uplift of mankind. Its requirements are for the things that are right and its restraints are from the things that are wrong. The soldier, above all other men, is required to practice the greatest act of religious training--sacrifice. In battle, and in the face of danger and death, he discloses those divine attributes which his Maker gave when He created man in His own image. No physical courage and no greater strength can take the place of the divine help which alone can sustain him. However hard the incidents of war may be, the soldier who is called upon to offer and to give his life for his country is the noblest development of mankind.

You now face a new world, a world of change. The thrust into outerspace of the satellite spheres and missiles marks a beginning of another epoch in the long story of mankind. In the 5 or more billions of years the scientists tell us it has taken to form the earth, in the 3 or more billion years of development of the human race, there has never been a more abrupt or staggering evolution.

We deal now, not with things of this world alone, but with the illimitable distances and as yet unfathomed mysteries of the universe. We are reaching out for a new and boundless frontier. We speak in strange terms of harnessing the cosmic energy; of making winds and tides work for use; of creating unheard-of synthetic materials to supplement or even replace our old standards basics, to purify sea water for our drink; of mining ocean floors for new fields of wealth and food; of disease preventives to expand life into the hundreds of years; of controlling the weather for a more equitable distribution of heat and cold, or rain and shine; of spaceships to the moon; of the primary target in war no longer limited to the armed forces of an enemy, but instead to include his civil populations; of ultimate conflict between a united human race and the sinister forces of some other planetary galaxy; of such dreams and fantasies as to make life the most exciting of all times.

And through all this welter of change and development your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable. It is to win our wars. Everything else in your professional career is but corollary to this vital dedication. All other public purposes, all other public projects, all other public needs, great or small, will find others for their accomplishment; but you are the ones who are trained to fight.

Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed, that the very obsession of your public service must be Duty-Honor-Country.

Others will debate the controversial issues, national and international, which divide men's minds. But serene, calm, aloof, you stand as the nation's war guardian, as its lifeguard from the raging tides of international conflict, as its gladiator in the arena of battle. For a century and a half you have a defended, guarded, and protected its hallowed traditions of liberty and freedom, of right and justice.

Let civilian voices argue the merits or demerits of our processes of government: Whether our strength is being sapped by deficit financing indulged in too long, by Federal paternalism grown too mighty, by power groups grown too arrogant, by politics grown too corrupt, by crime grown too rampant, by morals grown too low, by taxes grown too high, by extremists grown too violent; whether our personal liberties are as thorough and complete as they should be.

These great national problems are not for your professional participation or military solution. Your guidepost stands out like a tenfold beacon in the night: Duty-Honor-Country.

You are the leaven which binds together the entire fabric of our national system of defense. From your ranks come the great captains who hold the nation's destiny in their hands the moment the war tocsin sounds.

The long grey line has never failed us. Were you to do so, a million ghosts in olive drab, in brown khaki, in blue and grey, would rise from their white crosses, thundering those magic works: Duty-Honor-Country.

This does not mean that you are warmongers. On the contrary, the soldier above all oter people prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war. But always in our ears ring the ominous words of Plato, that wisest of all philosophers: "Only the dead have seen the end of war."

The shadows are lengthening for me. The twilight is here. My days of old have vanished-tone and tint. They have gone glimmering through the dreams of things that were. Their memory is one of wondrous beauty, watered by tears and coaxed and caressed by the smiles of yesterday. I listen vainly, but with thirsty ear, for the witching melody of faint bugles blowing reveille, of far drums beating the long roll.

In my dreams I hear again the crash of guns, the rattle of musketry, the strange, mournful mutter of the battlefield. But in the evening of my memory always I come back to West Point. Always there echoes and re-echoes: Duty-Honor-Country.

Today marks my final roll call with you. But I want you to know that, when I cross the river, my last conscious thoughts will be of the corps, and the corps, and the corps.

I bid you farewell.

Reprinted from A Soldier Speaks Douglas MacArthur. Edited by Major Vorin Whan, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965.

STUDENT HANDOUT 5

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ARMY OFFICER CORPS

The Profession of Arms

The Armed Forces defend freedom by protecting national interests and deterring war. Decisive victory is imperative should deterrence fail. To cope with the rigors of war, the Army must foster a professional Army ethic which includes:

- o Loyalty to the ideals of the nation.
- o Loyalty to the soldier and the organization.
- o Personal responsibility.
- o Selfless service.

The professional Army ethic applies to all aspects of officership and it is as important in staff positions and support units and organizations as it is in command positions and combat units. It knows no boundaries between leading, commanding, managing, learning and teaching; but requires the ability to understand the integration of combat, combat support, and combat service support units into the Army, joint, or combined forces to accomplish the mission. The Officer Personnel Management System reinforces and helps preserve the professional Army ethic through identification, development, and promotion of officer who live by this ethic, and who can lead the Army's soldiers and organizations in peace and war. The key to victory is the vigorous application of the professional Army ethic with the soldierly values: moral, physical, and spiritual courage, candor and personal integrity; technical and tactical competence; commitment to mission and unit welfare; the ability to think ahead and manage change; audacity coupled with sound judgment, and uncompromising standards.

Structure for Peace and War

Advancing technology, increasing battlefield lethality, and accelerating change have compressed decision cycles and multiplied the complexity of war. In preparation for war, leaders must: teach concepts and doctrine; build cohesive teams; train units for excellence; develop their subordinates; take care of soldiers and their families; establish an environment in which soldiers can live and grow; manage complex programs and system; plan for combat; plan for mobilization and prepare for rapid deployment. During the conduct of war, leaders also must: grasp situations quickly; deal with uncertainty; act decisively; maximize firepower and maneuver; gain and maintain momentum; minimize battlefield confusion; and lead soldiers and units to fight and win with resources available. Through progressive education, training, and assignments, officer develop the essential knowledge and skills to raise, provision, deploy, fight, maintain, sustain, and educate the Army in the complex tactics and strategies required to deter wars, to fight wars, and to win wars. Every officer must understand tactics, administration, logistics, communications, and information management and be competent in the requirements of peace, mobilization, and war.

OPMS Foundations

To assure a system that provides for orderly change but is grounded in unchanging fundamentals, the Officer Personnel Management System is anchored to seven philosophical foundations. The system:

- o Fosters the professional Army ethic.
- o Demands candor and high ethical conduct.
- o Develops and assigns officers to support valid Army requirements.
- o Provides as much opportunity as excellence allows.
- o Recognizes the unique talents and potential of each officer.
- o Provides continuous and progressive professional development throughout a full career.
- o Rejects self-serving motives.

Responsibilities

Officers developed under the Officer Personnel Management System must understand that their ultimate responsibility is to be prepared to perform their wartime duties. Critical to this understanding is the knowledge that officers will be required to fulfill their responsibilities on and off the battlefield, since the sustainment of the Army in peace is vital to its success in war. Through leading, teaching and coaching, officers must create an operating environment which fosters the professional Army ethic, encourages initiative, and builds esprit de corps. In return, the officer corps expects support by the system and a high degree of consistency in the application of its provisions.

COMMAND DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF COMBINED ARMS
UNITED STATES ARMY ENGINEER SCHOOL
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ADVANCE SHEET #8

Ethical Decision Making

I. SCOPE: Become able to apply military professional ethics to decision making.

II. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

TASK 8: Use the Military Professional Ethics Decision-Making Model in combat and peacetime scenarios.

CONDITIONS: Classroom, student notes, case studies, and handouts.

STANDARDS: The student will be able to:

1. Identify and describe the nine components of the Military Professional Ethics Decision-Making Model.

2. Provide an example of how the model is used by applying it to a case study.

III. INSTRUCTIONS:

1. READ:

a. Section I, pg 8-2.

b. Student Handout 1, "Aids for Engaging in Ethical Discussions", pg 8-8.

c. Student Handout 2, "Characteristics of Good Reasons and Decisions," pg 8-9.

2. BRING TO CLASS: Leadership Workbook.

3. OPTIONAL READING: a. Section II, pg 8-7.

b. Student Handout 3, "The Monkey Principle," pg 8-10.

SECTION I

Well trained soldiers speak, move, and act largely by an intuition which has become habit. The experienced officer learns to act correctly in emergencies, large and small - one might almost say at war's every heartbeat. Through experience and training he attains a state where decisions come to him almost automatically; he knows in an instant that one thing will work, another will not.

General Patton addressed this thought when he was once accused of making snap decisions. He replied: "I've been studying the art of war for forty-odd years. When a surgeon decides in the course of an operation to change its objective, he is not making a snap decision but one based on knowledge, experiences and training. So am I."

For this reason the officer who aspires to lead soldiers in war must develop his reasoning power tactically, technically and ethically.

In this lesson you must confront a very common misconception about ethics instruction. Many students expect the course to provide answers to specific ethical problems. It does not. It does, however, seek to provide an analytical method for them to use to choose courses of action when faced with ethical conflicts. Often, in the case of ethical questions there is no single "right" answer. But some courses of action may emerge as superior to others, and some may be disqualified from consideration altogether if a sound reasoning process is employed. Thus, a systematic approach, while not pretending to arrive at the "right" answer, can identify well justified courses of action in which we as decision makers can have confidence and which can be defended, as necessary or appropriate, to others concerned.

Genuine ethical problems are conflicts in values. We don't really have a problem if faced with a choice between an obvious right and an obvious wrong or unethical alternative. The difficulty begins when we don't know with certainty which course of action is right or, to be more accurate, which alternative is more right than the other. Ethical problems require us to make trade-offs, sometimes overriding certain legitimate values in favor of other values which may have greater priority in this particular situation. We may be torn when trying to determine which value should receive the greater priority. We may not feel confident that our choice will be understood or supported by those affected by it. We may worry that, which way we chose, the outcome may be less than satisfactory. We may be bothered by questions of motive -- our own or that of others involved. What we need to do is develop a better understanding of what is entailed in resolving an ethical issue, what forces are at play, and perhaps, a logical, systematic approach that will cause us to have greater confidence in our choices.

Suppose you are a staff officer and your boss publishes a policy letter. You see that the policy addresses one of the boss' pet peeves and it is obvious that he feels strongly about the subject. You have several reservations regarding the policy but they don't amount to anything you can't live with. Others in the organization, however, grumble loudly. In your opinion, some of the objections are justified, but most seem to be motivated by selfish concerns. In a staff meeting, some of the complaints surface and your boss strongly defends his policy. He then turns to you saying, "Don't you agree?"

In this case we have a conflict between candor and loyalty - values that are both held to be important in the military profession. How do we choose what to do?

Priority of values. We make the choice based on a personal, relatively inflexible ranking of values. We may strongly believe, for example, that honesty is always the best policy. Or we may have a strongly developed sense of loyalty to persons in authority, either deferring to their judgment or feeling that, even if the judgment is questionable, the greater responsibility is respecting and supporting the duly constituted policy maker.

Principles. We may choose between two competing values by following some internal rule of action which we'll call a principle. Sometimes we're not conscious of these rules or have never put them into words, but they operate in us nevertheless. For example, in this case we may decide based on which alternative would do the least harm to all concerned, including the boss' prestige, the unit welfare, and, of course, our own self interest. Rather than "least harm" we may operate on a "greatest good" principle which is only subtly different. Our choice may be to do what we would want someone else to do if he or she were the staff officer and we the boss, i.e., the "golden rule." Another principle that sounds very sophisticated but which many people employ is "universalization" whatever action I choose, would I be willing to agree that if some other person were in a similar situation, they would be justified in making the same choice?

The values addressed in this example are candor and loyalty. These are professional values, and, for many of us, they were personal values before we became soldiers. We all have a fairly lengthy list of personal and professional values that we have derived from culture, from the particular circumstances of our upbringing and education, and from our personal choices and experiences. They may change somewhat over time. At the same time, we adhere to a much shorter list of principles which remain relatively constant. We use these to govern the priority and application of our values. When values come into conflict, we are willing to make trade-offs or compromises so long as these don't compromise our principles.

DECISION MAKING

There are some other mental processes that we go through in making a decision about an ethical issue. In the simple cases, these processes are almost automatic; we may not be conscious of them. But in the more complex cases, to be unconscious of them is to invite sloppy, and perhaps fallacious, reasoning.

In the example of the boss' new policy and its conflict between loyalty and candor, let's say, for the sake of discussion, that our operating principle is "least harm." That is, we will choose either to speak out, giving a frank appraisal of the policy or give public support to the boss, suppressing our personal objections, based on which course of action we believe will do the least damage. How do we decide which alternative, in fact, is least harmful?

In such situations, you need a reasoning process to assist you in deciding what course of action results in the greater moral good.

An ethical decision-making process to help you think through ethichal dilemmas is shown if Figure 1.

The ethical reasoning process takes place within you from the time you confront a problem until you develop and implement a solution. In the process you analyze the problem, identify influencing forces, develop possible courses of action, assess them, and decide on a course of action. A variety of forces influence the ethical reasoning process. Principal forces that you should consider are defined as follows:

. Legal standards - formal regulatory standards contained in law.

. Basic national values - values established in the Constitution, Declaration of Independence, and other documents and traditions that provide the foundation for required behavior of all Americans.

. Actual Army values - values actually functioning in the local unit that produce the standards governing day-to-day soldier behavior. Actual Army values are often the same as traditional Army values. There are times, however, when they are not - such as careerism, falsifying records. and borrowing another unit's equipment to display as your own for an inspection.

. Individual values - values held by the individual soldiers involved in the situation.

. Institutional pressures - elements of Army policies, procedures, operations, and other aspects which influence the ethical behavior of soldiers.

DECISION MAKING MODEL

FIGURE 1



Decision Making Steps:

1. Identify the values in conflict.
2. Assess the impact of influencing forces.
   a. Laws and regulations
   b. National values
   c. Ideal Army values
   d. Actual Army values
   e. Individual values
   f. Institutional pressures
3. Determine possible courses of action.
4. Weigh alternatives in terms of:
   a. Influencing forces
   b. Ordering princilpes
5. Select a course of action.

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These six forces may not be the only important forces that you should identify and consider. Ethics is a part of leadership. Therefore, your reasoning process should also consider the four factors of leadership explained in Chapter 2 of FM 22-100 - the follower, the leader. communications, and the situation. The four factors of leadership and the six principal forces defined here are guides to help you determine the course of action which you believe leads to the highest moral good.

SECTION II

Requirement: Read the following case situation and be prepared to discuss how each of the elements of the decision making process apply. Be prepared to defend either of the following courses of action:

1. That SSG Walker should be punished under UMCJ.

2. That SSG Walker should not be punished under UCMJ.

Don't be concerned whether or not you agree with a stipulated course of action. What is important is how well can you justify a course of action according to the elements of the decision making process.

MOTOR SERGEANT

CASE STUDY

You are a company motor officer. Due to a number of recent motor vehicle accidents in the brigade, there is heavy command emphasis in your battalion on vehicle safety. The commander has issued a strongly worded policy letter concerning safety inspections, and the motor sergeant in one company was punished for repeated failure to insure that required inspections were correctly performed.

SSG Walker, your unit motor sergeant, has always been a thorough and conscientious NCO. Yesterday, however, a truck from your motor pool was stopped for a roadside spot-check and failed the inspection due to several obvious safety deficiencies. SSG Walker had signed the technical inspection sheet that permitted the vehicle to be dispatched from the motor pool. His signature indicated that he had personally checked the vehicle and that it was mechanically safe.

You interview SSG Walker and point out that, although his record was excellent, this is a serious matter. You remind him that a few days ago you caught a truck with faulty brake lights leaving the motor pool and had admonished him for it. You ask him to comment. He acknowledges his negligence and, in response to your further questions, he explains that he has been preoccupied with personal problems. You learn that he has been having marital difficulties and that three days ago his wife left him.

You are required to confer with the company commander concerning this case and to recommend the action he should take.

STUDENT HANDOUT #1

AIDS FOR ENGAGING IN ETHICAL DISCUSSIONS

Certain conditions must be met if two or more people are to engage in a serious discussion of ethics.

1. You must be willing to look closely at your values and beliefs and the values and beliefs of others.

2. You must be tolerant of the opinions and viewpoints of others.

3. You must be able to empathize with the viewpoints and positions of others.

4. You must set aside self-interest and be able to see things from the viewpoints of others, i.e., to sympathize with their circumstances.

5. You must be able to put aside the need to act while you search for reasons.

6. You must be able and willing to tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty.

7. You must be able to probe deeply and to get beneath the surface of a case situation.

8. Finally, you must be able to suspend for the time being your ethical and value beliefs in order to examine alternative views.

STUDENT HANDOUT #2

CHARACTERISTICS OF GOOD REASONS AND DECISIONS

1. The decision does not indicate partiality or favoritism to your own position if it does not benefit only you or a specific individual or subgroup.

2. The decision is universal. It applies to (is a good alternative for) anyone else in a similar situation.

3. The reasons or justification for the decision must be consistent with other standards, rules, regulations, guidelines, policies, principles, and organizational values. The decision does not undermine these principles, standards and values; rather it promotes professional Army values.

4. The decision will produce some action aimed at resolving the predicament. Not deciding or doing nothing still indicates a decision, and it has consequences for which you are responsible.

5. The decision sets an example for others. It enhances your integrity and credibility as an officer. It encourages others to have trust and confidence in you. It teaches a principle to others.

6. The decision shows an appreciation for moral rules and principles (e.g., honesty, fairness, justice, trust, loyalty, responsibility, obligation, welfare of the community).

STUDENT HANDOUT 3

The Monkey Principle

At first thought it might seem that three monkeys could have nothing to do with command and leadership. But, on second thought, consider the famous image of three monkeys sitting side by side--one with hands over his ears, another with hands over his eyes, and the third with hands over his mouth. The caption is "Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil."

In command and leadership, it is well to keep those monkeys in mind when faced with certain special situations. No clear rule separates cases where the monkeys are right from those where they are wrong, so let us examine and reflect on several footnotes to history involving monkey situations.

The first episode concerns the Army tactical officer for my cadet company at West Point. The occasion was a full field inspection in ranks with equipment rolled in a pack on the back of each cadet.

As the "Tac" moved down the line, an alarm clock went off inside the pack of one of my roommates. The ranks stood firm and unsmiling while the Tac blandly ignored the raucous clock and proceeded with his inspection. The inspection ended, the Tac left and the company was dismissed, both sides well pleased with the quiet self-control they had managed. (All except the cadet in whose pack the alarm clock had been hidden. "All right, now," he demanded loudly, "who the hell did it?")

That was a case where poor hearing by the Tac was the best part of wisdom. He knew there was virtually no chance he could find out who staged that alarm clock coup. So, figuratively speaking, he put his hands over his ears.

Here is another situation with monkeyshine overtones, involving weak hearing and poor eyesight. This occurred on my first post soon after we received a new regimental commander.

One Sunday afternoon I wandered down the hall from my room in the bachelor quarters to that of a classmate named Eddie. Several others were there with him, including an athletic pal of mine at The Point named Dudley, who was a bit nearsighted.

They were in Eddie's bedroom with a bottle of Prohibition Georgia corn and, incongruously enough, a long-necked bottle of green creme de menthe. The atmosphere was pleasantly jovial and they offered me a drink, but did not persist when I declined.

Not long after my arrival, there was a knock on the living room door and Dud, in slacks and undershirt, said, "I'll get it, Eddie."

He stepped through the bedroom door and I started to follow--but recognized the figure in the living room doorway and froze in place. It was our distinguished new regimental commander in white tropical uniform (seldom worn there) come to return our official social calls.

But Dud was not fazed, for he wheeled about in the middle of the living room and said, "Hey, Eddie, there's a white-haired old geezer here to see you."

I remained silent and frozen in the bedroom, feeling like the innocent bystander who sees a bullet headed his way. But by the time Eddie answered Dud's summons our visitor was gone. And shortly thereafter I was gone too.

That fine old gentleman realized his young bachelors were not expecting callers and knew his white uniform could be mistaken at a glance for a civilian suit. So he quietly faded away. Whether he guessed he had walked in on a little Georgia corn party I'll never know, but I believe he suspected it. If so, he was following the policy of those Old Army days: take positive action in disciplinary matters, but don't go snooping around for off-duty peccadilloes.

And he well knew that is what it would look like if one of his first acts was to invade the bachelor quarters unannounced, then lower the boom on that bedroom social hour around a bottle.

As for me, I never forgot the quiet consideration and understanding of an older senior officer for some young squirts. That fine old colonel (later a general officer) was following the example of all three monkeys at once: he saw no evil, heard no evil, and spoke no evil to the regimental adjutant the next morning about initiating a post mortem in the premises.

Years later, after assuming command of Company G, 26th Infantry at Plattsburg Barracks, I found myself with a somewhat similar monkey on my back. In fact, two monkeys: one involving eyesight and the other a question of whether or not to speak a restrictive evil.

Several weeks after assuming command I had shared a coffee break in Sgt. "Honest John" Smith's mess hall with 1st Sgt. "Big Jim" Redding. In this informal setting we discussed certain unwritten customs that I would follow as company commander. These included:

- That I might show up at the company any time, day or night, but unless there was some specific reason, I would normally confine my out-of-duty hours visits to my office, our kitchen, the supply room and hallways connecting them.

- More particularly, unless there was some direct reason to do so, in off-duty hours I would not invade the privacy of the dayroom or the sleeping areas.

- Finally, that I looked to him and our sergeants to monitor and control off-duty hours in these areas and bring me into the act when necessary.

Some weeks later, I returned to my office after supper on a payday. In passing along the hallway to the office, I glanced toward the dayroom and noticed a group standing around a table where others were seated.

Like my former regimental commander (the "white-haired old geezer") I was pretty sure I knew what was going on: that the use of cards and the exchange of money was involved. Like him, however, my eyesight was poor and I continued on my way, but the hands over my mouth slipped a bit the next day in a little conference with Big Jim Redding.

I told him that gambling was against regulations, but that if some men had to gamble and were going to do it anyway, maybe it was better for them to do it in our dayroom than to be taken by card sharpers somewhere else.

On the other hand, I told Big Jim to pass the word to all NCOs that for an NCO to gamble with the privates was strictly a "no-no." Also that I would invoke the law to divest any NCO of his chevrons who tested his skill and luck for money with privates. Further, it was the responsibility of NCOs to insure no outside sharpie invaded our barracks to "take" our soldiers.

Pertinent comments include:

- That image of the three monkeys was created by a civilian as a guideline in dealing with your fellow man in day-to-day living. However, in specialized situations, it can apply in military duties--with perception, judgment and common sense.

- There are those who will cluck in dismay at the idea of a regimental commander quietly fading away during Prohibition when he had reason to think he was privy to a violation of the Volstead Act. Similarly, they will look with dour displeasure at a former company commander who acknowledges that, within certain limits, he has tolerated gambling.

  To them let me quote Rudyard Kipling: "Single men in barracks don't grow into plaster saints." Further, to add my view: Military men in authority should keep in mind there are times in command and leadership when the idea of those three monkeys may be pertinent and appropriate.

- One of our greatest military leaders was General of the Army Omar N. Bradley. In A Soldier's Story he records a special command situation and his solution to it. This involved the indomitable Col. Harry A. "Paddy" Flint, who assumed command of the 39th Infantry before the invasion of Sicily.

To help his regiment gain confidence under fire Paddy would stroll about the front, calmly rolling a cigarette with one hand and saying scornfully, "Lokkit them lousy krauts. Couldn't shoot in the last war. Can't shoot in this one. Can't even hit an old buck like me."

One day Paddy came to II Corps headquarters with Maj. Gen. Manton Eddy. When Paddy ambled off to the G-3 tent, General Eddy picked up Paddy's helmet and displayed the "AAA-O" stencil on it.

"It means," General Eddy said, 'Anything, Anywhere, Anytime, bar nothing.' Paddy has this thing stenciled on every damned helmet and truck in his whole damned regiment." Then he added, "Haven't you issued some kind of corps order about special unit markings?"

"Manton," General Bradley replied, "I can't see a thing today--nope, not even that helmet of Paddy Flint's."

Just another case where the principle of the three monkeys was perceptively applied in command and leadership.

- Where does flexibility and permissiveness begin? Anyone who decides to break some rule or regulation will do so at his peril, and the same applies to the commander who tolerates a violation. Whether you are the superior or the subordinate in applying the monkey principle, your judgment had better be good--because you will have to live with the result.

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COMMAND DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF COMBINED ARMS
UNITED STATES ARMY ENGINEER SCHOOL
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ADVANCE SHEET #9

Set the Ethical Example

I. SCOPE: Learn the leader's ethical responsibilities.

II. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

TASK 9: Discuss the importance of ethical role modeling and setting the example.

CONDITIONS: Classroom and student notes.

STANDARDS: The student will:

a. Define role modeling and state why it is a key responsibility of an officer.

b. List and discuss two considerations (e.g., consistency, communication and trust) that support a positive ethical example.

c. State and discuss two sources of role model feedback.

III. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

TASK 9a: Analyze role modeling performance.

CONDITION: Classroom, officer profiles and student notes.

STANDARDS: The student will:

a. List two positive and two negative examples of traits or behaviors from each profile.

b. Suggest two actions the profiled officer could take to improve his example.

IV. INSTRUCTIONS:

1. READ: Section I, page 9-3.

2. BRING TO CLASS: Leadership Workbook.

3. OPTIONAL READING:

a. Section II, page 9-6

b. Student Handout #1, "Evaluating Your Effectiveness as a Role Model," page 9-8.

c. "Moving" Case Study, page 9-12.

d. Student Handout #2, "The Essense of Army Leadership," page 9-13.

e. "Ethics and the Senior Officer: Institutional Tensions", Clay T. Buckingham, Parameters, page 9-21.

SECTION I

As the commisioned officer in charge of your unit, your subordinates expect many things from you. They look to you for information, instructions and orders; they look to you to establish policy, and organize and direct their work; they look to you for advice, assistance and for personal and performance counseling; they look to you for technical expertise. <u>But most of all they are looking at you and observing your actions and behavior.</u> It is through your daily actions, the way you conduct yourself, that they will see your values. They will see your standards for their behavior and your expectations for their performance. In short, they are looking at the way you conduct yourself in your role so they may know how to act and pattern their behavior. In role modeling to setting the example, the proverb, "Your actions speak louder than your words," is absolutely true.

Think back into your past and select the two individuals whom you most respected while growing up and going to college. These could be individuals such as teachers, relatives, or scout leaders. Once you have identified these individuals, pick one and ask yourself why this individual had a significant impact on you. Now compare your attitudes, values and behavior to those of the individual you select. In most cases, you should find a strong parallel. These individuals provided your model or example during the time you knew them. In addition, their influence continues with you even though you may no longer have contact with them.

While somewhat more difficult, you can repeat this analysis for individuals you least respected. You see in their behavior things that you do not want to see in yourself. The outcome will be that your attitudes, values and behavior are quite opposite to these individuals. Here you have an example of a negative role model.

Upon assuming any position of leadership, you automatically become a role model for your subordinates. As a commissioned officer, a member of the profession of arms, and the senior ranking person in your unit, you have a responsibility for living by the required standards of behavior and conducting yourself at all times in accordance with the Army's values and the nation's values. Through your role model. vou can do more to establish and build a positive ethical climate than by any other action you take.

Every unit has a unique set of conditions that combine to establish a climate that is either conducive to decision making and action that supports professional values, or that subverts the values and principles held to be essential for the military. This climate is something that can be analyzed and positively influenced by the sensitive, well-

informed leaders, and conversely, that can be negatively influenced by an officer who is insensitive to the ethical dimensions of his decisions or who reasons poorly when faced with ethical problems. Admittedly, some factors in the ethical environment may not be subject to our direct control (e.g., an ill-advised directive from higher headquarters), but this does not exempt us from the responsibility to do all that we can to establish a positive climate in the areas that we can influence.

There are indicators of an ethical climate that can help us to decide whether the climate is positive or enhances and encourages ethical behavior or if the climate is negative or discourages ethical behavior. Further, the indicators can help us locate the positive aspects of a good ethical climate so we can help to maintain it, or help us to locate the negative aspects to make improvements (or at least learn from the experience).

a. Leadership is an extremely important climate indicator. Leaders have authority and responsibility based on their rank and position (job). Further, their effectiveness as moral leaders is based on the consistency of their decisions and actions with their personal and professional values. When we view a leader from the vantage point of a subordinate, we inevitably formulate an opinion on whether the individual acts appropriately within the limits of his authority and responsibility. In short, we have anticipation and expectation and expectations about how a good leader "ought" to act in a given situation. If we carefully consider where we derive our opinion of how a military supervisor "ought" to act, we will probably arrive back at our initial discussion of fundamental military values.

b. Communication. Within any organization, there are formal and informal methods of communication up and down the command chain. The character of both types of communication has direct influence on the ethical climate of the unit. When policies and directives are clear and unambiguous, and when candid feedback is sought, there is little opportunity for professional values and principles to be subverted. when formal communications are unclear, when informal communications contradict formal ones, when only positive feedback is solicited or tolerated, ethical abuses will abound.

c. Trust and Confidence. Like communication, trust and confidence should operate both up and down the chain of command. Although formal procedures for enforcing policies are necessary in any organization, a senior's obvious lack of trust in his subordinates is likely to generate resentment and a sense that members of the organization are really not expected to act honorably on their own. A similar lack of trust and confidence is then unlikely to be exibited by subordinates toward seniors, and the expectation of unethical behavior is more likely to be fulfilled.

d. Rewards and Punishments. Observing how rewards and punishments are distributed in a unit is another good indication of ethical climate. It goes without saying that if there is discrimination in awarding promotions, citations, passes and the like, or if only soldiers of a particular race, rank or background have easy access to leaders, the important values of justice, honesty and respect for the individual are being subverted. The same is true if a review of disciplinary procedures reveals significant imbalances. Because discriminatory practices can occur even when leaders are well intended, conscientious efforts to remain scrupulously fair are essential.

e. Value Orientation of Unit members. We have been looking at the effects on the ethical climate of various institutional elements and practices. An important ingredient of a somewhat different nature is the value orientation of the members of the unit. This includes your own values and those of the superiors, peers, and subordinates who make up your organization. When, in spite of the diversity of cultural, ethnic and religous backgrounds that characterize military units, there exists some fundamental agreement or overlap about the appropriateness of basic values, the ethical climate is enhanced. It is natural to expect difficulties if some members, whether individually or in groups, either have not learned or have come to disregard the improtance of honesty, loyalty, self-sacrifice, and so forth, for military effectiveness. Consider two opposing examples. What if a number of people in the unit feel that being a soldier is just another job, and that they owe nothing to the organization besides being present for duty during working hours? Or, what if several key members of the group hold the opposite view, that the mission is not only first, but it is the only issue of importance?

SECTION II

OPTIONAL IN CLASS EXERCISE

Discuss the following situations.
Determine how the circumstances in each one affects the climate of the unit. Use the questions following each vignette as a guide for further discussion. Spend no more then 4 to 5 minutes on each vignette.

The following questions pertain to each situation.

(1) What are the positive and negative examples of traits or behaviors shown in the situation?

(2) What standards are you communicating?

(3) What values are you communicating?

(4) What behavior and performance can be expected?

(5) Is it likely that the behavior will be ethical or unethical?

SITUATION I

In various meetings you have stressed the importance of always giving correct and accurate reports. On Friday morning your battery motor sergeant reports a deadline rate of 18 percent to you, the motor officer. In his visit to battalion later that morning your motor sergeant sees battalion records carrying your battery as reporting a deadline rate of 9 percent just below the battalion goal of 10 percent.

Is it likely your motor sergeant will be confused?

What kinds of reports can you expect from your motor sergeant in the future?

SITUATION II

During the last commander's call, you, the battalion S-1, provided an excellent presentation on the Army's Equal Opportunity program and strongly stated your support for every facet of the program. During a break later that week, you and several of your noncommissioned officers who attended the commander's call, get into a bull session where you delight them with your collection of off-color stories about women and minorities.

What will your noncommissioned officers think of you as a result of this incident?

What behavior might you expect of them in an equal oportunity type situations?

SITUATION III

After your third reinspection of the 2d squad's equipment storage room in preparation for a scheduled battalion commander's walk through of your platoon area you lose your cool. The equipment is in fair shape but the room itself is dirty, cluttered with extra parts and trading materials and the room badly needs paint. You angrily tell your platoon sergeant and the squad leader you want the room squared away, and add that you don't care how it is to be accomplished. Further, they best have it painted even though they might have to squeeze the paint out of berries!

What will your squad leader and platoon sergeant think of you as a result of this incident?

SITUATION IV

Your troop commander has just briefed you on the way your unit will conduct range firing next week. After returning from the meeting, you gather your NCOs together and inform them of the CO's directions. When discussing the firing, and in response to one of your NCO's questions about it, you give the CO's instruction on the matter. You then go on to say that the CO does not know a thing about setting up such training, but we (the platoon) are going to have to live with his plan and instructions.

If a member of the NCO's squad asks the NCO a similiar question how is the NCO likely to respond?

Is it likely that your NCOs will view you as you view your CO? Explain why or why not.

STUDENT HANDOUT 1

EVALUATING YOUR EFFECTIVENESS AS A ROLE MODEL

Recognizing that your impact as an ethical role model can exert a powerful and significant influence on your subordinates, it is important for you and all professional officers to pause periodically and ask yourselves, "What is my impact as a role model on my troops?" This self evaluation, while difficult, is necessary if you are to determine and overcome your weaknesses and enhance your strengths.

The single most important factor in securing feedback regardless of the source is the level of mutual trust that you share with the individual who is providing you feedback be that individual a fellow officer, a superior or subordinate. In such high mutual trust situations, feedback of all types of information including bad news will flow quite freely. The trust relationship within the military members of higher and lower grades (such as, between a captain and a lieutenant and between the lieutenant and his platoon sergeant) is only built through a matter of time and conscientious effort. It is usually quite fragile and can easily be rendered ineffective or destroyed. Once the bearer of bad news is stifled or killed, sometimes through a seemingly innocent remark, the relationship usually reverts to a situation where the subordinate tells the boss just the things he wants to hear. Restoring the trust relationship is accomplished only through a very long and difficult process.

When seeking feedback, it is particularly important that the young officer recognize that this is a difficult and complex task that requires him to approach and carry out carefully. Actions must be thoroughly thought and planned out prior to action. The advice of a senior officer on techniques for obtaining feedback might also be beneficial.

Sources of feedback: Generally feedback information on your performance and role model can be gained from four major sources. Each source has different characteristics, requires different approaches, and has the potential for producing varying validity.

a. Feedback from senior commanders.

(1) Senior commanders, particularly an officer's immediate commander, have always been a source for performance feedback. With the advent of the current officer efficiency report and its associated Officer Evaluation Report Support form (DA Form 67-8-1) the previous informal feedback responsibility has been formalized. While periodic intervals are established in the efficiency reporting system for feedback meetings an officer should not be limited to those times. The officer should seek out a senior's feedback in formally scheduled sessions as well as on informal occasions. The key, however, is carefully listening to the guidance and instructions from your commander which frequently contain indirect feedback on your performance. In assessing your role model using feedback from your commander, it is important to recognize that your commander is assessing your performance from a perspective that is different from that of your subordinates. Feedback obtained from your commander, however, is usually more direct and more easily obtained than from your subordinates.

b. Feedback from peers.

(1) Your fellow officers provide another source for information on the impact of your role model. Although usually not directly involved in your day-to-day activities as your commander or soldiers, they frequently have an opportunity to assess your performance and gain information on your performance from a variety of sources. Feedback from peers is usually gained through a variety of informal opportunities, such as, at social occasions and during the duty day.

(2) One of the better sources for peer role model feedback can be provided by your organization's chaplain. While the chaplain has a confidential relationship with the individual soldiers in your platoon or section, he can provide you a wealth of generalized information about the types of problems and soldier attitudes he has observed in your orgainization. The chaplain's specialized training generally provides for an accurate assessment of soldier perceptions and also enables him to not only provide feedback on your role model but also provide suggestions for corrective action.

c. Feedback from subordinates.

(1) One of the most difficult sources for obtaining reliable feedback is from your soldiers. The previously discussed trust relationship that is important in all feedback situations is absolutely essential in this area. A direct approach should seldom if ever be used. Instead you must rely almost extensively on informal or indirect approaches and sources. You must be sensitive to the activities within your platoon or section as many indicators are passed through the slightest nuances. Some approaches that might be used:

(a) Use Indirect questions: for example, PSG Davies, how do the men feel about_____ (e.g., our recent attempts to improve discipline?)

(b) In a meeting of your platoon noncommissioned officers seek out the opinion and thoughts of the most junior section or squad leader prior to expressing your position or allowing your platoon sergeant to state his position on the matter. (Incidentally, when you role model this technique it is highly likely your subordinates will do the same, thus further opening feedback channels.)

(c) In giving orders and instructions, provide and encourage subordinates to ask questions to assure that they understand. If you always get a "yes sir" or "can do," it is possible that your orders are clear and understood in all situations. However, it is more likely that although you make this statement, the message you have previously passed to them by words and actions tell your soldiers you are not interested in their clarification questions. In this case the feedback system is inoperative.

d. Personal Introspection.

(1) Looking at yourself, your thoughts and feelings, is difficult, but essential. Through self examination you provide yourself feedback on your own performance and also evaluate or assess the input of others. With experience you will be able to gather feedback from a variety of sources, assess them and establish actions that will improve your performance and role model. This entire professional ethics block of instruction provides you a wealth or materials designed to help you sharpen your ethical awareness and sensitivity and deal effectively when confronted by ethical problems. Your professional reading and other courses in leadership which address the areas of interpersonal communications will help you improve your self evaluation skills and abilities. This sensitivity, coupled with experience, will provide you with an increased ability to interpret soldier responses to activities within your organization.

(2) Some considerations that will enable you to gain a better understanding of your role model and the signals you are sending members of your platoon are summarized in the following:

(a) Do you hear both the good and bad news coming up through your chain of command? Beware if only good news comes up.

(b) Do your soldiers approach you (1) with their professional problems? (2) with their personal problems? If they feel able to share both their professional as well as personal problems with you, it is very likely you have good operating feedback channels. Beware if you hear no problems.

(c) How did you react the last time you heard bad news? Did you "kill" or "wound" the bearer of that news? Would that individual bring you bad news again?

(d) When giving orders and putting out policies, do you consider the possible impact of the order? Do you follow up to see what is actually happening as a result? What could you expect to get from a policy that stated that only a 98% or higher accuracy on your SIDPERS data would be acceptable?

CASE STUDY - MOVING

LT Spinks is headed for the Advanced Course. He is really looking forward to the time away from the hectic problems of work in the troop environment. For two years now he has rented a house off-post and the time has come for him to vacate these premises. He has a German Shepherd dog that has lived with him for the entire period of time. With his being away so much of the time, the restlessness of the dog has caused damage to several places in the house. He realized that he will have to do something if he is to get his $500 pet deposit back. Fortunately, the damages to two of the walls are at places where he can push furniture up against them. The tears in the fabric of the living room furniture are hidden if he pushes the couch and chair close to the wall and turns one seat cushion over. During the inspection, the landlady who is the wife of a recently deceased prominent citizen in the community does not look very closely but trusts LT Spinks when he says that all is OK. After LT Spinks leaves, the landlady discovers the damage and determines not to rent to American military persons in the future.

STUDENT HANDOUT #2

THE ESSENCE OF ARMY LEADERSHIP

Colonel Dandridge M. Malone, US Army

The very essence of leadership is its purpose. And the purpose of leadership is to accomplish a task. That is what leadership does--and what it does is more important than what it is or how it works. The purpose of leadership is to accomplish a task.

Individual Leadership

Political leaders, community leaders and scout leaders are all similar to some extent. All try to put people, things, time and effort together to accomplish a task. The big difference with Army leaders is the "Army" part, and that is a big difference.

Being an Army leader means that in the final analysis, that leader must be ready someday, somewhere, to lead soldiers to accomplish an ultimate task that no one else wants to do, under conditions that no one else wants to tolerate. Those intolerable conditions exist with an Army at war in combat--killing and dying. Small-unit leaders will usually lead this ultimate task, but any of us might someday get the call, no matter what rank, branch or military occupational specialty.

This ultimate task is what makes an Army leader so different from all those other leaders. It is also the essence of being a "soldier." And it is the essence of "service" as well, and the underpinnings of the whole idea of military "duty." All these things mean being ready to give up freedom, and even life, for the sake of our nation and its people in what has been called "the noblest act of mankind." At bedrock level, that is what Army leadership is all about. And that is why Army leadership is so important and so different.

To accomplish a task, that is the purpose. Army leaders have done or will do this a thousand times in response to orders direct, implied or trained into them. These orders will come down through the one thing that links all of our leadership togethe the chain of command. This chain of command controls, coordinates and supports. It also challenges. Think about that time when the essence of leadership, soldier, service and duty will all come together, when the chain of command speaks of that ultimate task and when it says "Attack!"

The artillery shifts, small arms crack, men tremble and the platoon tenses for the final assault up the hill. An Army leader gives the signal, and they go. Why is it that John T. McFerren, soldier, US Army, obeys the leader's order? Leadership or followership? Neither. It is both.

John T. McFerren assaults up into this kill-or-die situation because:

- o His buddies are counting on him to do his job.
- o He thinks his buddies will call him a coward if he does not attack.
- o He has learned that his leader knows the right thing to do.
- o He wants to please his leader.
- o He believes he will be court-martialed if he does not attack.
- o He thinks he will be left alone if he does not attack.
- o He believes that following orders is the right thing to do.
- o He believes he will be rewarded for attacking.
- o He believes that attacking is less dangerous than not attacking.
- o He believes he will feel guilty if he does not attack.
- o He wants to prove his manhood, his courage, his competence or his worth as a soldier.
- o He hates the enemy.
- o He enjoys the excitement and thrill of combat.
- o Following orders has become an automatic habit.

ESSENCE OF LEADERSHIP

McFerren assaults for any, or all, or some combination of the above reasons, or for some other reasons not listed. If the leader had the expertise and the time, he might somehow figure out the "why" for McFerren, but, next to him, there is Johnson, Allen and Brown. They go too, and each for some different pattern of reasons which neither the leader nor they will ever know--but they go.

They go because at that critical moment in time, when each will wrestle briefly with the decision of whether to attack or hide, attacking is their best choice. The Army leader, first out, first up and out front, shows them that this is so. And, so, they go. They follow him. He leads soldiers. That is his task.

The incident about the assault, McFerren and the leader up front also represents, in simple terms, the essence of Army leadership. All the bedrock elements are there, all the basic mechanics and the ultimate task. Listen to Army leaders talk leadership, and, sooner or later, this situation, or one just like it, will always come. They will argue about the whys and the hows. They will tell war stories about what worked and what did not, and, every time, they will point out exceptions.

What all this means is that there is no set of absolute rules or procedures, learned from experience, that will tell us exactly how Army leadership works or what Army leaders should do step-by-step. Nor is there any physchological "model," learned from scientific research, that has all the answers or that can tell a leader how to turn a soldier on and off like some machine. Our Army knows more about leadership than any other institution, and what it knows it has learned from both the wisdom of experience and the findings of scientific research. Army leaders have no choice but to learn the same way.

Years ago, some wise Army leaders, at a time and place unknown, sat down, thought out and wrote up "the principles of leadership." These principles represent, better than anything else, the essence of what our Army has learned from experience. Just like the principles of war, they are basic tools for analysis and understanding and basic guidelines for what to do. These principles are present in McFerren's assault. They are in the leadership stories that Army leaders tell. They are found in the leadership schools and in the manuals. They are working wherever Army leadership is. They are basic tools and basic guidelines. They are simple, plain and straightforward. They are experience and wisdom. If you aspire to be a leader, you must know, practice and live them. You must:

o Know yourself and seek self-improvement. You must be honest with yourself about your strengths and weaknesses as a leader. By knowing yourself, and your soldiers, you should be able to tell how your actions will affect the actions of your soldiers.

o Be technically and tactically proficient. As an Army leader, you must show your troops that you have the knowledge and capability to lead them. Your rank and your position do not ensure that your soldiers will follow or trust you in battle. When the chips are down, they follow the man who knows. You must learn in detail all the technical and tactical aspects of your job.

o Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions. After you have found your strengths, overcome your weaknesses and become technically and tactically able to do your job, you must take the initiative to accomplish your unit's mission. You now must be ready to accept the responsibility for what the unit does or fails to do. Rank has its privilege, but responsibility comes first. You must also conduct yourself in the manner your rank requires.

o Make sound and timely decisions. As a leader, you must be able to make a rapid and true estimate of the situation and, from that, make sound decisions. A leader needs to be decisive. A soldier works well when his leader is quick to adjust to changing situations. A good decision, made now, is far better than the best decision made too late.

o Set the example. The standard for your unit is set by your example. "Follow me and do as I do" must be your guide to the way you act. This applies to all aspects of what you do as a leader, particularly in the face of hardship and danger. Your good example will produce good results in your unit.

o Know your soldiers and look out for their welfare. As a leader, you need to know and understand your soldiers. You must get to know your subordinates and be aware that they come from different backgrounds and that each is different. If your subordinates know you are concerned about them, they are more likely to become a unit that can be depended upon.

o Keep your soldiers informed. A well-informed soldier will have a better attitude toward his leader. As a result, he will be a better soldier, and you will have a better unit. Your soldiers need to know the situation to make a decision if you are gone. If your soldiers know the unit mission and their role in it, then they can set their own goals.

You will not always be able to give your soldiers the reason for every task because you may not know it or there may not be enough time to tell them. Let them know that, when possible, you will tell them the reasons why you are doing what you are. They will trust you when there is not enough time to give all the facts because they know you will do so later. Soldiers usually fear the unknown. By keeping them informed, rumors and fears will be reduced.

o Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates. Give your subordinates enough authority to do their job. This creates trust and respect between you and your subordinates. This also encourages your subordinates to take the initiative when doing their jobs. By giving your subordinates authority, you are showing you trust them to do their job. Keep in mind that too much supervision is as bad as not enough supervision. Delegate.

o Ensure that the task is understood, supervised and accomplished. Give clear and concise orders so your soldiers will know what they are to do. Soldiers usually respond quickly to orders they understand. Do not give too many details; let your soldiers develop their own ways for using they skills to do their tasks. You must make it clear that you are available for help. You must also check to see your orders are being followed.

o Train your soldiers as a team. Each soldier must know what his job is within the unit and how important he is to the unit. Make your subordinates feel they are a part of a team effort. Work to keep the morale of the soldiers high to aid in getting better teamwork. The team spirit also helps your men to feel safe.

o Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities. Good training gets a unit ready for its mission. You must know what your unit can and cannot do. Employ your unit within its capabilities. Your soldiers will lose their spirit if they are continually given tasks that are too easy or too hard. You must use sound judgment in assigning tasks to your unit. If the unit fails time after time, your subordinates will lose trust in themselves and in you as a leader.

So where and how does a leader use these time-honored principles? He uses them wherever and whenever he is leading, and he uses them to put together the two great factors that underlie all that we know about Army leadership: mission and men. Leaders are always working with these two basic factors.

Wherever and whenever possible, a leader tries to balance so that the needs of the mission and the needs of the men are both met. But there are times, sometimes in peace and oftentimes in war, when the needs of both cannot be met. When leaders cannot balance, they must choose one over the other. In these situations, and the leader must make them few, mission must come first. The ultimate task tells us so and so does the meaning of "soldier," "service" and "duty."

The mission side of the scale requires, simply stated, knowing the job--weapons, gunnery, maintenance, tactics--in excruciating detail. This is most of what "professionalism" means--technical competence. Without it, an Army leader can never lead for long. Just talk will not work.

The other side of the scale requires, simply stated, knowing the soldiers, not merely their hat size, birthday and where they are from, but what is inside of them--what makes them do things or not do things; what turns them on or off; what they can do and what they will do under stress; when they are afraid, tired, cold or lonely; how they feel as individuals and as teams; and where their will and spirit lies.

It is precisely here, here in this "balancing" business, where leaders most frequently fail. It is here where young leaders have their greatest difficulties and where even old leaders, despite their wisdom, sometimes lose sight of the ultimate purpose of leadership. The problem arises because of the relationship that exists between soldiers' "happiness and satisfaction" on the one hand and their "mission accomplishment and productivity" on the other.

Common sense would tell us that happy, satisfied soldiers will get the job done better. From this, a leader, especially if he is new, might well assume that if he can somehow keep his soldiers happy and satisfied, then they will be more productive--get the job done better. A thousand scientific studies of leadership and a thousand lessons of leadership experience show that this natural, common-sense assumption is precisely wrong!

In simple terms, task or mission accomplishment drives morale and esprit far more often than the other way around. When soldiers and units get done those things that soldiers and units are supposed to do, that is when morale and esprit get highest. That is why the individual soldier's morale and "motivation" are usually at their peak right after basic training. That is also why unit esprit and "motivation" are usually at their peak when the unit is training in the field. Mission accomplishment drives "job satisfaction" far more often than the other way around.

If an Army leader does not know both sides of this mission-men scale in detail, he will be forever getting it tilted the wrong way at the wrong time. Tasks will not get accomplished, and soldiers' time, soldiers' will or the soldiers themselves will be wasted.

Organizational Leadership

The preceding discussion has covered the cornerstones of individual leadership--primary purpose, ultimate task, basic principles and fundamental mechanics. All that has been said so far about the essence of leadership is sound, but it is incomplete. It is not all of the essence. There is one more thing--a whole additional aspect of leadership that leaders all too often overlook. To do well what our Army must do, Army leaders must understand this final essence.

Leadership must be more than the sum of its parts. It is analogous to an electrical connection. Take a battery, a piece of wire and a flashlight bulb. Lay them out on a table. What you have is three pieces, three individual things. That is all. Now, hook those three things all together. What you get is one thing composed of three pieces. Each piece does something different, but, if each piece functions as it is supposed to, and if you get them all hooked together right, you get something extra. You get a fourth thing that you did not have before, something extra--in this case, light.

This simple word picture explains the final essence of leadership. Most of what I have said so far about the foundations of leadership concerns the individual leader--personal, individual leadership. Individual leadership is absolutely essential, critical and of the utmost importance. But, by itself, the idea of individual leadership is not enough to explain what Army leadership is and what it can be.

Go back to the word picture, back to where we had the three individual things, three individual pieces. Army leadership will work just like that example. Each individual leader in an organization, of whatever size, does something different, but, if each individual leader functions as he is supposed to, and if the commander gets them all hooked together right, something extra is created that was not there when there were only individual pieces.

In the example, the extra was light. In our Army, the extra is highly effective, high-performing units--the kind of units that have drive and killing power on the battlefield: the kind that get the right things done right, without a lot of hassle, down in the motor pool; the kind that have esprit, high standards and a reputation for solid performance. That is the extra.

Getting that extra is not easy, but it is not magic, charisma or luck. It is doable. The formula lies foremost in the competence of individuals, then in how communications flow throughout the unit and, finally, in the team work and cohesiveness of individuals and teams. Training hard, together, on the job and in the field, in all the individual and team tasks related to the unit's mission, that is what puts these three critical factors together to produce the extra. That is the formula, plain and simple. There is no other way.

It is not the tooth fairy that comes in the night and brings that extra that every soldier would like. It is the leadership of the unit, not the individual leaders by themselves, but the whole leadership of the organization, each piece functioning properly, and all hooked together right, developing the individual and unit skills needed to fight and win.

Our Army has always understood this notion of "organizational leadership." At least one of the principles of leadership gets at it straight out. But only recently have we begun to study our experience and our research so as to be able to put this idea into words, into our training and into the essence of how we lead.

To understand the practical value of this idea of "organizational leadership," go all the way up the chain of command to the top of our Army's leadership, up to the chief of staff's level, up to where the task to be accomplished is "defend this nation." If you start coming back down the chain of command, breaking that big task into subtasks, those into sub-subtasks, and so on down the chain, you can work all the way down to the point where a section leader in the motor pool says, "Get that generator fixed so we can get this tank running."

In between those two tasks to be accomplished--defend the nation and fix the generator--there are a hundred million others, up and down and sideways. All come from that first one, all are related and all get accomplished, for better or worse, by the leadership of our Army.

It is easy to see from this example that leaders at different levels have different tasks to get accomplished. Leaders who are generals, leaders who are colonels and leaders who are captains all need different leadership skills--leadership skills that best fit the level where they work and the kinds of tasks that are found there. They need a basic load of basic individual leadership that applies at any and all levels, but, then, they also need the particular leadership skills required to accomplish the tasks at their particular level.

What all this means is that if we can really understand this notion that leadership varies by level and if we can, from our research and experience, put into words just what the differences are, then our Army, our whole Army, is on the way to getting some of that "extra." This idea of "organizational leadership"--not just talked about, but studied and tried--gives us the key for how to get the individual pieces hooked up right and how to get that extra.

What all this also means is that if we can get this new piece of our leadership doctrine working, our chain of command will work better. We will see less and less cases of company officers trying to do sergeant's business, generals and colonels in helicopters trying to fight rifle companies in combat or captains and majors trying to pass judgment on how the chief of staff should defend our nation.

To make this happen, the lower, middle and upper levels of our Army's training system must each teach the additional and particular leadership skills required at each level. And that means that every leader, as he moves up through the levels of our Army, will always have something more, something new and something extra to learn about leadership.

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ETHICS AND THE SENIOR OFFICER: INSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS

by

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Army officers are devoting a lot of thoughtful consideration to the subject of ethics. The purpose of this article is to present a firsthand appreciation of various ethical tensions that confront senior Army officers. To accomplish this I will briefly explore the foundations of our ethical system, offer some thoughts about how this ethical system should apply specifically to the military profession, and finally take an empirical look at the tensions in the military society that provide fertile grounds for ethical abuses.

The term ethics is used to mean the study of human actions in respect to their being right or wrong. Whether we like it or not, ethical reflection has seldom been carried out in isolation from theology. Ethical values generally reflect our view of human life as it is embodied in the teachings of the prevailing religion, because all human conduct, essentially, takes place in relationship to other human beings. Therefore, if I believe that human life, that is, *all* of human life, without exception, has equal and infinite value, then my concept of right and wrong conduct will reflect this conviction. If I believe that human life has limited value, let's say limited by what it can contribute to the common good, then my concept of right or wrong conduct will reflect this conviction. If I believe that some forms of human life have more worth than others—that, say, males are more valuable than females, or whites are more valuable than blacks, or Americans are more valuable than Cambodians, or the rich are more valuable than the poor, or Jews are more valuable than Arabs—then my concept of right and wrong conduct will reflect whichever of these convictions I hold.

Our Western value system of right and wrong is based primarily on what Jesus taught concerning the origin and value of human life, augmented by the Old Testament lawgivers and prophets. This is what we commonly call the Judeo-Christian tradition. Although these teachings have been eroded and in some cases prostituted radically through the centuries, they still strongly influence the attitudes of Americans and other Westerners and form the core of our ethical concepts. In the Judeo-Christian view, man was created by God in His image; that is, with awareness, with purpose, with personality, and with inherent worth. All forms of human life are equally endowed by God with worth and dignity. There is no distinction between male and female, between black or white, rich or poor, aristocrat or peasant, Americans or Cambodians, Jews or Arabs, old or young, born or unborn, smart or dumb, with regard to inherent worth and dignity. All are created with equal worth, with equal dignity, with equal status, and with equal rights within the human race.

From this basic belief has come the thesis that whatever protects or enhances human life is good, and whatever destroys or degrades human life is evil. Thus, our whole moral and ethical concept of right and wrong

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stems from this thesis-antithesis of good and evil, and I believe that we cannot consider right and wrong within the military profession outside of this framework; that whatever protects and enhances life is good, and whatever destroys and degrades life is evil. The great concepts of justice, mercy, compassion, service, and freedom are immediate derivatives of this central distinction between good and evil as received from our Judeo-Christian heritage.

Before addressing ethics within the military profession, I will deal briefly with the ethical basis for our profession. The moral justification for our profession is embedded in the Constitution—"to provide for the Common Defense." We are that segment of the American society which is set apart to provide for the defense of the remainder of that society. The word defense is key. We are to defend our territory, because that is where our people live, but in an expanded sense, we are defending our value systems, our way of life, our standard of life, our essential institutions, and whatever our government declares to be our national interest. Our Founding Fathers were realists. They knew that most of the rest of the world did not share our view of the value and worth of human life. They recognized that we lived in and would continue to live in a dangerous world, one in which only the strong, or those allied to the strong, can remain free. Only the strong can influence whether peace will be preserved or broken, because strength deters aggression and discourages conflict, and weakness invites aggression and encourages conflict.

Those who provide for the common defense, who protect the lives of our citizens, can best do so by creating a strong, effective deterrent to would-be aggressors. As military people our objective is "not to promote war, but to preserve peace" and to protect life. Even if deterrence fails and we go to war, our final objective is peace. Ours is an honorable profession with an ethical purpose entirely consistent with our basic view that whatever protects and enhances life is good.

I will now turn to ethics as they specifically apply to the military profession. In essence, professional ethics is that body of written or unwritten standards of conduct by which that profession disciplines itself. One writer said, "Professional ethics are designed to assure high standards of competence in a given field." In the general case, then, that conduct which contributes to the attainment of the purpose of that profession is good. The conduct which detracts from the attainment of the purpose of that profession is bad. Various professions have adopted either written or unwritten codes. Doctors, nurses, engineers, journalists, lawyers, businessmen—all have established standards of right and wrong for their respective professions. For instance, the written code of Hippocrates states that the medical profession is dedicated to the preservation of life and should be of service to mankind. Certain practices inimical to that goal are forbidden in the Hippocratic code.

In the military profession we do not have an all-inclusive code of ethics, although we do have documents which contain broad and compelling standards of professional conduct. Some would say that the West Point motto of "duty, honor, country," is all that we really need. But those values, as good as they are, do not give a conceptual basis for their implementation. What is duty? What is honor? What do we mean by country?

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Lieutenant Calley probably considered that he was doing his duty at My Lai. Our code of conduct for POWs sets forth right and wrong conduct under those limited but extremely trying conditions. Have you ever thought of our Oath of Allegiance as a document of ethics? It is—of sorts. "I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic." That sounds great. But whose interpretation of the Constitution? The latest Supreme Court decision? And who are those domestic enemies? Anyone who disagrees with our interpretation of the Constitution? And what is the role of the Department of Defense in fighting domestic enemies? I thought that was the role of the FBI. And further, the Oath states, "I will obey the orders of the officers appointed over me." Well, yes, assuming they're legal, assuming they're consistent with my moral standards.

But back to my earlier statement: If that conduct which contributes to the attainment of the purpose of the profession is good, and that which detracts from the attainment of the purpose of that profession is bad, then for the military profession, whatever enhances the common defense essentially is good, and whatever diminishes the common defense is essentially bad. But this must be tempered by the larger issue, that whatever protects and enhances human life is good and whatever destroys life or diminishes the quality of life is bad.

This consideration leads, of necessity, to a brief discussion of means and ends. I think it should be an absolute rule among military people that ends do not justify means. Nor that means justify ends. Both ends and means must be consistent with our fundamental values. Honorable ends cannot be achieved by dishonorable means, nor do honorable means justify dishonorable or unethical ends. Although the general welfare of our nation is an honorable and ethical purpose, the selective elimination of nonproductive members of society, although it would contribute to the general welfare, cannot be tolerated. Domestic tranquility, although an honorable purpose, cannot justify police brutality or unlawful detention. Common defense is an honorable purpose, but misrepresentation of an enemy threat before a congressional committee cannot be justified by the belief that it is necessary in order to acquire funding for an important weapon system.

So can we make any general rules for ethical conduct within the military profession? I think so. Essentially, what is right is that which enhances the accomplishment of our basic purpose, the common defense, provided that it is consistent with our overall view of the value and dignity of all human life and that the means to accomplish it are acceptable. Or, ask these questions: Does the action we are about to take or the policy under consideration contribute to the national defense? Is it consistent with the protection and enhancement of life? Are both ends and means consistent with our national values?

Given these thoughts, I will now turn to the empirical aspects of the subject, the tensions within the Army which provide fertile grounds for ethical abuse. All military officers have experienced these tensions, and they will continue to characterize the environment in which senior officers will serve. The higher the position, the more complex and less precise are the issues. The last job I really understood was being a tank platoon leader in combat. As I progressed upward, the ethical environment became more murky, less clear, less subject to specific rules and simple solutions. However, an officer's usefulness to the nation and overall credibility will be fundamentally affected by his ability to enter an environment where absolutes are hard to find, and still make wise and ethical decisions. These tensions will require of you a bedrock of ethical values.

The one tension that will be most consistently with you involves the ethical use of authority. The authoritarian structure of our profession, even though essential, is the natural breeding ground for the unethical use of authority. The power and influence of a colonel is greater than that of a lieutenant

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colonel. The influence of a general officer is truly awesome. This fact requires a clear understanding, first, of the meaning of rank.

Within our hierarchical, authoritarian structure, there are various levels of responsibility. Each level of responsibility is assigned a commensurate degree of authority. Rank is simply a badge of the authority vested in a person to carry out a specific level of responsibility. Company-level responsibility requires company-level authority, and the rank of captain is associated with that level of authority. So lieutenant colonel rank represents the authority necessary to carry out battalion-level responsibilities; colonel, brigade-level responsibilities; major general, division-level responsibilities. When authority is used in the fulfilling of responsibility, it is used legitimately and ethically. When authority is used for purposes not directly associated with carrying out assigned responsibilities, it is being used illegitimately and unethically. Conversely, if I fail to use my authority to carry out my responsibilities, my negligence is itself unethical, and someone who will use that authority should be given my job. The question is: Am I using my authority, my rank, fully but solely for the purpose of carrying out my responsibilities?

As you go up in rank, those of lower grade tend more readily to assume that you are using your authority legitimately and ethically, because of the high regard with which juniors hold very senior officers. Thus, the general who directs his pilot to arrange a flight plan on an authorized TDY visit so as to remain overnight at a city not specifically on the most direct route, so that the general can visit his mother who is in a nursing home, will be assumed by the pilot to be fully authorized to do so. The Pentagon colonel who calls an action officer in from leave because the colonel thinks his general might ask a question which the action officer is best qualified to answer will be assumed to be using his authority ethically. Think about that.

This gets to the guts of the use of authority. In my opinion, one of the most widespread and patently unethical uses of authority is the exploitation and degradation of subordinates, which is a generally accepted institutional practice. It is an encouraged institutional practice, and it is wrong. We have fostered the image of the successful leader as the one who doesn't get ulcers, but gives ulcers; as the one who is hard, unfeeling, even vicious.

Some may disagree, but I think that is true. Whom do we admire? We admire the man with "guts." What do we really mean by this? We mean the man who drives his people hard, who has the reputation for firing subordinates, who goes for the jugular, who works his people 14 hours a day, and who takes his objective in spite of heavy and possibly unnecessary casualties. We set these people up and idolize them. Even in industry. We like the kind of guy who moves in as the CEO and fires three-fourths of the vice presidents the first week. He gets things done! He's got guts! But what about the perceptive, cool-headed leader who takes a group of misfits and molds them into an effective, highly-spirited team? Or the colonel who can see the great potential of a young commander who is performing only marginally and, through coaching and encouraging, turns him into a first-rate performer? Or, the leader in combat who takes his objective with no casualties? Or the brigade commander who has the guts to resist the arbitrary, capricious order of a division commander to fire a faltering battalion commander because the colonel believes that with the proper leadership that battalion commander can be made into a successful one? Or, the Pentagon division chief who defies the norm and refuses to arrive in his office before 0730, or to require his action officers to do so, and who manages the workload of his division so that every man gets a reasonable amount of leave, seldom has to work on weekends, and gets home every evening at a reasonable hour?

We seldom hear about those people. We don't hold them up as examples as we should. The higher we go, the more important it is to be careful that our impact on the lives and careers and families of our subordinates is positive and not negative. I can think of a

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division artillery commander in Germany who ruled by fear, who was hated by his subordinates, and who was the proximate cause of a number of serious domestic crises. I can think of a lieutenant general in the Pentagon who purposely intimidated his subordinates and associates in order to get his own way. I can think of a colonel, the executive to a former Chief of Staff, who blossomed like a rose to his superiors, but who was vicious, demeaning, and bullying to his subordinates. I can think of a colonel in the Pentagon who never showed appreciation and voiced only criticism and whose subordinates gradually became discouraged and frustrated and unproductive.

In contrast, I can think of an Army lieutenant general whose modus operandi was to make his subordinates successful in their jobs. He said, "I'll have no problem with my job if I can make all of my subordinates successful." I think of a division commander in Germany with whom I was closely associated, who spent countless hours talking with subordinates at every level, coaching them, encouraging them, teaching them. I think of a Pentagon division chief who looked for opportunities to push his action officers into the limelight, who volunteered them for prestigious positions as secretarial-level "horse-holders," who worked in the background to cross-train his people so that no one would ever have to be called back from leave, who personally took the rap when things went wrong, and who, in my opinion, ran the best division in the Pentagon. It all gets back to how they looked at people, their value, their dignity, their fundamental worth, their potential.

The higher you go, the easier it is to misuse authority. The checks that we were subject to as junior officers become less evident and less compelling. We gradually begin to believe that we really don't need to seek the counsel of others. We are at first surprised by and then pleased by the freedom of action accorded us.

For instance: "I really have to visit Germany, but should I do so this winter? No, I'll wait until the weather's better. Let's see, where can I go this winter? I really need to visit Panama and Hawaii. Let's visit Panama or Hawaii this winter."

We begin to rationalize small personal indiscretions that we would never accept in a subordinate, like having our personal car worked on by a division mechanic during duty hours, or allowing our wife to bully the post engineer into refurbishing the kitchen of our quarters out of cycle. Sometimes we begin to believe that we are somehow above the law—they really didn't have a person of our status and responsibility in mind when they wrote it, did they?—and we divert funds, appropriated for barracks maintenance, to refurbish the interior of a rod and gun club, or piece several segments of minor construction money together to accomplish some major construction projects that were disallowed in the last appropriation cycle. These examples are taken from my personal knowledge. As a rule, and this is very important I think, general officers do not get relieved for incompetence. They do get fired for indiscretions, which is simply another way of saying that they've used their authority unethically.

A former Inspector General of the Army for whom I have great regard and who was, in a sense, the conscience of the Army for the four years that he was the IG, told me that at any one time about ten percent of the general officers in the Army were under investigation of some kind or another. Most of those charges turn out to be either false or simply a matter of perception, i.e. where the general did something which others perceived to be unethical but really was not. As General Abrams once said, "The higher you go on the flag pole, the more your rear-end shows."

The second great tension involves the ethical use of military force. The higher you go the more you'll be called on to exercise judgment in this arena, although some with relatively moderate rank in key positions have great influence on such matters. For instance, a US Marine Corps major on the National Security Council staff wrote the point paper that convinced the President to send Marines into Lebanon. The current Weinberger-Shultz debate falls into

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the category of this tension regarding the ethical use of military force. When should it be used? Under what circumstances? In what strength? In defense of US territory only? Or in defense of US interests? Or in defense of our allies? What are our interests? Grenada? Lebanon? The Straits of Hormuz? How about Vietnam? Our involvement in Vietnam was purely ethical in the sense that the United States had no really compelling self-interest. We simply wanted to prevent 16 million South Vietnamese from becoming slaves to a totalitarian neighbor. But what about the level of force used? Was it ethical *not* to saturate-bomb Hanoi in an effort to force the North Vietnamese government to call off the invasion of South Vietnam? How about Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Afghanistan, the Iranian rescue operation? Should force be used only if there is a reasonable chance of effecting a desirable outcome? General Ridgway, then Chief of Staff, went to President Eisenhower in the summer of 1953 and personally talked him out of sending American ground troops to Vietnam after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu at the hands of the Viet Minh. Was he more ethical or less ethical than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who failed to intercede ten years later to prevent combat troops from being sent into South Vietnam? Could *failure* to use military force in the defense of freedom be unethical? That's a good question. And what of the Bay of Pigs? Was it moral for the President to call off the air strikes at the last minute, thus practically insuring failure? Was it moral for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree to the calling off of those air strikes? Did the operation in and of itself have an ethical purpose? And now today, what of the use of military power to accomplish our purposes in Central America? What are our purposes in Central America? Is the use of military force the only way to accomplish these purposes? If so, how much force? In what form?

In addition to these two prime ethical tensions, there are others that every senior officer will confront, although the forms might vary. I will briefly cite several. One ethical tension is that what is just and fair to an individual may conflict with a policy that attempts to correct long-standing injustice. One of the major problems here is that an open and frank discussion is not only discouraged but virtually impossible due to the emotionally explosive nature of the issue. I'm speaking of course about establishing quotas or their look-alikes for minorities and women in various selective processes like promotions, schooling, command, and other visible assignments.

Another ethical tension is loyalty to the organizational position or policy versus adherence to personal conviction when the two are in conflict. In testimony before a congressional staff, how can you present the OSD or Army position if you personally disagree with it? The same ethical dilemma confronts a Chief of Staff who personally disagrees with the President's chosen strategy. Another ethical tension involves the conflict between ambition and selflessness. What is legitimate ambition? We preach selflessness as a sterling quality of character and then we tend to reward ambition. It is ironic that one Chief of Staff who talked a lot about selflessness was, in his rise to that position, one of the most openly ambitious officers I know.

Another ethical tension is between people and mission. Does the goal of having combat-ready units justify neglect of families? Conversely, does the proper care and nurture of families excuse having noncombat-ready units? Can we achieve both? Should dependents accompany their sponsors overseas? Does it detract from readiness, or contribute to it? Is it ethical to separate families from their sponsors in peacetime under any circumstances? What are the effects of separating families? We've muddled through this one, perhaps not very successfully.

A final ethical tension involves the difference between honesty and deception. Decisions at every echelon in our structure are made based upon the information available to the decision-makers. If that information is inaccurate or incomplete, the decision may well be faulty. The decision may be faulty even if the information is accurate and

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complete, but it is more likely to be faulty if the information is inaccurate and incomplete. Therefore, it is essential that information provided to our superiors, to our subordinates, and to our peers be accurate and complete. The oath of a witness in a trial to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" should be the oath of a professional officer.

This was brought home to me as a tank platoon leader in the Korean War. It was nighttime. The tank battalion of which I was a part had been heavily engaged during the day in support of an infantry regiment in a river-crossing operation. Now we were defending against a flank attack by a Chinese force on the near side of the river. There was a lot of mortar and artillery fire, including illumination and white phosphorus; many casualties; and general confusion. The friendly force was withdrawing and I ended up with my tank platoon fighting sort of a rear-guard action in pitch dark along a road. About the time I got my platoon past a certain checkpoint, I got a radio call from my battalion commander asking if I was the last friendly force to cross the checkpoint. Since we were in close contact with the advancing Chinese force, I said yes, we were the last. Shortly thereafter a long and intense American artillery barrage was laid down in the area I had just vacated. The next morning my battalion commander came to me in our assembly area. He told me he had called the artillery into that area because of my statement that I was the last unit out. In fact, I was not. A friendly infantry unit somehow had been intermingled with the Chinese force and had sustained casualties in the artillery barrage. Gently, but clearly, the battalion commander said, "Buck, you made me tell a lie."

I've never forgotten that. I had told him what I perceived to be true, but was not. I should have qualified my answer, explaining that in the dark and confusion I could report only that my tanks had crossed the checkpoint. That was the only thing I knew for sure. The rest was speculation. Many times since then I've been tempted to speculate beyond what I knew and was certain to be true and I have sometimes yielded to that temptation.

As DCSOPS of USAREUR during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, I was reporting to CINCUSAREUR on the situation so far as we knew it. The actual invasion was of less importance to us than the threat to our nuclear weapons in both Greece and Turkey, stemming from intense animosity by both sides toward Americans for failing to take a clear stand with either country on the invasion. I was discussing the threat to our nuclear weapons with CINCUSAREUR and unconsciously began to drift away from known facts into speculation about what might be true. The CINC looked squarely at me and said, "General, stop bugling. I can't make decisions on speculation. You're intermingling facts with possibilities."

In many situations at high levels of command, the issues of honesty and deception are not recognized as such. One of the most common deceptions is the exaggeration of need in order to get what is really needed, knowing that the initial request is certainly going to be reduced. Money is usually the object, at least in the Pentagon environment. In fact, the whole program budget procedure, in my view, is essentially deceptive and unethical. The annual requests for operations and maintenance funds come in from the major commands over four-star signatures claiming that the request is the bare minimum they can live with. The DA action officers in the planning and budgeting arena don't believe a word of it. They look at what the command got the previous year, do some puts and takes, and come up with their own figures. The whole process at the major command level was a waste of time, energy, and money. Commanders' statements are given about as much credence as a Dan Rather commentary on the objectivity of the news media. Then the Programming and Budgeting System, in crunching together the Program Objective Memorandum, inflates those requests which are the "pet rocks" of influential Pentagon pachyderms, and submits them to OSD knowing full well that OSD will cut some of these programs back,

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knowing they have been inflated by the Army. Of course, OSD may take the money thus "saved" and add it to other programs based on what some assistant secretary of defense perceives to be important, or what is the current wind of opinion regarding what will sell on the Hill and what won't.

Another blatantly unethical practice in the programming and budgeting arena is what I call the "multiple stampede effect." Newly assigned Lieutenant General A or Assistant Secretary A comes along with Project A which has been his obsession for years. It requires major multi-year funding. He forces it into the program, stampeding the appropriation directors to get on the team, and so the program is funded at the expense of other ongoing programs. Lieutenant General A is then promoted and made a MACOM commander where his influence in the central programming and budgeting procedure fades considerably. Now Lieutenant General B arrives on the scene with Project B, his personal pet rock, and he is able to push his project through the Program Budget Committee and into the next year's Program Objective Memorandum. And where does the money come from? From Program A. So Program A and all the other Program A's are cut back to make way for Program B and all the other Program B's sponsored by the powerful new Lieutenant General B's who will be replaced the next year by Lieutenant General C's with their projects. Thus we have programs by the dozens, originally spawned by the stampede effect of strong-willed, powerful proponents, which are distorted from their original purpose and deflated by inadequate funding, and flop around from year to year due to changes of emphasis and priority at DA level. The people assigned to manage these programs in the field never know from year to year what they can expect in the way of support. Over the course of my last 12 years on active duty, I was involved in the programming and budgeting procedure for ten of those years, eight of them at the DA level and two at the MACOM level. I used to leave Program Budget Committee meetings in the Pentagon feeling unclean, polluted, like I needed to go to confession. The whole system is wasteful of the money our citizens have entrusted to us for their common defense. And most of the senior programming and budgeting participants recognize this. Almost every year that I was in the Pentagon, the Director of PA&E or the Director of the Army staff or the DCSOPS or the Vice Chief of Staff vowed to implement reform and instituted new and different procedures—none of which, as of 30 June 1982, when I retired, had fundamentally improved the system in my opinion.

Another aspect of the honesty/deception tension involves readiness reports. First of all, even the most accurate unit readiness report is a deception unless it is considered in the context of the Army's capability to sustain that unit in combat. The tooth-to-tail, combat-support ratio debate is a case in point. Combat divisions in Europe with C-1 ratings give our national leaders a false sense of confidence if these divisions cannot be sustained in combat past the first few weeks. The readiness of the whole force is what is important. If you are in the force structure business you are contributing to a massive deception if you fail to provide adequate combat support and combat service support to our combat divisions. If you are in the programming and budgeting business you are contributing to a massive deception if you fail to program sufficient ammunition or repair parts to sustain our divisions in combat. The readiness reporting system is not and cannot be purely objective. Subjective judgment always enters in, but the intent, the motive, is what is important.

Consider a new division commander in Europe who has been in command about a month. His predecessor, a young, ambitious major general, is the new USAREUR Chief of Staff. The new division commander makes his assessment and gives his division a C-3 in training, a drop from C-2. As USAREUR DCSOPS, I review the reports. All the other divisions report C-2. I discuss the reports with the Chief of Staff. He takes strong exception to the C-3 rating of his old division, recognizing that if the report is accurate, his own leadership, judgment, and candor are in

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question. The Chief of Staff challenges the judgment of the new division commander, indicating to him that he's using an unrealistic standard to measure the training status of the division. The new division CG holds his ground. The Chief of Staff then questions the motive of the division commander, saying that he obviously wants to show a lower rating on his first reports so he can show improvement later on. The division commander holds his ground. The Chief of Staff then begins a subtle campaign to discredit the division commander in the eyes of the CINC. Time passes. The Chief of Staff moves rapidly on to a three-star job and is promoted to lieutenant general. The division commander, who is highly respected both by his peers and by his subordinates, completes his tour and transfers to a job in the Pentagon, and eventually retires as a two-star with 35 years of service. In retrospect, the division commander's subjective judgment on the training status of his division may have been too severe, although I do not in any way question his motive. As DCSOPS, I would have judged all divisions essentially the same in training. Maybe they all should have been C-3. Who was right?

The officer efficiency report system is even more complex. Here the ethical principle of fairness conflicts directly with the ethical principle of honesty. Am I being fair to my people to rate them honestly in accordance with the intent of the OER regulation when I know that across the Army my contemporaries are inflating the reports of their people? Am I justified in waging a one-man campaign for strict honesty when it comes at the expense of my people?

Another aspect of honesty involves what you show your boss when he comes to visit. Conversely, what you should be looking for when you visit your subordinates may be inferred.

The scene is Fort Hood. I am Chief of Staff of the 2nd Armored Division. The Army Chief of Staff is coming to visit the post and wants to see tank gunnery training in progress. Recently the division has received a large number of infantrymen rotating back from Vietnam combat duty. Department of the Army has directed us to convert these infantrymen quickly into tankers, and to integrate them into our tank battalions. Most of these Vietnam veterans have only a few months to go before leaving the Army. They are not at all interested in becoming tankers, and as a matter of fact, they're not really interested in anything but getting out of the Army. We have developed a strenuous, four-week TBT (to be tankers) program, which includes familiarization firing on ranges 1 through 5 of the tank gunnery course. The TBTs will be firing Table 4 main gun when the Chief of Staff visits. All indications are that they will be doing poorly, considering the extreme brevity of their preliminary gunnery training, their record on the subcaliber ranges, their general lack of technical aptitude, and their negative attitude.

A senior adviser suggests to the division commander that we should take our best NCO gunners and have them firing when the Army Chief of Staff visits the range. The point is made that an Army Chief of Staff usually visits any given division only once during the tenure in command of a division commander. Our division is a fine division. It has a good reputation. We have some great battalions. Field training has been going well. Maintenance is up. To show the Chief of Staff what we know would be subpar marksmanship will give him a distorted view of the overall standards of the division and will be a disservice to the Chief of Staff. An alternative is put forth. Why not simply change and reprint the training schedule with attendant back-dating, bringing one of our better-trained tank battalions off of maintenance cycle and putting them on the range on the day the Chief visits.

As division chief of staff, I opposed these proposals, stating that the Army Chief of Staff needs to know the trauma we are undergoing resulting from a DA decision to convert short-term Vietnam infantrymen into qualified tankers in four weeks. After all, I argued, the Chief of Staff is an experienced commander with a reputation for fairness and will understand our situation, and anyway, it would be deceptive to alter the training schedule and substitute training in

which he might be more pleased. We owe it to him to tell it like it is, to show him what he needs to see, not just what he may want to see.

The division commander sides with me, and we make no special arrangements to change the schedule. The Chief of Staff visits the range. The outward appearance of the range—that is, the police, the ammunition stacks, the communications, the flags, the condition of the tanks, the saluting, the uniforms—is superb. But the gunnery is atrocious. Few rounds hit the targets. Although the CG had carefully briefed him on the whole situation enroute to the range, the Army Chief of Staff is incensed. He calls the firing to a halt, dismounts the TBTs, the NCOs, the officers, and gathers everyone around him. He berates everyone for such a rotten example of gunnery, for the waste of ammo, for the poor NCO instruction, for inadequate officer supervision. Then he takes the CG aside, mercifully out of hearing of the troops, but in their full view, and proceeds to tear the division commander apart; he thereafter leaves the range without a single word of appreciation for anyone. The division commander is philosophical. "The Chief of Staff is in a foul mood today," he says, "Nothing would have pleased him. He is exhausted from a killing schedule. He has been under severe attack by the press in recent weeks. He will calm down and the whole episode will pass away."

The Army Chief of Staff never visited the division again during the CG's tenure of duty. And the CG, until then considered to be a rising star, eventually moved on to another major general's position, well out of the mainstream of the Army, from which he retired.

Before I left the division, the CG gave me a superb efficiency report, and I was selected for brigadier general just a year later. Was I right or wrong in recommending that we not change the schedule or substitute experienced gunners for the TBTs? Did my decision contribute to the common defense? Was it consistent with our basic value systems? It certainly ruined a great division commander's career, and the influence of his character and competence was lost to the Army. On the other hand, I got away unscathed, except for a deep sense of continuing sadness at what I had done to my boss.

In conclusion, I can give no easy answers regarding these ethical tensions. I can, however, from my experience, conclude that an officer's ethical framework for addressing each of them needs to address the three fundamental questions: Does the action contribute to the national defense? Is it consistent with the protection and enhancement of life? Are the means to accomplish it acceptable? Standing firm ethically can exact a cost, perhaps a steep one. As professionals we must be willing to pay it.

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ADVANCE SHEET #10

Communication: The Leader's Medium

I. SCOPE: Become familiar with the communication process.

II. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

TASK: Describe the communication process.

CONDITION: Given a classroom environment and the appropriate references.

STANDARD: The officer will describe the communications process by using the communications model presented in classroom instruction and in the references distributed in class by study aids. The description will include identifying the elements of the communications process and its roles as the leader's medium in exercising one's leadership.

III. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

TASK: Describe the process for analyzing any communications situation.

CONDITIONS: Given a classroom environment and the appropriate references.

STANDARD: The officer will describe the process for analyzing any communications situation by using the four factor analysis model presented in classroom instruction and in the references distributed in class as study aids. The description will include an identification of the role listening plays in the analytical process.

TASK: Discuss the importance of active listening in the communication process.

CONDITIONS: Given a classroom environment and the appropriate references.

STANDARD: The officer will discuss listening as the means of collecting the data needed to analyze and assess the communications situation.

TASK: Identify common listening failures.

CONDITION: Given a classroom situation and the appropriate references.

STANDARD: The student will identify the following listening failures.

a. Turning off the listener because of anger, annoyance, or boredom.

b. Preparing to respond while the speaker is still speaking.

c. Deciding it's your turn to speak before the speaker is finished.

d. Becoming so wrapped up in finding the right moment to speak that you stop listening.

e. Ignoring the speaker's non-verbal signals.

TASK: Define and discuss effective communication techniques common to superiors and subordinates.

CONDITIONS: Given a classroom environment, classroom notes, discussion, and assigned readings.

STANDARDS: The officer will apply effective communication techniques necessary to gain credibility and establish good working relationships as well as maintain open effective communication in an actual or simulated unit situation.

TASK: Discuss how feedback can affect the content, context and delivery of the message while it's being communicated.

CONDITIONS: Given a classroom situation and a film.

STANDARDS: The officer will discuss the role and impact of feedback and how it can affect the content, context and delivery of the message while it's being communicated. The officer's discussion must include an awareness of the crucial importance of being alert and flexible in acquiring and using feedback. The officer must also demonstrate that the techniques of good listening must be applied in order to get the most out of audience feedback received.

TASK: Identify barriers to communication.

CONDITIONS: Classroom, student roles and selected readings.

STANDARDS: Identify the barriers to communication and as a minimum discuss their negative impact on the communication process.

TASK: Discuss the effects of attitudes, beliefs, and values on communication.

CONDITIONS: Classroom, student notes and selected readings.

STANDARDS: The student will be able to describe how attitude, beliefs and values effect communication.

TASK: Discuss the impact of physical, mental, and emotional states on communication.

CONDITIONS: Classroom, student notes and selected readings.

STANDARDS: The student will be able to describe how physical, mental and emotional states impact the communication process.

TASK: Evaluate how situational factors affect communication.

CONDITIONS: Classroom, student notes and selected readings.

STANDARDS: The student will be able to evaluate the situational factors that affect communication.

IV. INSTRUCTIONS:

1. READ: FM 22-100, Military Leadership, "Communication", pages 185 through 202

2. BRING TO CLASS:

   a. FM 22-100, Military Leadership

   b. Military Leadership Workbook

3. OPTIONAL READING:

   a. Student Handout 1, "Chain of Command"

   b. Student Handout 2, "The Multitudes of Information".

-SECTION I

(IN CLASS READING)

Communication: The Leader's Medium

Example No. 1

SGT: Sir, I don't get this latest operations order. We can't handle this post maintenance support detail today. What do they think we are?

LT: Well Sgt Gardner, that's the order, so take care of it as soon as possible. We'll just have to operate under even heavier pressure this week.

SGT: Doesn't HQ know we're already fully committed in running Battalion SQT Hands-on Test Stations today?

LT: Look Sarge, I don't decide what goes on at HQ. I just have to see that the orders get carried out, so that's what I'm going to do.

SGT: The troops aren't gonna like this.

LT: That's something you're gonna have to work out with them, not me.

Example No. 2

SGT: Sir, I don't get this operations order. We can't handle this post maintenance support detail today. What do they think we are?

LT: Sounds like you're pretty sore about it Sgt Gardner.

SGT: I sure am, sir. We've just now managed to eye-dropper manage our share of manning the Battalion SQT Hands-on Test Stations for this week. Now this comes along!

LT: As if you didn't have enough work to do, huh!

SGT: I don't know how I'm gonna tell the platoon about this.

LT: Hate to face them with it now, is that it?

SGT: Sir, I really do. They're under a real strain today. Seems like everything we've done lately is rush, rush, rush.

LT: I guess you feel it's kind of unfair to load anything more on them right now?

SGT: That's it, sir. I know there must be plenty of pressure on everybody in the unit, but... Well, if that's the way it is... Guess I'd better move out and get the word to them.

LT AMES

CASE STUDY

(IN CLASS EXERCISE)

A platoon in the central part of Vietnam had their old platoon leader reassigned to a staff position. Soon, a new platoon leader was assigned to the platoon filled with many who had survived 6 to 10 months combat time. The new platoon leader, Lieutenant Ames (not his real name), made a favorable first impression with the platoon members. Within a week, however, the impressions began to change. On several occasions, LT Ames would appear to be listening to what his subordinates had to say, but he did not take their advice into account when he made his decisions. For a while, the soldiers gave him the benefit of the doubt, but soon, they began to question his leadership among themselves.

Soon, the platoon was given a search and destroy mission. After they had moved out into the assigned area, they had to set up a night defensive position in a location normally patrolled by American forces. For those who had lived in the environment for some time, expecting booby traps was second nature. The Viet Cong frequently booby trapped positions that American troops had used in the recent past. They knew that there was a tendency for new troops to occupy previous positions because they were easier to set up. LT Ames had chosen one of those sites to establish the defensive position. The experienced members of the platoon strongly advised the Lieutenant to choose a site some 50 to 75 meters away from the selected site. The alternate site had not been used before. It was within the limits established by the company commander in the pre-mission briefing, and it provided the same degree of cover and concealment as the selected site. Lieutenant Ames stood fast on his decision and directed the platoon to dig in. He took out his entrenching tool and started digging in one of the previously used positions. With the first scoop of his shovel, he hit a booby trap and was severly wounded. For LT Ames, the war was over. He lost both legs, an arm, and an eye.

SECTION II

(IN CLASS READING)

GAINING CREDIBILITY

One of the most frequent complaints of platoon sergeants about new lieutenants is that they come into their new unit and in a well-meaning attempt to establish their position of leadership, they fail to listen and learn from those about them. Remember, no one is expected to know all there is to know about any job. In most cases, subordinates are happy to impart their knowledge for it makes them feel important, and they DO have much to offer. Your task is to take what they have to say and weigh it along with other factors as you make your decisions.

One squad leader was asked about the attributes of the best lieutenant he ever served with. He answered with a story about a field training exercise. The platoon had the mission of moving from point A to point B through some difficult terrain as a part of a larger exercise. When he wanted to be sure about what action they should take next, the lieutenant gathered the squad leaders and PSG around the map and said "this is where I think we are and this is how I think we ought to proceed. What do you think?" One of the squad leaders who was especially good at map reading offered what amounted to a minor correction, which the lieutenant checked out with the rest of the group. When all agreed, they made the correction and moved on to accomplish the objective. The squad leader was asked if the honest question lost credibility by showing lack of expertise. He replied "No." It helped. We did not feel that the lieutenant was lost, but he did make us feel that he appreciated our opinions. He was both teaching us and leading us at the same time. He made us feel important.

A very important observation at this point is that you as a leader have to discriminate as you receive information. Much of the information that you will receive will be worthy of consideration, but you will have to weigh it. The decision is yours. You have to determine if it is accurate and straightforward. In short, you have to decide on the credibility of the source.

Listen and observe at all times. In so doing, you will gain credibility. Three other aspects of military professionalism are foundations for gaining credibility. They are summarized below.

o PROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE:

(1) Respect superiors and subordinates as fellow professionals.
(2) Give the benefit of the doubt to others unless and until they prove themselves untrustworthy.
(3) Be loyal to superiors and subordinates.
(4) Never demean or ridicule a subordinate.

(5) Do not run down a subordinate behind his back.
(6) Do not undercut a leader with criticism. Deal with him or her one-on-one.
(7) Do not talk down to a subordinate. Treat him/her as a fellow professional and expect professional behavior from him/her.

o PRACTICE POSITIVE HONESTY:

(1) Be honest and expect honesty.
(2) Question orders, directives, and policies that cannot be complied with legally and ethically.
(3) Never issue orders, directives, or policies that cannot be complied with legally and ethically.
(4) Be collaborative rather than competitive--seek to establish win/win situations rather than win/lose.
(5) Be more interested in finding right than in judging wrong.
(6) Don't be a "yes-man." You do yourself and your unit no favors.

o BE YOURSELF:

(1) Soldiers will determine very quickly if you are pretending to be something that you're not.
(2) Is your leadership style consistent with your personality?
(3) This is an important basis of trust--if soldiers have question about what they see, they will find trust more difficult.

SECTION III

(IN CLASS READING)

SUSTAINING COMMUNICATION

Once you have gained credibility an important mission is to sustain communications within your unit. S.L.A. Marshall called information "the soul of morale in combat and the balancing force in successful tactics." Some pragmatic advice is summarized below on how to sustain communications.

(1) Inform-up and down

(a) Your commander is accountable for your mission, he deserves to be informed as to its status.

(b) Your soldiers will fight better if they are given as much information as possible.

(2) Initiate Communication

(a) Get to know your soldiers. Seek Feedback.

(b) Reward Feedback--Don't Behead the Bearer of Bad News.

(c) Clearly articulate your expectations, standards, and intent. What are your priorities.

(d) Let the soldiers know where you stand.

(e) Seek to clarify the expectations, standards, priorities, and intent that your commander has of you.

(f) Determine where you stand with your commander.

(g) Don't work on perceptions; seek facts.

(h) Make yourself available up and down.

(3) Simplicity and Clarity

(a) Avoid double talk.

(b) If a paragraph will do, don't write three pages.

(c) Keep priorities to a minimum.

STUDENT HANDOUT 1

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Dandridge M. Malone

The chain of command lays out very clearly the line of legal authority from the President of the United States right on down to you. It spells out who has authority to issue orders to who. It identifies for anyone, at any level, who is in charge. And, finally, it identifies who is responsible for getting tasks done and for taking care of the people who do them.

A chain of command is an absolute essential for getting done, in an organized way, any task that requires the effort of more than one person. That is a flat-out fact of any organized effort. What this should tell you, as a leader, is that here is a leadership fundamental. Knowing how the chain of command works is an absolute essential in figuring out how to know what to do, and how to get it done.

But for now, never mind the links of the chain that run up through those upper levels of leadership to the President. Think instead about the links in the company. And call this leadership of the unit--the captains, lieutenants, sergeants; the nervous system; the channel of communication that coordinates and controls; the thing that puts together skill, will, teamwork, all that equipment, and all those weapons; the thing that focuses combat power.

Why is the chain of command so important? Well, as with almost anything else in the Army, if you want to know the real reason or purpose of something, go to the battlefield, where the unit fights. The why for anything about the Army must always be answered there.

In the company, on the battlefield, there is no time for silly arguments and discussions about who takes orders from who, or which orders to follow, or what the objectives ought to be, or what standards should be established. Any of this wastes time, and destroys the quick, smooth coordination that the unit must have if it is to win in the deadly business of delivering steel. On the battlefield, the formal chain has been established by law and TOE; leaders have been appointed by the commander to hold designated leadership positions; and authority, responsibility, and obedience are facts. All that's settled. What the chain of command does on the battlefield is COMMUNICATE.

Somewhere in a leadership class you probably spent considerable time on the techniques of how people communicate. But this is not really that kind of "communicate." This is communicate, as on the battlefield. And there, the chain of command is the main channel, the prime line, of the communications--the information--that must flow among all the parts of the company so that it can fight as a unit, as a whole "thing."

The chain of command coordinates and controls. And to do this, it must move information up and down among the levels of leadership of the unit. The chain of command moves battle information--quick, clear, clean, complete--and only the critical, and only the truth. It is the nervous system of the unit. And if the chain has breakdowns or failures, then the unit will go to pieces, and lose, and die. This simple fact of the battlefield explains many things.

It tells you why there are prescribed hand and arm signals. It tells you why there is a prescribed language for the radios and telephones and why experienced leaders will discipline this carefully. It tells you why you should learn, use, and make instincts out of the estimate, the troop leading process, and the five-paragraph field order. These are the main messages in the language of a chain of command communicating in battle. And, finally, it tells you why older, wiser, experienced leaders are always so concerned about "working through the chain." The reason is simple. What these leaders know is that the development, functioning, and maintenance of the chain of command, in peacetime, is the major determinant of whether the unit will survive and win in battle.

LINK

As a leader, you are a link in the chain of command. You already know this, but it means far more than just a green tab or a position on the organizational chart or a picture on the day room wall. When that unit fights, you do many things, but the most important thing you do is communicate--get, process, and move information, both up and down.

In a smoothly functioning chain of command that is working hard at delivering steel, there are only two kinds of information moving downward in the chain, and two kinds moving up. Flowing downward are orders, the things that control. Once in a while, you might get a whole, written-out, five-paragraph field order, brough by a runner. More often, you'll get a fragmentary order, coming over the radio from your leader as he makes the inevitable changes and adjustments called for in that final step of good troop leading procedure. The other kinds of information moving downward is planning information, the kind that you as a subordinate need for your planning, for coordinating with other parts of the unit, and for figuring out, ahead of time, what to do next.

Moving upward in the chain, there are, first and most important, such reports as enemy sightings, and status reports, and SITREPS, and locations. Reports tell the unit's brain about what's happening inside the unit--what all the parts are seeing and doing, and what kind of shape they're in. More important, these reports moving upward describe the progress in carrying out the orders that came down before.

The second kind of information moving upward are requests for support--which parts of the unit need more of what to carry out their orders. It is these requests that can bring to bear the awesome power of the combat support units.

And so, very simply, that's what happens when the chain communicates and the unit fights: two kinds of information moving down and two kinds of information moving up. Now, this information doesn't just flow along, like through a pipe. It is carried by many things--messages on paper, runners, hand and arm signals, smoke grenades and flares, radios and telephones. And, most often, at your level, by men yelling and shouting and calling to each other.

This is how the chain of command communicates. The chain of command is what tells a unit what to do. And the chain of command is what gets it done.

You, as a leader, are vital, critical, as battle information flows up and down the chain of command. Again, the most important thing you do, as a link in the chain, is COMMUNICATE--get, process, and move information. And right here, let's develop some how-to's about these three tasks.

First off and flat out, you, as a leader, must be expert in the nomenclature, functioning, operation, and maintenance of any piece of communications equipment and any communications procedure used or likely to be used at your level. This is far more important to you as a leader than being expert with your individual weapon. There is no qualification weapon. There is no qualification badge for being expert in communications. That's one of the things that any leader is expected to be.

Getting information does not mean waiting until it is given to you. If it is needed, you get it. From above or below. This says that you, as a link in the chain of command, need to be thinking constantly about what information is needed by the link above you, and by the link below you. Getting does not mean just receiving. What you get, from above or below, may have errors in it. Or you may not understand it. In either case, think, and compare what you get with what you already know and remember. If it does not seem right, or if you do not understand it clearly; go back to where you got it and check.

A remote unit radio set up on a hill somewhere can pass on, unchanged, all the information it gets, going up or going down. But remote units aren't links in the chain of command. You, as a leader, are supposed to process the information to use it and to do things with it. If you get a five-paragraph field order, you process the information in it by running it through the estimate. Then you move that information on when you issue your own orders.

Most of the time, good processing requires that you cut out some of the information you get before you pass it up or down. This is tricky. Remote unit radios cannot do it. To cut out the right things, and do it right, you have to know the information needs of the link above and the link below. Then you can answer this question: Which information is "need to know," which is "good to know," and which is "nice to know"? If time is critical and things are moving fast, then cut out the nice and the good.

Processing also means that you must often change information. You don't change the meaning or the truth of the information, but you often have to change the words, or the language, or the way the information is carried, so that the next link up above or down below can understand it. In effect, you translate. A fragmentary order comes down to you as a bunch of words on the radio, and you translate that into a hand and arm signal for the next link below. The meaning of the words and the signal is the same. The words on the radio and you arm both say "Attack!"

Moving information means you don't sit on it. If you make a conscious decision to stop some item of information while you are cutting down and translating, that's fine. But, if you know the information needs of the links above and below, then you know what is critical. And if what you have is hot, then it has to move with speed and accuracy, like a reflex action in the nervous system of a well-trained athlete.

Speed is determined mainly by how important you think communications are and by how expert you are with communications equipment, procedures, and techniques. And accuracy--accuracy is determined not by you, but by the link that receives the information you pass on, up or down.

There is one simple, critical rule right here, particularly applicable in the tricky business of moving orders downward: Always check to see that an order is understood. An affirmative nod or a "Roger" on the radio is often not enough. When there is time, and you're moving a critical order, as the link on the receiving end to say back the information you sent. And further, if you're good, you won't quick there. You'll watch to see what happens as a result of the information you sent.

The chain of command coordinates and controls; orders and planning information flow down; reports and requests flow up; and each link in the chain gets, processes, and moves information. Fighting the battle takes only a short time. Getting ready to fight is a full-time, long-term, every day activity, with a multitude of tasks to be accomplished. The chain of command is what gets both things done. Time spent studying and talking about how the chain communicates will not be wasted.

Excerpted from Small Unit Leadership: A Common Sense Approach. by COL Dandridge M. Malone, (USA Ret.) by permission of the publisher, c Presidio Press, 31 Pamaron Way, Novato, CA 94947. Note: This article also appeared in Infantry Magazine, May-June 80.

STUDENT HANDOUT 2

The Multitudes of Information

Information is the soul of morale in combat and the balancing force in successful tactics. Yet in an era of warfare which is on the whole extremely enlightened, when we are so concerned for the welfare of troops that we strain our supply lines so that fresh eggs and oranges may be served in the front line during the course of the most rapid advance by field armies in history (Germany, April-May 1945), we have not found the means to assure an abundant flow of that most vital of all combat commodities--information.

It is true that we have worked marvels in furthering the rearward flow of information to higher headquarters. When a small and highly mobile force of men seized the bridge at Remagen the fact was known to the Supreme Commander, then at Rheims, within the hour. What happens in a line company is quite likely to become known to the staff at a corps headquarters 20 miles to the rear within the space of a few minutes. The rub comes of this--that in all probability it will not become known to other companies within that same battalion in the course of the same day, if at all. Yet these are the people to whom the information would be most useful.

We can look briefly at a few of the reasons for this pervading contradiction:

(1) There is lacking a general recognition of the supreme importance of the lateral flow of information.

(2) Command at the lower levels is too often neglectful of the principle that it is not a channel of information only but a distribution point.

(3) Commanders at the lower levels tend to be the arbitrary judges of what information deriving from a source lower down would be highly useful to the other elements lower down instead of abiding by the rule: when in doubt, pass it along.

(4) Inertia.

But these are by no means the full explanation. We see in battle the recurrent phenomenon of command at its various levels hard-riding the lower quarters for information until each echelon becomes so bedeviled by this nagging and incessant pressure that the mere easing of it, by whatever device or strategem, is likely to become the primary concern of each commander in his turn. He has time to think of little else. The satisfying of the higher level becomes the main object of operations.

It is the worst vice in operations and it is no respecter of persons; the victim is as likely to be a division commander as the leader of a platoon. But when it strikes through to the lowest level its consequences become intolerable and one finds it difficult to excuse the offender with the observation that the fault is in human nature. The dignity of command should require the curbing of that particular fault.

In the Pacific fighting I found company commanders joining a platoon in line just to isolate themselves from their telephones. They were literally "tired to death" of having the battalion commander insist on having a fresh progress report every fifteen or twenty minutes. And the battalion commander--poor devil--was only passing on the pressure which he had in turn received from a regimental commander who was trying to placate division. Yet one would observe that unless a battalion commander is wholly lacking in judgment or in intestinal fortitude, he should be strong enough to take this on his aching back and not pass it down to the headquarters which is at grips with the enemy.

In the Burton Island fight during the invasion of the Marshalls, one of these prodding demands for more progress raced from division right through lower headquarters to a platoon which had been stopped cold by Jap fire coming from spider holes arranged in great depth along the beach. Lieutenant B---- got the message and crawling forward to his most advanced rifleman, told him to get up and go on. The boy screamed: "So the whole god-damned Army wants to kill me, does it? O.K., Lieutenant, here I go, but watch what happens!" He was shot dead almost before he had gotten out of his tracks. That incident seared deep into the brain of every man who witnessed it. It was a final judgment on the futility of that kind of leading.

Now I would point out that the long-range jockeying of the lower echelons is not a genuine quest for information in the majority of cases. It is simply a search for mental easement via the telephone. It contributes little or nothing to understanding of the actual situation and it rarely contributes anything to tactical progress. In operations the object of any valid quest for information from the top down is to see what may be done to help. The application of a senseless pressure --and by that I mean a pressure which is at variance with the odds of the contest along the fighting line--serves only to destroy the confidence and wear the nerves of subordinates.

The all-too-frequent consequences of such pressure are lying, exaggeration, and distortion of the situation at the lower levels, resulting in a false concept of the situation at the higher. The average company commander can stand only a limited amount of this heat and then he will knock over a couple of outhouses and report that he has captured a village, or give the location of three cut-off and hopelessly placed riflemen as the approximate position of his left flank, even

though he knows that his next move will be to withdraw them if possible. The effect is to make a wishful thinker of the most objective soldier. He reasons to himself: "I'll have that position in another hour, so I'll tell them that I have it now and get them off my back." Not infrequently this pseudo-optimism defeats its own purpose, for it gives the higher command a false idea of progress and keeps the company commander from getting the help that otherwise he might have received.

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ADVANCE SHEET #11

Listening for the Commander's Intent

I. SCOPE: Understand and demonstrate active listening.

II. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

TASK: Apply communicative techniques for listening and clarifying the commander's intent.

CONDITION: Given a conference/discussion, a student workbook, and a practical exercise in which a new lieutenant meets a commander.

STANDARD: The officer will listen actively to several practical exercises and develop correct listening responses for 4 of 5 situations. Additionally, through the role playing exercise the officer will clarify expectations of the commander and the details of a unit situation.

III. INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Bring to Class:

   a. FM 22-100, Military Leadership

   b. Leadership Workbook

2. Optional Reading: Student Handout 1, "A short course in body language".

SECTION I

(IN CLASS EXERCISE)

SITUATION: You are the Task Force Engineer of a mechanized task force.

LT _____, here is a map of the maneuver area (Figure 1) for next week's wargames. Bring it back by Monday noon, and indicate on it all bridges, culverts and other things that will prevent movement of our task force (M1 tanks) over the roads in the area. I've got to know exactly which routes will allow me to negotiate the terrain otherwise the OPFOR will corner and destroy us piecemeal. You have no resource limitations in executing this mission.

REQUIREMENT

a. Develop a plan for your platoon to accomplish this mission. Write out a mission statement for your squad leaders.

b. If any table group need additional guidance to complete this mission, send one member of the group to ask for clarification from the instructor.

Friday

Scale 1km

North Arrow

Enemy expected from north

SECTION II

(IN CLASS READING)

LISTENING FOR THE COMMANDER'S INTENT

A. INTRODUCTION

The very nature of leadership demands the ability to communicate. Leadership does not occur in a vacuum, but in a world of differing people. Motivation, task accomplishment, and unit cohesion are all rooted in the leader's ability to communicate clearly, accurately, and effectively. Clarification of the commander's intent or the right response to a senior officer's request or directive is a vital ability. The right word spoken to a subordinate, at the right moment, and in an appropriate way can make all the difference in mission accomplishment and in an individual's life.

The exercises in this workbook are to provide the student the opportunity to practice important communication skills. They are designed to maximize the classroom learning environment and to facilitate communicative skills training.

The learning and refinement of these skills will increase the leader's confidence in his/her ability to communicate effectively.

B. TYPICAL COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE MESSAGES/RESPONSES TO A SENIOR

1. Placating -- so the senior person doesn't get mad.

"Whatever you say sir." or "Yes Ma'am. We can do that. No problem at all." (and knowing all the time it will take your unit the entire week-end).

2. Blaming -- so the senior person does not think we are weak or inefficient.

"It just wasn't our fault. Third platoon screwed up and we..."

3. Excuse Giving -- same as #2 above.

"But sir: We don't have the personnel or the equipment to get the job done.: (when it is really a matter of "I just don't like the idea" or "I don't want to do the task").

4. Defending -- same as #s 2 and 3 above.

"Well Ma'am, it's like this: We just had a run of bad luck -- a flat tire here, a rifle malfunction there, ..." (all the time, simply trying to cover tracks instead of admitting failure with a given task or mission).

5. Analyzing -- so the senior person will see our "logical, thoughtful, reasoning ability."

"Sir, that sure sounds like a good idea. Of course, we need to give all aspects some thoughtful consideration--weigh the merits--count the cost--look at the advantages and disadvantages... (implication--"Look how rational I am.")

6. Dumb Silence -- so as to be seen and not heard; too angry or too afraid to respond; giving assent and support by saying nothing while seething over the possible consequences and hating ourselves for being so irresponsible; confusing a false allegiance with loyality.

C. TYPICAL COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE MESSAGES/RESPONSES TO A SUBORDINATE

1. Ordering, Directing, Commanding

You must do this.

You cannot do this.

I expect you to do this.

Stop it.

Go apologize to her.

2. Warning, Admonishing, Threatening

You had better do this, or else...

If you don't do this, then...

You better not try that.

I warn you, if you do that...

3. Moralizing, Preaching, Imploring

You should do this.

You ought to try it.

It is your responsibility to do this.

It is your duty to do this.

I wish you would do this.

I urge you to do this.

4. Advising Giving Suggestions or Solution

What I think you should do is...

Let me suggest...

It would be best for you if...

Why not take a different approach?

The best solution is...

5. Persuading with Logic. Lecturing. Arguing

Do you realize that...

The facts are in favor of...

Let me give you the facts.

Here is the right way.

Experience tells us that...

6. Judging. Criticizing. Disagreeing. Blaming

You are acting foolishly.

You are not thinking straight.

You are out of line.

You didn't do it right.

You are wrong.

That is a stupid thing to say.

7. Praising. Agreeing. Evaluating Positively. Buttering up

You usually have very good judgment.

You are an intelligent person.

You have so much potential.

You've made quite a bit of progress.

You have always made it in the past.

8. Name-calling. Ridiculing. Shaming

You are a sloppy worker.

You are a fuzzy thinker.

You're talking like an engineer.

You realy goofed on this one!

9. Interpreting. Analyzing. Diagnosing

You're saying this because you're angry.

You are jealous.

What you really need is...

You have problems with authority.

You want to look good.

You are being a bit paranoid.

10. Reassuring. Sympathizing. Consoling. Supporting

You'll feel different tomorrow.

Things will get better.

It is always darkest before the dawn.

Behind every cloud there's a silver lining.

Don't worry so much about it.

11. Probing, Questioning, Interrogating

Why did you do that?

How long have you felt this way?

What have you done to try to solve it?

Have you consulted with anyone?

When did you become aware of this feeling?

Who has influenced you?

12. Distracting, Diverting, Kidding

Think about the positive side.

Try not to think about it until you're rested.

Let's have lunch and forget about it.

That reminds me of the time when...

You think you've got problems![1]

[1] Thomas Gordon, Leader Effectiveness Training: L.E.T., Ridgefield, CT: Wyden Books, pp 60-62.

SECTION III

(IN CLASS READING)

ALTERNATIVES TO TYPICAL COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE MESSAGES/RESPONSES

1. Silence --when nothing needs to be said; but not "dumb" silence.

2. Simple Acknowledgements --"I see." or "I understand." or "I can appreciate that sir."

3. Door Openers --"Sounds good. Tell me more." or "Would you like to talk about it?"

4. Active Listening --listening that interprets, clarifies, and reflects the idea, thought, feeling, or need behind a speaker's message; a response that looks for and checks out the driving force behind otherwise mere words.

RECOGNIZING ACTIVE LISTENING RESPONSES

For each of the following situations, identify the most appropriate active listening response.

1. (From a senior officer) Lieutenant, your platoon really messed up today. You were late forming the convoy, missed the SP time, and didn't keep the appropriate convoy speed or interval. I'm tired of this kind of sloppy performance!

a. "Hey sir, it just couldn't be helped. We had two flat tires and one truck stalled before we even got going. Then our radios malfunctioned and we..."

b. "We really did blow it didn't we sir?"

c. "Sir, I know we looked pretty bad. But we just haven't had time to practice. And second platoon was spread out through the motor pool..."

2. (From a senior officer) "Lieutenant, I've been giving your performance some thought, and overall I'm quite pleased. I am concerned, however, about the maintenance status of your platoon. I don't like the way things are getting done--or rather, the way things are not getting done.

a. "We could improve, couldn't we sir?"

b. (Say nothing. Just sit there.)

(Situation continued) "You better work night and day, weekends, holidays, or whatever and get that deadline rate down and get it down quick."

c. "Yes sir. We'll get it done."

d. "It's that bad?"

3. (From a subordinate) "About that letter of indebtedness, Sir. I'm not sure how it happened. I guess I just got in a little too deep?"

a. "A little too deep! Is that all you've got to say--a little too deep?"

b. "Well, I don't care what you did. Fix this matter and fix it quick. I don't want to see any more of these. Do you understand?"

c. "What do you mean by 'a little too deep'?"

4. (From a subordinate) "Sir, I don't understand. We run the wheels off our trucks just doing routine missions and now we're supposed to put them back on the road for training. They won't hold up. We've got to stop to do some maintenance sometime--somewhere--somehow. We've got to stop. When are we going to stop?"

a. "Well Sarge, I tell you. You'll have time for maintenance when hell freezes over--and not much before then."

b. "It's a kicker isn't it Sarge?"

c. "Don't ask me. Ask the CO--ask Battalion. They're the ones driving this train--not me! I'm just here following orders."

WRITING ACTIVE LISTENING RESPONSES

Write an active listening response to each situation below.

1. (From your commander) "Lieutenant, I'm concerned. You don't seem to be doing a blankety-blank thing around here. Half the time you're not <u>even</u> here and when you are I'm not sure what you're doing. What do you do anyway?"

2. (From your commander) "Lieutenant, this is going to be one busy day. The battalion commander is running in our PT formation, we have three movement missions, one platoon on post detail, I have a stack of paper work a foot high, and the 1SGT is homesick. I'm going to need your help!"

3. (From a subordinate) "Sir, it's not that I don't want to do right. IT's just--well--everytime I start out to do something, it all seems to go sour. My alarm doesn't go off or I have a flat tire on the part I try to put on truck doesn't fit, or the Platoon Sergeant's on my case about this or about that. Nothing I do seems to go right. Can you help me?"

SECTION IV

(IN CLASS EXERCISE)

PRACTICING ACTIVE LISTENING--ROLE PLAYING

Introduction

This meeting is important because it is at this time that mutual expectations are set concerning the superior-subordinate work relationship. Some of the important topics which might be discussed during the initial meeting are: (1) the manner in which the company commander plans to "break in" the lieutenant to the company's operations; (2) a description of the lieutenant's primary and secondary duties; (3) a description of those resources which will be available to assist the lieutenant; and (4) a description of the individuals with whom the lieutenant will be working. This meeting should enable the lieutenant to gain a general impression of the type of leadership which the company commander will expect from him. Typically, this will coincide with the company commander's philosophy of leadership.

This initial meeting exemplifies a situation in which good communication skills are very important. The present exercise provides an opportunity for the student to practice these skills. Below is an outline of the major points discussed in the text. All of these points should be remembered while performing the exercise.

1. Communication is a process underlying all other leadership processes.

2. Communication is normally a two-way process involving both listening and speaking skills.

3. Listening skills, which encourage the other person to speak, include being attentive, providing eye contact, having a receptive body orientation, and giving occasional nods and verbal reinforcements. Do not interrupt or "put your words in the other person's mouth".

4. Listening skills required for understanding and correctly interpreting another speaker include: listening with your eyes as well as your ears, paying attention to the tone of your voice, and asking questions for clarification.

5. Speaking skills include: speaking clearly and audibly and asking for verification.

STUDENT HANDOUT 1

A SHORT COURSE IN BODY LANGUAGE

The study of "body language" or kinesics involves nonverbal movement; shifts of posture and muscle tone; gestures of the hand and the eye. When these movements are broken down into smaller units, called "kines," it is possible to interpret and translate the nonverbal communication into a written language.

Listed below are a number of body movements and their possible interpretations. The agent should take the following precautions when applying the interpretations listed:

a. Kinesics is not an objective science--it is based on more or less subjective interpretations.

b. Look at an attempt to analyze your own body language before assessing others.

Body movement, gestures	Possible interpretations
Head or face:	
lowering the eyebrows	concentration or anger
raised eyebrows	possible surprise, enticipation or questioning
widening of eyes (pupils)	heightened interest, fear
removing glasses	withdrawal
non-committal face expression "poker face"	it <u>is</u> an expression, conscious or unconscious
closing nostrils with fingers	contempt
placing index finger alongside nose	suspicion
mouth falling open	bored
flared nostrils	hatred and aggression
cheeks sucked in	disapproving and critical of others

tongue continuously flicking teeth	sexual aggressiveness
tongue continuously licking lips	passive need to be made love to
biting lips	self-depreciation
lowering chin and looking up	coy shyness
picking face or biting nails	unsureness, negative feelings toward self

Hands or fingers

fingering collar of shirt	desire to escape
placing hand over the heart or over the upper middle part of the chest	honesty
confused and embarrassed hands	unsuccessful repressed inclination to masturbate
woman unconsciously playing with ring on her finger	possible conflict or trouble with her partner
man flicking necktie when meeting woman	sexual attractiveness (tie is a phallic symbol)
wiping under nose with finger	aggression
drumming or tapping fingers	impatience, hostility, frustration
fingers held in steepled position	superiority
hands held behind head	confidence, superiority
man running fingers through his hair	uncertainty
woman patting or touching her hair or man running a comb quickly through his hair	flirtation
woman running a comb quickly through his hair or man patting or touching her hair	blows the mind
folding hands deep in lap	defense against rejection
self-scratching, picking, squeezing	aggression, hostility

woman exposing palm of hand to man	flirtation
rubbing objects	sensuousness, reassurance
touching another constantly	lack of confidence, desire to hold on
fist pounding, fist-clenching	aggression
hand covering face	protection
self caressing, stroking	sensual personality, possible narcissism, vanity
covering eyes with a hand	fear or shame
Legs or feet	
crossing legs and arms in front	fear of human contact
foot tapping	irritation, annoyance or repressed anger
foot swing in short choppy arc	anger
curling toes upward or downward	sexual interest
restless foot movements	anxiety
Body	
leaning forward in a chair or across a table	interest, acceptance, cooperative attitude
leaning backwards	lack of interest, non-acceptance
standing rigidly with arms held away from sides in tense C curve	defensive-aggressive conflict, could also be fear of being attacked verbally by others
buttocks push out prominently	hostile sexual feelings
body pushed out in front	in women it could mean preoccupation with fertility and pregnancy
	in men it could mean subconscious desire to bear children

torso muscles sag outward from diaphram down	person possibly thinks of self as a child physically
stomach muscles held in very tightly	aggressive-defensive syndrone
shoulders slumping or sagging	probably expressing feelings of repressed hostility-withdrawing from other physically fatigue, grief, hopelessness, apathy
shoulders rigidly held	aggression, attack position
shrugging shoulders	a. to show that one cannot do something or prevent something's being done b. to accompany such speeches as "It's not my fault" c. to express patience or absence of any intention to resist d. need to get rid of something which is irritating
unbuttoning one's clothing	cooperation, agreement, possibly sexual attraction
buttoning one's clothing	rejection, withdrawal, possibly sexual defensiveness
turning body away	rejection
turning body toward	acceptance
woman moving away from a man in anger or sulking	come and make up to me

Other

artificial cough	a. often represents criticism, doubt, surprise b. calling attention to oneself c. anxiety d. could accompany a lie
yawning in company	boredom and lack of interest
sighing	anxiety

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ADVANCE SHEET #12

Counseling Communicative Skills

I. SCOPE: Understand and demonstrate the use of I-messages.

II. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

TASK: Apply some communication skills especially to speak so others understand your intent.

CONDITION: Given a classroom environment, discussion, and role playing exercises.

STANDARD: The officer will:

a. Discuss the Johari Window as a model for understanding the dynamics of self-disclosure.

b. Identify the three basic modes of communication.

c. Assess role playing situations.

d. Use I-messages to communicate thought, ideas, wants, needs, feelings, and expectations.

e. Ensure personal intent is understood.

III. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

TASK: Identify and describe the techniques for promoting, interpreting and using feedback in communication situations.

CONDITION: Classroom, student notes, and role playing exercises.

STANDARDS: The officer will identify and describe the techniques for promoting, interpreting and using feedback in each of the communication situations.

IV. INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Read: Student Handout 1, "Speaking to be Heard--I-Messages".

2. Bring to Class:

   a. FM 22-100, Military Leadership.

   b. Leadership Workbook.

3. Optional Reading: Student Handout 2, "How to Counsel".

STUDENT HANDOUT 1

SPEAKING TO BE HEARD -- I-MESSAGES

A basic requirement for an individual who is required to communicate is knowing how to deal with his own feelings and how to use an expression of feelings appropriately in the leadership role.

A brief introduction is provided that describes the use of a concept, the I-Message, as a means of improving the effectiveness of communication.

Before we can talk about the I-Message, it is important that we understand its origin. The concept of the I-Message came about to overcome the use of the You-Message. You-Messages are statements that accuse, demand or criticize another person. You-Messages are used because a person is angry, upset or frustrated and are intended to communicate feelings. Most of the time such attempts fail, because You-Messages bring on defensive or angry responses. One of the reasons we too often use You-Messages is that we are not in touch with our own feelings. However, if we are to give the I-Message correctly and it is to be an accurate I-Message, we need to know what our feelings are at that particular time. All of us feel anger, frustration, sadness, the whole gamut of emotions. We find that our behavior is influenced significantly by these various self feelings. What we say is determined by what we are feeling at the particular time. If we are to give a message to another person that is correct, so that the person will know where we are, we must be in touch with our feelings.

The process of becoming aware of our own feelings will allow us to communicate more correctly with other people. This might be called modeling the behavior; so that when we communicate with I-Messages we have modeled the kind of behavior that is expected in a particular situation. This would allow the other person also to communicate with I-Messages. If we are to communicate effectively, it will require that we know where the other person is so that we can respond appropriately. That is the object of the I-Message, which in turn expects that the other person will return an I-Message. This type of communication would move the relationship from a surface relationship, which is what normally occurs in our everyday living, to one that is more meaningful in communication.

All of us recognize that we would not want to communicate on the feeling level all of the time. There are occasions and persons with whom it would be inappropriate to attempt to create this kind of relationship. We need to decide at which time the I-Message would be appropriate and at which time it would be inappropriate. This leads us to the conclusion that we would like to be able to make a choice in the kind of message we could expect in response. However, we do not have a choice if we do not understand how we feel or what our feelings mean.

We must be aware of our feelings and be able to communicate them. I-Messages work when we are able to choose the appropriate time at which to give I-Messages and when we want them in return. Having that choice, we can communicate the kinds of messages that are most effective.

COMMUNICATION EXERCISE: WRITING I-MESSAGES

For each situation write an I-Message expressing your possible feelings (a You-Message is in parenthesis). Answers should:

Not be disguised You-Messages where you suggest a solution or a put-down.

Not necessarily accentuate the negative -- try to send positive messages.

Not be used for your feelings to punish others -- just inform them of the effects of their behavior.

1. One subordinate who is sitting next to you during a meeting is smoking a huge cigar and the smoke is blowing in your face. (Please put out your cigar!)

2. A staff member borrows your <u>new</u> tape recorder without asking. (Say, you ought to know better, please ask.)

3. A subordinate often picks his nose in public. (You aren't too cultured are you?)

4. One of your peers is responsible for making changes in the training schedule, but he often fails to tell you--and you need to know. (Dammit, can't you keep me informed?)

5. Your clerk is repeatedly making the same typing error. (Have you got some kind of psychological hangup?)

6. One of your subordinates has begun to come to work unshaven, with uncombed hair, and with dirty clothes. (You're just trying to see how far you can go, aren't you?)

7. A guest has just spilled cigarette ashes on your new carpet for the second time. (You clod! Can't you look at what you are doing.)

8. A subordinate is 15 minutes late for an important meeting. (You should be ashamed for not being on time.)

9. Your superior has just come in with another minor project for you and he never tells you which one he wants you to do first. There is no priority being set. (Hey sir, just tell me what you want done first!)

STUDENT HANDOUT 2

HOW TO COUNSEL

A critical part of a leader's job is to counsel soldiers who have problems. Effective counseling helps the soldier understand what his own problem is, then helps him get started doing something about it. The leader's goal in counseling is to make the soldier more effective on the job. The objective of all counseling sessions is to help the soldier solve his own problem. Counseling is a complex skill and is an important part of a leader's duties.

When to Do It

- When the soldier's attitude or actions have changed markedly and you think he may be having problems that require your help in solving.
- When a subordinate leader brings a soldier to you for counseling.
- When a soldier himself asks you for your help or advice.

How to Do It

- Make yourself available. Don't just schedule "open door" time or tell your men, "Come see me if you got any problems." Get out and make yourself available.
- Don't ignore or joke about soldiers with problems. Try to build a reputation of dealing with your soldiers' problems honestly and fairly and effectively.
- Listen. Stay quiet and let the soldier do the talking.
- Take your time, be patient.
- Get the soldier to state his problem specifically. Ask him, "Can you tell me more?" Tell him, "I don't understand what you mean by so and so," or "Would you give me an example of that?"
- If you think that something can be done about the problem, then work with the soldier to reach agreement on what he should do to solve it. If you don't think something can be done, tell the soldier that.
- Keep on the subject.
- Make sure the conversation focuses on what the soldier wants to talk about. Your own war stories don't usually help him very much.

- Gather as much information about the soldier's problem as possible.

- Have the soldier explain points in greater detail if necessary.

- Don't get mad or argumentative about what he says. Keep on listening. Let him talk.

- At this point, think about all you've been listening to and determine whether the soldier needs some special help. You should send him for special help only if:

  The problem is too difficult for you.

  There is a language or cultural barrier between you and the soldier.

  You think you are not making any progress.

  You think you are too personally involved in the problem.

  He obviously needs expert knowledge that you don't have.

- If you send him to someone else, then you make the appointment for him.

- Check to make sure the soldier keeps his appointment.

- Talk to him after his appointment to make sure that he believes he's getting the help he needs.

- If you work with the soldier yourself, follow up on the counseling session:

  Make sure he does those things that he has told you he would do to solve his problem.

  Require him to establish intermediate goals if necessary.

  Check on his progress from time to time. Each time, get him to talk. You listen.

How to Know When It's Done Right

- When the soldier tells you or his leader that the problem is solved.

- When the attitude or actions that first led you to suspect that there was a problem start changing for the better.

- When the soldier returns to duty from an appropriate referral agency, and there is a change in his attitude and actions.

HOW TO USE THE EER AND OER
TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE

Soldiers always want to know where they stand. Since promotion and pay are tied to performance levels, this is a particularly critical responsibility of leaders. A leader must evaluate the performance of each subordinate continually, giving him the positive and negative feedback that is necessary to improve performance. This process of evaluation and feedback is an important part of the requirement to submit formal evaluations (EERs and OERs). There are some simple rules you can follow that will help you in conducting these performance counseling sessions.

When to Do It

- When the Army personnel system requires formal evaluations of soldier performance. To wait until a written report is due, however, is an injustice to the soldier and will probably not have the desired effect on his performance. The leader should provide feedback to the subordinate regarding his performance a minimum of three or four times during the rating period. Soldiers should never be surprised by what is written on their efficiency reports.

How to Do It

- Prepare in advance by reviewing the subordinate's job requirements.
- Get facts upon which to base your overall evaluation of the subordinate's performance. Continually keeping notes on the performance of subordinates is the most effective way to do this. It is also the most fair way for your soldiers.
- Give your subordinate enough time to prepare for the counseling session.
- Set aside some private, uninterrupted time for the session.
- Welcome the subordinate. Put him at ease.
- Explain the purpose of the counseling session.
- Ask the subordinate to tell you about his own performance.
- Compare this with your evaluation of his performance. If it doesn't match up, back up your evaluation with facts. Focus on performance more than [illegible]titude.

- Get the subordinate to identify ways to improve performance.
- Make sure the subordinate agrees to take immediate specific action.
- Keep the talk positive. Don't cut the subordinate down.
- Write up your evaluation.
- Follow through on the subordinate's progress.
- Provide necessary intermediate performance feedback.

How to Know When It's Done Right

- When subordinate performance holds steady or improves.

Excerpted from Small Unit Leadership: A Common Sense Approach, by COL Dandridge M. Malone, (USA Ret.) by permission of the publisher, c . Presidio Press, 31 Pamaron Way, Novato, CA 94947.

COMMAND DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF COMBINED ARMS
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ADVANCE SHEET #13

Engineer Reaction Course

I. SCOPE: To become able to apply the decision-making process and appropriate leadership styles when responding to a specific situation in a field environment.

II. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

TASK: Apply the decision-making process and leadership skills to accomplish a mission.

CONDITIONS: In a field environment, given a leader's reaction course, and given a mission statement.

STANDARD: The student will use leadership skills to accomplish the mission. The seven step decision-making process will be used.

a. Identify the problem
b. Gather information
c. Develop courses of action
d. Analyze courses of action
e. Make a decision
f. Make a plan
g. Implement the plan.

III. INSTRUCTIONS:

1. READ: None

2. UNIFORM: Per instructions of Training Company Commander

☆U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1986-491-036/52437